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Introduction
Over the last years, the history of economics has received broad attention. 
As a side-effect of the financial crisis of 2008, much of this research has 
served a critical purpose: By investigating the history of economic thought, 
scholars aimed at unveiling how economics helped bringing into being 
the world of ruthless capitalism we inhabit. Aside from rather “popular” 
explorations in the history of economic thought, which targeted the entire 
field of economics (Sedláček 2011; Vogl 2016), the financial crisis also 
spawned a broad research on the history and impact of economic statis-
tics. Research has especially focused on the history of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). Scholars have, for example, investigated how the GDP 
became what has been called “the world’s most powerful number” and 
how it has helped making economic growth a priority among social 
scientists and politicians alike (Fioramonti 2013; Speich Chassé 2013; 
Lepenies 2016; Schmelzer 2016).
Despite this newly awakened interest in the history of economics and 
economists’ impact on economic and political decision-making, the history 
of economic forecasting has received only little attention until now. This 
finding is surprising, as economic forecasting has often been perceived as 
one of the most important fields of economic expertise (Zarnowitz 1992, 
519; Köster 2016). Also, economists’ failure to predict the financial crisis 
was one of the strongest points of public criticism towards economics after 
2008. Journalists attested economists a “collective failure,” and accused 
them of three sins: “That macro and financial economists helped cause 
the crisis, that they failed to spot it, and that they have no idea how to 
fix it” (Nienhaus 2009; “What Went Wrong with Economics. And How 
the Discipline Should Change to Avoid the Mistakes of the Past” 2009; 
cf. also Jorion 2012). These highly emotional reactions, which take the 
value of economic forecasts as a yardstick for evaluating the performance 
of the entire economics profession, is contrasted by a comparatively silent 
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stance of the scientific community. The academic interest in the history of 
economics that the financial crisis has brought about has, it seems, not yet 
spread to the field of economic forecasting. There are still very few case 
studies that investigate the creation and the impact of economic forecasts 
(Friedman 2014; Lenel 2018; J. Pietruska 2018; Reichmann 2018).
This volume is an attempt to change this. We believe that economic 
forecasting presents a unique opportunity to study the development of 
economic statistics and modelling and other forecasting practices and the 
changing relationship between economics, economic policy, and the public 
over time. Forecasting constitutes an important activity carried out by 
institutes of economic research, central banks and international organiza-
tions. Economic forecasts receive extensive media coverage and attain great 
public attention. Policy institutions and private companies rely to a high 
degree on economic forecasts. Notwithstanding the challenges and diffi-
culties economic forecasting faces, it apparently inhabits a crucial place in 
modern industrial societies. This raises pressing questions. Why does the 
reliance on economic forecasting not seem to be shattered by forecasting 
failures and the severe disappointments they yield? How do economic 
forecasting services adapt their forecasting techniques and presentations 
to practical purposes? How do they deal with wrong predictions and eco-
nomic crises? Is it true, what some critics say, that forecasters stay with 
their models regardless of empirical failure? Or are there practices of crit-
ical self-evaluation at work which contribute to the refinement and (some-
times) paradigm change of forecasting techniques? Finally, what is the 
impact of forecasts on economic expectations and behavior and how do 
the expectations of economic and political decision-makers, in turn, affect 
the epistemic process of economic forecasting?
In approaching the history of economic forecasting, we try to avoid 
what appears to us as one of the biggest problems of the research on the 
history of economics today:  The issues at play are normally discussed 
among economists, historians, and sociologists, but these disciplines rarely 
reach out to each other. Despite repeated calls for a synthesis (cf., e.g., 
Abbott 1991; Siegenthaler 1999), interdisciplinarity is more than under-
developed in this field. This is unfortunate, as a greater cooperation would 
prove beneficial for all three disciplines. Economists could gain from a 
greater historical contextualization of economic knowledge. As historians 
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and sociologists have shown, economics is not a uniform science, but 
differs among historical and geographical contexts (cf., e.g., Fourcade 
2009). Also, historians’ and sociologists’ focus on the practices of knowl-
edge production, their sites and multilayered effects, could help economists 
broaden the all too narrow perspective of the so-called Dogmengeschichte 
or History of Economic Thought (Dommann, Speich Chassé, and Suter 
2014; on the field of the history of knowledge more general, see Dupré and 
Somsen 2019). Historians and sociologists, on the other hand, could ben-
efit from economists’ broader knowledge and their better understanding of 
the relevant issues. And while historians could caution sociologists against 
drawing too broad generalizations from small sample sizes, historians, on 
the other hand, could gain from using sociological theories and models. 
This might not only counteract historians’ deplorable inclination to mar-
ginalize their own work, but also make their case studies and their under-
lying premises and methods more comprehensible and more comparable 
to others.
One of the goals of the conference “Futures Past. Economic Forecasting 
in the 20th and 21st Century,” hosted at the University of Hamburg in 
October 2018 and funded by the German Research Foundation Priority 
Program 1859 “Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of 
Economic Behavior,” was to encourage such exchanges. We wanted to 
bring together scholars from different disciplines to discuss the history of 
economic forecasting in the 20th and 21st century, its changing practices, 
its roles in society, and the multilayered interactions between forecasters, 
economic and political decision-makers and the public. The conference 
demonstrated that the different perspectives on the subject provoked 
fruitful discussions, confrontations, and clarifications of perspectives. The 
successful “experiment” of the conference motivated us to edit this volume, 
which seeks to give an impulse to a field of research which deserves more 
attention and more collaboration.
1.  A Very Short History of Economic Forecasting
People have always tried to forecast the future. For the longest time, how-
ever, the main target of prophecy were cataclysmic events in the context 
of Christian eschatology. During the 18th century, in the course of the 
 
 
Laetitia Lenel et al.14
development of a “modern” society, attempts to forecast the future became 
more important and systematic. The shift in the relationship between 
experience and expectation, which the historian Reinhard Koselleck 
described as one of the main features of the onset of modernity, brought 
about a consciousness of a future that was fundamentally different from 
the past (Koselleck 2004). The semantics of political and social communi-
cation were more and more transformed to target a future that was now 
understood as open (Luhmann 1980). At the same time, political thinkers 
started to outline conceptions about the historical development and the 
future prospects of civil society. These were not actually forecasts, as espe-
cially utopian endeavors were generally meant as a criticism of present 
conditions (Saage 1991). They did, however, constitute first attempts to 
bridge the separation of space of experience and horizon of expectation.
The late 19th century, then, saw the emergence of professional 
forecasting, as trading at stock exchanges and speculative market practices 
of all kinds grew in importance, especially in grain trade. This brought 
about a growing demand for all kinds of forecasts such as to predict, for 
example, weather conditions and market fluctuations. As Jamie Pietruska 
has shown in her work on the culture of prediction in the second half of 
the 19th century in the United States, a new quest for certainty led to the 
establishment of numerous forms of prediction. Utopian novelists, crop 
forecasters, and business prophets competed for scientific authority and 
professional credibility (J. Pietruska 2018). Interestingly, despite their dif-
ferent fields and techniques, these forecasters often shared certain seman-
tics such as a “meteorological” language, which has remained important 
in economic forecasting up to this day, thus testifying to meteorology’s 
lasting influence (Anderson 2005; J. L. Pietruska 2011; J. Pietruska 2018).
With regards to economics, the “discovery” of the business cycle in the 
mid-19th century played a major role in the development of forecasting. 
In the 1860s, the French physician and economists Clément Juglar studied 
time series of economic data and identified a cycle of roughly ten years’ 
duration. Juglar distinguished different phases of economic fluctuations, 
thereby abandoning the long-held notion of random events and shocks as 
the sole cause for economic crises (Juglar 1862). As the first to define a pat-
tern of periodic fluctuations, Juglar has been referred to as the “ancestor” 
of business cycle research (Schumpeter [1954] 1997).
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Numerous economic crises in the late 19th and early 20th century 
seemed to testify to the periodic character of economic fluctuations, 
thereby prompting economists and entrepreneurs to study business cycles 
in a more systematic fashion. The economic crisis of 1907 led to the 
establishment of a multitude of forecasting services in the United States 
(Friedman 2014). Some relied on “common sense,” extrapolations of 
past developments, or simple statistical correlations. Others claimed to 
apply sophisticated mathematical methods and models to predict future 
economic developments. The “Harvard barometer,” established in 1919, 
especially captured contemporaries’ attention for its seemingly sophisti-
cated technical approach, spurring the establishment of economic serv-
ices and institutes of business cycle research in Europe, Australia, and 
South-America throughout the 1920s (Friedman 2009; 2014; Lenel 2018). 
However, as recent research has shown, failures of the Harvard index led 
members of the Harvard group to increasingly abandon the use of the 
index in the early 1920s, instead basing their forecasts on the expectations 
and plans of American manufacturers as well as Federal Reserve author-
ities and other bankers (Lenel 2018). Widely unnoticed by the public, an 
unofficial practice of “foretalk” with economic and political decision-
makers replaced the seemingly “mechanical” means of forecasting.
The unforeseen October 1929 crash and the following Great Depression 
greatly shook the economic forecasting community. As a reaction to their 
forecasting failures and the severe loss of reputation that these failures 
brought about, forecasting services like the Harvard Economic Service had 
to shut their doors in the aftermath of the Great Depression. At the same 
time, the unprecedented economic crisis revealed the importance of eco-
nomic forecasting and prevention measures. With government interven-
tion in the economy increasing throughout the 1930s, administrations’ 
demand for economic forecasts rose.
This demand was further spurred by the publication and wide reception 
of John Maynard Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, and 
Money (Keynes [1936] 2013). The claim for deficit spending and work cre-
ation schemes to maintain economic growth and minimize price changes 
required a close monitoring of monetary, fiscal and economic conditions. 
Keynes’ General Theory therefore provided a framework to expand the 
statistical coverage and to develop national accounting systems. As a 
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reaction, the 1930s and 1940s saw a second wave of establishments of 
institutes of business cycle research in Europe and the U.S., with institutes 
becoming the nucleus for the development of empirically based and the-
oretically informed forecasting techniques to predict future economic 
developments.
Forecasting could mean very different things, though. Which time span 
should be predicted? Which data, which theories, which techniques should 
be used and applied? These were hotly debated issues in the postwar 
decades, as the somewhat dramatic American “measurement without 
theory” debate exemplifies (Koopmans 1947; Fourcade 2009, 86). With 
the IS/LM model interpretation of Keynes’ General Theory (Hicks 1937) 
and the development of dynamic macro models (e.g. Samuelson 1939) 
based on the description of business cycles as reactions to stochastic 
shocks in a system of difference equations, macroeconomic theory began 
to replace old-style business cycle theories (M. S. Morgan 2012, 217–55) 
with endogenously arising economic fluctuations. While descriptive and 
“intuitive” techniques of forecasting lost in reputation, economists began 
to model the economy as a system of simultaneous economic equations 
with stochastic influences. By manipulating their models, they could tes-
tify their hypotheses about relationships represented in the model and 
demonstrate some answer with the model (M. S.  Morgan 2012). This 
procedure promised to yield “objective” future knowledge that seemed 
urgently needed at a time of a growing quest for economic policy advice 
(M. S. Morgan and Rutherford 1998).
This quest was fostered by a growing planning euphoria. Two decennia 
of relatively stable economic growth since the late 1940s, which had 
led contemporaries in the 1960s ask if the business cycle was obsolete 
(Bronfenbrenner 1969), had created the notion of a “programmability” 
of the future (Plitzko 1964). The planning optimism was further fueled 
by the Cold War context, in which the future became a battleground as 
predictions could serve as weapons (Connelly et al. 2012; Andersson 2012; 
Seefried 2015; Andersson 2018).
In the following decade, however, sharp economic fluctuations, the “oil 
shocks” of 1973 and 1979, the “comeback” of unemployment, and the 
structural changes which were a result of industrial restructuring and a 
serious competition from East Asian countries, created a new feeling of 
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uncertainty which pushed back the optimism of the 1960s. Already in 
1971, a reviewer explained that it “is hard to imagine that the question 
of the possible obsolescence of the business cycle would be chosen as the 
theme for a conference held today” (Allsopp and Bronfenbrenner 1971, 
951). Keynesian macroeconomics came under attack, as critics blamed it 
for the phenomenon of “stagflation,” as the seemingly paradoxical coex-
istence of economic stagnation and a high inflation rate characteristic of 
Western industrial countries during this decade was called (Nützenadel 
2005). Not surprisingly, the 1970s also brought economic forecasting under 
fire, as forecasters delivered more and more false predictions (Graff 1977). 
While some observers in the 1960s had considered long-term forecasts 
of more than ten years possible, forecasters now even grappled with the 
accuracy of short-term predictions. Two phenomena were striking:  that 
forecasters had enormous problems to predict economic downswings, 
and that they had a tendency to underestimate upswings. In the German 
case, these shortcomings even led to “backbiting” from scholars of the 
German Democratic Republic, who perceived the forecasting problems 
as indicative for the unstableness of the free market system in general 
(Kuczynski 1970).
And forecasters? Critics often stated that forecasters stayed with their 
“wrong” methods at all costs and simply ignored their “failures.” The 
reality was different, though: Forecasters undertook big efforts to improve 
their methods, to broaden their statistical basis, and to develop com-
puter programs (and the appropriate computers) to process the gigantic 
data volume. Forecasters furthermore developed sophisticated evalu-
ation methods to assess and improve the quality of forecasts. Some of 
them also started to apply different kinds of forecasting techniques during 
the 1970s – especially autoregression equations  – to overcome some of 
the mentioned shortcomings. The 1980s and 1990s brought substantial 
improvements in time series methods: vector autoregressions, models for 
non-stationary data and models to handle co-integrated systems (Elliott, 
Granger, and Timmermann 2006; 2013). Although this often simply 
caused other (just different) problems, it demonstrates that forecasters 
undertook great efforts to improve their forecasts. This also entailed the 
cooperation of economic institutes and forecasting services, which led for 
instance to a “Gemeinschaftsdiagnose” (joint prognosis) by the leading 
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economic research institutes in Germany, aiming to enhance the authority 
of forecasts by achieving a consensus (Reichmann 2018, 34–35).
But fundamental problems remain (Fildes and Stekler 2002). As Tara 
Sinclair shows in her contribution to this volume, forecasters are still facing 
severe challenges when predicting economic downswings. Unfortunately, 
this is exactly what the public demands from them. But this inaptitude 
is certainly not caused by unwillingness or ideological ignorance of 
forecasters (Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof 2019). The simple truth is that 
“correct” forecasting is a very complicated, to some degree unsolvable 
task. But this has more to do with the complexity of the task itself and the 
challenges it has to tackle.
2.  The Social Fabrication of Forecasts: Some Aspects
As already mentioned, the financial crisis of 2008 also plunged forecasters 
into a crisis (“What Went Wrong with Economics. And How the Discipline 
Should Change to Avoid the Mistakes of the Past” 2009). As a reaction, 
forecasters began to overthink their forecasting habits. Some forecasters 
openly admitted that their models were unable to predict financial crises 
(Heuser 2008; Hartmann and Vogel 2010). However, the loss in reputa-
tion does not seem to have had lasting effects. As other crises before, the 
financial crisis of 2008 has not diminished the public interest in economic 
forecasts. Forecasts are still eliciting broad media coverage, and institutes 
of business cycle research are still receiving public funds. This indicates 
that the accuracy of economic forecasts is not the only criterion deter-
mining their demand. Rather, forecasting seems to constitute a dynamic 
means of observing current developments that helps actors to coordinate 
and stabilize their expectations of an uncertain future in the present. As 
the sociologist Werner Reichmann has argued, economic forecasts are 
anchored in the present, not in the future. By influencing the variables 
they predict, forecasts can validate or invalidate themselves. “True” or 
“false” are therefore no fitting categories for judging the quality of eco-
nomic forecasts (Reichmann 2018, 286).
This is of course highly controversial, as the accuracy of forecasts seems 
to constitute the most important “currency” within the field of forecasting. 
As Oskar Morgenstern has argued in 1928, “Every forecast must become 
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true, otherwise it is entirely worthless” (Morgenstern 1928, 95). But 
Reichmann’s observation rightly points to the fact that the epistemic status 
of forecasts in the social sciences is different from their status in the natural 
sciences, as economic forecasts have the potential to create the conditions 
of their own fulfillment (Morgenstern 1928, 92–108; Merton 1948, 195; 
Reichmann 2018, 286–87). They can become “self-fulfilling prophecies,” 
which the sociologist Robert Merton described as false definitions of a 
situation that evoke a new behavior which makes the originally false pre-
diction come true (Merton 1948, 195), or act as “self-disfulfilling proph-
ecies”: The prediction of a recession can lead to countercyclical measures 
by the government, thereby preventing or at least postponing the predicted 
recession.
The potential of economic forecasts to shape actors’ expectations and 
thereby influence their economic behavior makes economic forecasting 
and its potential impacts both a challenging and a highly relevant topic. 
How actors form expectations is a hotly debated question in economics, 
even more so since the 2008 financial crisis, which presented a severe 
challenge for the standard theory of rational expectations. According to 
the rational expectations theory, economic actors form decisions on the 
basis of all available information. They are therefore able, on average, to 
accurately predict the future; deviations from perfect foresight are only 
random. Recently, the sociologist Jens Beckert presented a different ac-
count of economic expectations. Alluding to the fundamental uncertainty 
of the future, Beckert described economic expectations as “communica-
tively established imaginaries” of the future (Beckert 2016, 42). According 
to Beckert, actors base their behavior on these “fictional expectations” as 
if they did actually describe future states of the world (Beckert 2014, 9–10; 
2016, 10). This allows them to act and coordinate their economic actions.
In this picture, economic forecasts play a crucial role. They offer stories 
on which economic actors can base their fictional expectations and thus 
their behavior. By this means, forecasts are persuasive and performative 
utterances that are inherently political. But forecasts are not only a means to 
create and stabilize expectations. They also provide what Luhmann called 
a “symbolic cover,” which allows actors to coordinate their expectations 
and thereby overcome the threshold of uncertainty. Only by agreeing on 
shared expectations, agents can counteract the double contingency which 
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is present in all social interactions. Forecasts thus justify and legitimate 
action despite the uncertainty of the future, thus enabling capitalism’s 
functioning (Luhmann 1995, 127–28; 1994, 74; Beckert and Bronk 2018; 
Lenel 2018, 412).
This might explain why forecasts are the outcome of not only statistical 
calculations and mathematical models, but also of an interactive negotia-
tion process. As Werner Reichmann has shown in his research on current 
forecasting practices in German-speaking countries, forecasters are embedded 
in various formal and informal networks (Reichmann 2013; 2018). They 
consult with economic and political decision-makers and, as demonstrated 
by the German Gemeinschaftsdiagnose, also with other forecasters. By this 
means, economic and political decision-makers as well as other economists 
can participate in the epistemic process of forecasting (Reichmann 2013). 
Similar networks have already existed in the 1920s, thus questioning the 
vision of a purely technical forecast, which was brought forward, among 
others, by the Harvard index (Lenel 2018, 398–405). Drawing on a term 
introduced by the American sociologist David Gibson in his research on 
political decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis, Reichmann 
describes the exchange between two or more actors about possible futures as 
“foretalk:” Here, actors negotiate their expectations to produce a consensus 
on the future (Gibson 2011b; 2011a; 2012; Reichmann 2013).
As these observations forcefully remind us, we need to rethink 
our common understanding of economic forecasts. Forecasts are not 
well-founded statements about the future, but only judgments of likeli-
hood, which are the outcome of communicative acts of imagination. As 
Jamie Morgan explained, their translation into number gives the impres-
sion of precision and thus “makes us think of economic forecasting as 
more than simply complicated guesswork, […] a science and not an art 
of numbers” (J. Morgan 2013; on the process of translation, see Svetlova 
2012). In fact, however, economic forecasts are mere anticipations of pos-
sible futures, or “foresights” (on this term, see J. Morgan 2013; Priddat 
2016). Through the process of negotiation and by being circulated, how-
ever, they can create “convergences of beliefs” and expectations and by 
that means gain currency (Arrow 1979). Their communication engineers 
agreement on a shared narrative of the future and thereby fosters the real-
ization of this version of the future (Priddat 2016).
Introduction 21
The importance of the social fabrication of forecasts should, however, 
not be overstressed. The future is not just made of expectations. There are 
“objective facts” in economic life. People have money or have not, have 
marketable goods or not, have suitable technologies at hand or not. These 
facts may be perceived as “constructed” as well, but they are, and this is 
important here, not negotiable. They simply do not change if actors have 
different expectations. They, too, influence actors’ expectations. The hard 
to disentangle mixture of economic facts and stories, material conditions 
and fabricated expectations demonstrates that economic forecasting is cer-
tainly not physics, but at the same time not made out of thin air.
Economic forecasts are the result of very different practices. They are 
derived by a set of different statistical, mathematical and social techniques, 
thus entailing both calculative and non-calculative practices. By presenting 
contributions from economists, historians, and sociologists, this volume 
wants to highlight the multifacetedness of economic forecasting. While by 
no means representative in geographical or periodical scale, this volume 
seeks to start a discussion on the multilayered, intricate practices which 
form the basis of economic forecasts and their impacts on futures past.
3.  This Volume
The contributions in this volume look at the history and present state of 
forecasting, the practices involved and the impacts they yield(ed).
Tara Sinclair opens the volume with an overview of the state and histor-
ical record of economic forecasting and an analysis of some explanations 
and the implications of this record. In her chapter, “Continuities and 
Discontinuities in Economic Forecasting,” Sinclair demonstrates that 
until this day and despite the seeming advances in forecasting techniques, 
forecasters have serious problems to predict economic downturns. As 
Sinclair argues, this finding testifies to the necessity for policy makers 
and the public to use economic forecasts with caution and improve and 
quicken their reactions to recessions as they are occurring. Forecasters, 
on the other hand, should be encouraged to publish warning signals of 
recessions in advance as the social costs of recessions are huge.
The historian Jan Logemann in his chapter, “Measuring and Managing 
Expectations:  Consumer Confidence as an Economic Indicator, 
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1920s–1970s,” investigates the origins and the application of consumer 
confidence measurements as a prognostic tool. Stimulated by a new under-
standing of consumers and their vital importance for economic growth, 
economists and market experts working in the mid-20th century devel-
oped new techniques to track consumers’ changing expectations. From the 
1950s onwards, corporate and government officials used these techniques 
to forecast and engineer consumer-driven economic growth in the United 
States and in Europe. Logemann argues that European émigré scholars 
like George Kantona played a crucial role in this development. Drawing 
on insights of continental European social and Gestalt psychology, they 
presented new ideas about the expectations of consumers and their 
impacts and developed innovative tools to measure these “soft” factors 
and derive forecasts from them. Logemann’s chapter not only sheds light 
on the origins and the history of an important forecasting variable, but 
also provides a fascinating account of the central importance of transna-
tional knowledge transfers in economics, whose history and place in 20th 
century economics is astonishingly unexplored up to this date.
In her contribution, “The economist as futurologist. The making and 
the public reception of the Perspektivstudien in Switzerland, 1964–1975,” 
historian Marion Ronca investigates the emergence and the history of the 
“Perspektivstudien” in the 1960s, which aimed at providing long-term 
forecasts of the economic development in Switzerland. As a reaction to 
the opposition of vested interests and its unique form of government, 
Switzerland had long abstained from economic planning and the devel-
opment and expansion of a statistical infrastructure. In the 1960s, how-
ever, the Swiss government assigned a group of economists headed by the 
futurologist Francesco Kneschaurek to investigate the long-term develop-
ment of Switzerland. Ronca argues that the “Perspektivstudien” excluded 
social and political factors in their outlooks and thus conveyed a new 
conception of the economy as a separated, ahistorical sphere. As such, 
the “Perspektivstudien” were contributing to widespread expectations of 
an infinite post-war prosperity that were, however, heavily shaken during 
the 1970s.
Timo Walter offers a sociological analysis of the problems of inflation 
targeting, which is premised on the assumption that future inflation rates 
can be ensured by shaping economic expectations in the present. In his 
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chapter, “The Janus Face of Inflation Targeting: How Governing Market 
Expectations of the Future Imprisons Monetary Policy in a Normalized 
Present,” Walter draws on recent interventions in the fields of sociology 
and anthropology to investigate the conditions on which the success of this 
future-oriented and expectations-based form of monetary policy depends 
and the limitations these conditions imply. Walter shows that inflation 
targeting has become an “expectations game,” which is played out entirely 
within a “present future” (the future as it is imagined and projected from 
the present) and decoupled from the “future present” as it materializes 
at a later point in time. Through increasingly sophisticated models for 
forecasting inflation, central banks can construct a present future in terms 
of which they can coordinate expectations. This procedure, Walter argues, 
is problematic as it reduces central bank’s control of the future present and 
thus their power to govern the future.
In his chapter, “Social Interaction, Emotion, and Economic 
Forecasting,” sociologist Werner Reichmann points to the social fabri-
cation of forecasting. Drawing on surveys conducted with forecasters at 
business cycle research institutes in Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
since 2004, Reichmann distinguishes two epistemic resources that help 
economic forecasters to issue forecasts despite the radical uncertainty of 
the future. First, Reichmann shows that forecasters do not work alone, but 
are entangled in a vast network of other forecasters, business professionals, 
and politicians who participate in the epistemic process of economic 
forecasting. Second, Reichmann emphasizes the vital role of emotions 
in economic forecasting. By developing a “feeling” for numbers and an 
intuitive understanding of economic trends, forecasters try to overcome 
the shortcomings of pure reasoning, economics theory, and econometric 
models. Pointing to these findings, Reichmann forcefully argues that eco-
nomic forecasting is not merely a technical matter, but also depends on 
social interaction and the mobilization of emotions.
Oliver Pilmis, too, takes a sociological perspective on forecasting. 
Contrasting Reichmann’s qualitative approach, Pilmis’ contribution, “The 
Dynamics of Expectations: A Sequential Perspective on Macroeconomic 
Forecasting,” exploits a huge database of historical inflation and growth 
forecasts and investigates the heterogeneity across forecasters by the means 
of quantitative analysis. Pilmis reaches the conclusion that economic 
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forecasting is mainly data-driven. This means that a fundamental homo-
geneity of forecasting methods and applied models exists and a certain 
characteristic of forecasts depending on the forecasting institutions cannot 
be easily identified. Interestingly, Pilmis reports a tendency for all forecasts 
under investigation to return to a certain “normal stance” in the medium 
run with higher and stronger adjustments in the short run.
The chapter by the economists Jörg Döpke, Ulrich Fritsche, and Gabi 
Waldhof, “Never Change a Losing Horse?: On Adaptations in German 
Forecasting after the Great Financial Crisis,” presents the result of a broad 
empirical survey investigating how macroeconomic forecasters have 
reacted to the dire accuracy of forecasts before and in the first phase of 
the financial crisis. Building on surveys and questionnaires among German 
forecasters in 2017, they demonstrate that despite occasionally contrary 
statements, forecasters’ behavior has changed surprisingly little since the 
financial crisis. There is, however, increased awareness of forecast uncer-
tainty. Also, forecasters whose forecasts proved erroneous in the past seem 
to be more prone to adopt other methods and theories.
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Continuities and Discontinuities in Economic 
Forecasting1
“The cost of a recession is so great that a forecaster 
should never miss one.”
Herman O. Stekler (11/4/1932 - 9/4/2018)2
Abstract: Throughout the history of macroeconomic forecasting, several major 
themes have remained surprisingly consistent. The failure to forecast economic 
downturns ahead of time is perhaps the most significant of these. Forecasting 
approaches have changed, but forecasts for recessions have not improved. What 
can we learn from past evaluations of macroeconomic forecasts? Is it possible to 
predict major economic shocks or is it a fool’s errand? This chapter discusses how 
forecasting techniques have evolved over time and yet the record on forecasting 
recessions remains dismal. There are several competing hypotheses for why 
forecasters fail to foresee recessions, but little evidence any of them are going to be 
addressed before the next recession occurs. This suggests planners and policymakers 
should expect to be surprised by the arrival of downturns and develop ways to be 
prepared for recessions without having clear warning of their coming.
Keywords: Forecast evaluation, recessions
 1 The author thanks Jacob Jones for excellent research assistance; Fred Joutz, 
Prakash Loungani, James Morley, Adrian Pagan, and Nigel Ray, for insightful 
discussions; and participants in the Futures Past: Economic Forecasting in the 
20th and 21st Century Conference at the University of Hamburg and the Second 
Macroeconomic Modelling Workshop at the University of Tasmania for helpful 
comments. This chapter is dedicated to my colleague, co-author, mentor, and 
friend, Herman Stekler, whose passion for forecast evaluation was so incredibly 
contagious. He left a lasting imprint on the profession and is greatly missed.
 2 Quote from Joutz, Loungani, and Sinclair (2015).
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1.  Introduction
One of the key tenets of economic theory is that decisions are for-
ward-looking. Economic forecasts are used in all sorts of planning and in 
particular are relevant for policymakers who are charged with preventing 
recessions. Unfortunately the record is not good for forecasting recessions. 
Ahir and Loungani (2014) and An, Jalles, and Loungani (2018) docu-
ment that forecasters have a poor record of predicting recessions across 
countries and for both private and official sectors. Does this poor record 
reveal that forecasting recessions is a fool’s errand? Or are improvements 
possible? This chapter provides an overview of the historical record of 
economic forecasting focused on recessions, considers some common 
explanations of this poor record, and discusses the implications of this 
record for future planning and policymaking.
2.  The Historical Record of Economic Forecasting
Economic forecasts before and through the Great Depression tended to 
focus on qualitative predictions: would the economy get better or worse? 
This qualitative nature made them difficult to evaluate until textual 
analysis approaches were introduced by Goldforb, Stekler, and David 
(2005) and Mathy and Stekler (2017). According to Hardy and Cox 
(1927), three common forecasting methods were used: (1) a “cross cut” 
approach of judgemental comparison and weighting of positive and neg-
ative news, (2) modeling the economy as following a regular rhythm, and 
(3) forecasting by analogy, comparing current events to past events to pre-
dict future outcomes. These forecasting approaches led to what Goldfarb, 
Stekler, and David (2005) called “egregious errors” where forecasters 
in 1930 predicted 1931 would show a recovery in the U.S. Instead the 
economy contracted for two more years.
Many new forecasting techniques have been introduced since the 
Great Depression. They have been predominantly quantitative and have 
focused on continuous rather than binary or directional forecasts. Two 
broad camps have evolved over time: (1) theory-based and (2) data-driven. 
The theory-based approaches started with large-scale macroeconomic 
models which have since been replaced by Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) models. The appeal of theory-based models is that 
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they provide structure and stories to explain the patterns in the forecasts. 
They can also be used to analyze the impact of different proposed pol-
icies on the forecasts. In terms of forecast quality, however, the theory-
based models typically cannot out-perform simple benchmarks such as 
autoregressive models (Chauvet and Potter 2013).
Data-driven approaches have focused on mostly time series econometric 
models such as autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), vector 
autoregressive (VAR), and factor models of various kinds. New techniques 
are being developed now using “Big Data,” machine learning, and arti-
ficial intelligence. Data-driven approaches, however, cannot consistently 
beat judgemental forecasts, particularly the average forecast from forecast 
surveys (Ang, Bekaert, and Wei 2007).
With all the advances in forecasting techniques, it would be reasonable 
to expect that forecasts would have improved over time. Unfortunately 
there is little evidence that there has been substantial improvement, par-
ticularly if focused on predicting recessions. The Global Financial Crisis of 
2007–2008 and the associated Great Recession took economic forecasters 
by surprise. Culbertson and Sinclair (2014) document how both private 
sector forecasters and policymakers completely failed to predict the Great 
Recession in the U.S. And this is not just a U.S. story. In a response to a ques-
tion from Her Majesty the Queen of England about why everyone missed 
the Global Financial Crisis, Besley and Hennessy wrote: “the exact form 
that it would take and the timing of its onset and ferocity were foreseen by 
nobody” (2009, page 8). Ahir and Loungani (2014) found that around the 
world, none of the 62 recessions in 2008–2009 was predicted by September 
of the previous year by the consensus of professional forecasters.
For an example of how economic forecasts perform around recessions, 
Fig. 1 presents a graph of U.S. real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
and the median of the four quarter ahead forecasts for US real GDP 
growth from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters 
(SPF). Median forecasts from surveys, particularly from the SPF, tend to 
out-perform other forecasting methods (see Ang, Bekaert, and Wei 2007; 
similar results are true for Europe using the European Central Bank SPF, 
see Genre et al. 2013). Fig. 1 shows that the forecasts perform fairly well 
outside of recessions, but there is little to no anticipation of a downturn a 
year in advance of recessions.
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Perhaps a year ahead is asking too much of forecasters, but it is a rele-
vant horizon for planning and policymaking. Even if we look at forecasts 
just one quarter ahead, forecasters miss the arrival of the downturn in the 
next quarter, although once in a recession they do adjust their forecasts 
downward. They consistently miss the turning point and the depth of 
recessions, however, even at this short horizon, as can be seen in Fig. 2.
One interpretation of these figures is that forecasters focus on predicting 
normal times and ignore recessions, at least until the recession has arrived. 
In their study of 19 advanced economies, Dovern and Jannsen (2017) pro-
vide evidence that forecasters produce forecasts that are unbiased condi-
tional on being in an expansion and therefore neglect recessions in their 
models and forecasts. Fildes and Stekler (2002) similarly conclude that 
forecasters are better when economic conditions are relatively stable. This 
might reflect the standard training for economists to fill in the status quo 
when other information is not available. Forecasting recessions may there-
fore still be out of reach for our existing models and knowledge. There 
are however, various potential reasons why forecasters consistently miss 
recessions, described in the next section.
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3.  Why Do Forecasters Miss Recessions
A number of different explanations have been put forward as to why 
forecasters consistently miss recessions. Some suggest we need better 
models or better/more timely data sources. Others suggest that falsely 
predicting a recession when one does not occur is much worse than 
missing a recession entirely, which explains why forecasters are conserva-
tive in forecasting recessions. Still others suggest that by their very nature 
recessions are inherently unpredictable.
In a sense these explanations range from optimistic to completely pessi-
mistic. The solution in the case of poor models, methods, or data is to invest 
further in these directions. The new methods and data sources coming 
from the Big Data revolution may help us to forecast future recessions. 
Historical experience, however, tempers this optimism since there have 
been substantial improvements in these directions to date without notice-
able improvement in forecasting recessions.
Despite the under-prediction of recessions, it is still a common joke 
that forecasters over-predict recessions, which suggests economists are 
very sensitive to over-prediction. For example, Paul Samuelson said in 
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1966 that the stock market predicted nine of the past five recessions.3 
This might mean that forecasters could predict recessions, but they do 
not have the right incentives to do so. If it is an issue of forecaster rep-
utation, where predicting a recession when one does not occur is more 
costly than missing one entirely, then we might see forecasters only slowly 
respond to new information, particularly around downturns. This might 
look like forecasters are smoothing their predictions over time (Nordhaus 
1987). But recent research suggests forecasters sometimes over-respond 
to new information, not always smoothing (e.g. Azeredo da Silveira and 
Woodford 2019; Bordalo et al. 2018; Messina, Sinclair, and Stekler 2015; 
Dovern and Weisser 2011). Similarly we might expect forecasters to herd, 
i.e. to produce forecasts similar to their peers, to protect their reputation. 
Rülke, Silgoner, and Wörz (2016), however, find evidence of anti-herding 
across an international set of business cycle forecasters, particularly in 
times of increased uncertainty. These findings suggest that even if we could 
find a way to change forecaster incentives around predicting recessions, 
that may not improve their record on forecasting recessions.
Thus we are left with the most dismal explanation, that recessions may 
be caused by purely random shocks, which by their nature are impossible 
to forecast (e.g. Drautzburg 2019). Consistent with this explanation, we 
see forecasters adjust their models after a downturn so that they would 
have better predicted the past, but do no better at predicting the future. 
This was particularly obvious after the Global Financial Crisis where 
forecasters added financial and housing sectors into their models so they 
would have been able to forecast the Great Recession with those models. 
Only time will tell if these improvements help predict the next recession.
To give a sense of the challenge facing forecasters, Fig. 3 provides an 
example using 3-month decline in the industrial production index. This 
 3 Samuelson, Paul (September 19, 1966), “Science and Stocks,” Newsweek, p. 92. 
Herman Stekler proudly claimed to have “predicted n + x of the last n recessions” 
(recorded by Joutz, 2010, in an interview of Stekler for the International Journal 
of Forecasting), but he saw this as in contrast to the profession that typically 
missed recessions completely. If policymakers were predicting and preventing 
some recessions then we would see a poor forecasting record coming from 
predicting more recessions than occur, but unfortunately the record is too few 
recessions forecasted by policymakers rather than too many.
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was a leading indicator originally proposed in the 1950s (Alexander and 
Stekler 1959; Stekler 1972).4 Every US recession identified by the NBER5 
is signaled by this indicator in some way, but there are both false signals 
of recession and false indications of expansions. Perhaps the most discon-
certing is that we miss the start of many recessions, not by much, typically 
just one to two months, but it suggests that we cannot breathe easy even 
when this indicator is in positive territory. Indicators are often maligned 
for falsely predicting recessions, but we might be willing to take some 
false signals if we consistently had an accurate prediction of the timing 
of recessions. Unfortunately no model, forecaster, or indicator has yet 
achieved that standard.
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Fig. 3: Industrial Production Index and Recession Signal
 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Industrial Production 
Index [INDPRO], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO, June 23, 2019. Note that because this 
series is revised, it is important to evaluate it in real time (Stark and Croushore 
2002). This simple example, however, uses the latest available data.
 5 https://www.nber.org/cycles/
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4.  Nowcasting Recessions
The record for identifying a recession once it’s occurring (nowcasting) is 
much better than predicting one even one quarter ahead. There is evi-
dence that policymakers such as the Federal Reserve are able to identify 
recessions once they are in progress (Sinclair, Joutz, Stekler 2010). Giusto 
and Piger (2017) have shown that several approaches identify recessions in 
real time. These approaches provide faster identification of recessions than 
waiting for the NBER business cycle dating committee to provide official 
classification of the turning point, but for monetary policy with its long 
and variable lags, knowing a recession is occurring only in real time may 
be too late. There are however, other policies that might work in a world 
where we can only nowcast recessions.
For example, recently there has been much attention directed to the 
“Sahm rule” based on Claudia Sahm’s proposal (Sahm 2019) to use a 
3-month moving average of the unemployment rate as a trigger for 
automatic stimulus payments. Sahm argues that an increase of 0.50 per-
centage points or more, relative to the unemployment rate’s low in the 
prior 12 months (in order to allow for changes in the natural rate of unem-
ployment), has historically only occurred during or closely after recessions 
in the US. Thus this rule does not predict recessions, but it is a simple 
and useful one to trigger automatic fiscal stimulus. This sort of policy ap-
proach can quickly react to a recession as it is occuring to offset some of 
its impact even if we cannot predict recessions in advance.
5.  Conclusion
The failure of forecasters to predict past recessions does not necessarily 
imply we will never be able to forecast recessions. It is possible that with 
further development of techniques and insights into the structure of the 
economy along with new and more timely data sources our forecasts will 
improve. But it is important for the public and policymakers to understand 
the current state of forecasting and not rely on predictions to prepare for 
downturns.
Despite advances in forecasting techniques, computational power, as 
well as data quality and quantity, forecasters continue to systematically 
miss recessions. Harding and Pagan (2016) advise that we should know 
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the limits of forecasting and focus research instead on better understanding 
the business cycle rather than trying to predict it We may need to accept 
that nowcasting recessions is the best we can do and build policy plans 
with that information in mind. As we continue to develop new models and 
methods, deepen our understanding of the structure of the economy, and 
build the quantity and timeliness of data sources, we need to continue to 
heed Stekler’s (2007) advice for evaluating forecasters and remember that 
forecasters are responding to their own set of incentives that affect their 
judgement as well as the models they choose.
References
Ahir, Hites, and Prakash Loungani. 2014. “ ‘There Will Be Growth in the 
Spring’: How Well Do Economists Predict Turning Points?” VoxEU.
Org. April 14. https://voxeu.org/article/predicting-economic-turning-
points (last access: 8/5/2019).
Alexander, Sidney S., and Herman O. Stekler. 1959. “Forecasting 
Industrial Production--Leading Series versus Autoregression.” Journal 
of Political Economy 67 (4): 402–9. doi:10.1086/258200.
An, Zidong, João Tovar Jalles, and Prakash Loungani. 2018. “How 
Well Do Economists Forecast Recessions?” International Finance 21 
(2): 100–21. doi:10.1111/infi.12130.
Ang, Andrew, Geert Bekaert, and Min Wei. 2007. “Do Macro 
Variables, Asset Markets, or Surveys Forecast Inflation Better?” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (4): 1163–212. doi:10.1016/j.
jmoneco.2006.04.006.
Azeredo da Silveira, Rava, and Michael Woodford. 2019. “Noisy 
Memory and Over-Reaction to News.” AEA Papers and Proceedings 
109 (May): 557–61. doi:10.1257/pandp.20191049.
Besley, Tim, and Peter Hennessy. 2009. “The Global Financial Crisis – 
Why Didn’t Anybody Notice?” British Academy Review 14: 8–10.
Bordalo, Pedro, Nicola Gennaioli, Yueran Ma, and Andrei Shleifer. 2018. 
“Over-Reaction in Macroeconomic Expectations.” Working Paper 
24932. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w24932.
Chauvet, Marcelle, and Simon Potter. 2013. “Forecasting Output.” 
In Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Vol. 2, edited by Graham 
 
 
Tara M. Sinclair40
Elliott and Allan Timmermann, 141–94. Elsevier. doi:10.1016/
B978-0-444-53683-9.00003-7.
Culbertson, Daniel S., and Tara M. Sinclair. 2014. “The Failure 
of Forecasts in the Great Recession.” Challenge 57 (6): 34–45. 
doi:10.2753/0577-5132570603.
Dovern, Jonas, and Johannes Weisser. 2011. “Accuracy, Unbiasedness 
and Efficiency of Professional Macroeconomic Forecasts: An Empirical 
Comparison for the G7.” International Journal of Forecasting 27 
(2): 452–65. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2010.05.016.
Dovern, Jonas, and Nils Jannsen. 2017. “Systematic Errors in Growth 
Expectations over the Business Cycle.” International Journal of 
Forecasting 33 (4): 760–69. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2017.03.003.
Drautzburg, Thorsten. 2019. “Why Are Recessions So Hard to Predict? 
Random Shocks and Business Cycles.” Economic Insights 4 (1): 1–8.
Fildes, Robert, and Herman Stekler. 2002. “The State of Macroeconomic 
Forecasting.” Journal of Macroeconomics 24 (4): 435–68. 
doi:10.1016/S0164-0704(02)00055-1.
Genre, Véronique, Geoff Kenny, Aidan Meyler, and Allan Timmermann. 
2013. “Combining Expert Forecasts: Can Anything Beat the Simple 
Average?” International Journal of Forecasting 29 (1): 108–21. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2012.06.004.
Giusto, Andrea, and Jeremy Piger. 2017. “Identifying Business 
Cycle Turning Points in Real Time with Vector Quantization.” 
International Journal of Forecasting 33 (1): 174–84. doi:10.1016/j.
ijforecast.2016.04.006.
Goldfarb, Robert S., Herman O. Stekler, and Joel David. 2005. 
“Methodological Issues in Forecasting: Insights from the Egregious 
Business Forecast Errors of Late 1930.” Journal of Economic 
Methodology 12 (4): 517–42. doi:10.1080/13501780500343524.
Harding, Don, and Adrian Pagan. 2016. The Econometric Analysis of 
Recurrent Events in Macroeconomics and Finance. Princeton University 
Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/1984459 (last access: 8/5/2019).
Hardy, Charles O., and Garfield V. Cox. 1927. Forecasting Business 
Conditions. New York: MacMillan.
Joutz, Frederick L. 2010. “Interview with Herman O. Stekler.” 
International Journal of Forecasting, Special Section: European 
Continuities and Discontinuities 41
Election Forecasting 26 (1): 195–203. doi:10.1016/j.
ijforecast.2009.12.001.
Joutz, Fred, Prakash Loungani, and Tara Sinclair. 2015. “Honoring 
Herman: A Special Section for Stekler.” International Journal of 
Forecasting 31 (1): 93–95. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.11.001.
Mathy, Gabriel, and Herman Stekler. 2017. “Expectations and 
Forecasting during the Great Depression: Real-Time Evidence from the 
Business Press.” Journal of Macroeconomics 53 (September): 1–15. 
doi:10.1016/j.jmacro.2017.05.006.
Messina, Jeffrey D., Tara M. Sinclair, and Herman Stekler. 2015. 
“What Can We Learn from Revisions to the Greenbook Forecasts?” 
Journal of Macroeconomics 45 (September): 54–62. doi:10.1016/j.
jmacro.2015.04.002.
Nordhaus, William D. 1987. “Forecasting Efficiency: Concepts and 
Applications.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 69 (4): 667–
74. doi:10.2307/1935962.
Rülke, Jan-Christoph, Maria Silgoner, and Julia Wörz. 2016. “Herding 
Behavior of Business Cycle Forecasters.” International Journal of 
Forecasting 32 (1): 23–33. doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2015.02.004.
Sahm, Claudia. 2019. “Direct Stimulus Payments to Individuals.” 
Brookings. May 16. https://www.brookings.edu/research/direct-
stimulus-payments-to-individuals/ (last access: 8/5/2019).
Sinclair, Tara M., Fred Joutz, and Herman O. Stekler. 2010. “Can 
the Fed Predict the State of the Economy?” Economics Letters 108 
(1): 28–32. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.010.
Stark, Tom, and Dean Croushore. 2002. “Forecasting with a Real-Time 
Data Set for Macroeconomists.” Journal of Macroeconomics 24 
(4): 507–31. doi:10.1016/S0164-0704(02)00062-9.
Stekler, Herman O. 1972. “An Analysis of Turning Point Forecasts.” 
American Economic Review 62 (4): 724–29.
Stekler, Herman O. 2007. “The Future of Macroeconomic 
Forecasting: Understanding the Forecasting Process.” International 
Journal of Forecasting 23 (2): 237–48. doi:10.1016/j.
ijforecast.2007.01.002.

Jan Logemann (University of Göttingen)
Measuring and Managing 
Expectations: Consumer Confidence as an 
Economic Indicator, 1920s–1970s
Abstract: This chapter explores the origins of consumer confidence measurements 
as a prognostic tool. Commercial consumer studies had gained in importance since 
the interwar decades as a “scientific” means of predicting market developments 
for corporations and advertisers. In the years surrounding World War II, govern-
ment economists became equally interested in forecasting consumer behavior. Such 
forecasts required a new understanding of consumers, their attitudes and expec-
tations, and of the role that psychological factors play in economic behavior. The 
chapter focuses on George Katona and several other European émigré scholars in 
this field to highlight the importance of transnational knowledge transfers. Finally, 
it considers consumer research as a means of economic forecasting in the context 
of attempts to socially engineer mass consumption and to “manage” consumer ex-
pectations on both sides of the Atlantic during the middle of the twentieth century.
Keywords: Consumer confidence, consumer research, George Katona, émigré 
scholars, behavioral economics, economic psychology
1.  Introduction
Beginning in the 1950s, consumer confidence measurements became a crit-
ical indicator of economic development in the United States.1 In America’s 
“consumer’s republic” (L. Cohen), economists and marketing experts iden-
tified “the consumer” as a crucial link between shifting cultural attitudes 
and social expectations on the one hand and market developments on the 
other (Cohen 2003). Accordingly, the study of consumer expectations and 
decision-making became a focal point of new research in behavioral eco-
nomics and economic psychology. Since World War II, large-scale surveys 
kept track of consumer outlook regarding individual finances and overall 
 1 This chapter draws on my upcoming monograph Engineered to Sell: European 
Émigrés and the Making of Consumer Capitalism (Logemann 2019).
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economic development. Their responses were now compiled into indices 
of consumer confidence that since have become a staple of popular eco-
nomic analysis as well. While economists debate the prognostic value of 
consumer confidence measurements, newscasts today are full of reports 
about swings in consumer confidence, especially in times of crisis.2
This chapter, however, is less concerned with the accuracy of consumer 
attitude measures for predicting the movements of business cycles or con-
sumer spending. Instead, I will ask about the historical contexts in which 
consumer attitude measurements emerged as a predictive tool. Why and 
in what ways do the middle decades of the twentieth century represent 
a point of transition for the history of economic forecasting? A growing 
interest in market studies among marketing specialists had contributed 
to the rise of consumer surveys already since the interwar years. They 
drew on early, psychologically-informed research on consumer behavior, 
which transformed prevailing assumptions about the expectations and de-
cision-making of consumers and economic actors more generally. In the 
context World War II and postwar affluence, research in consumer psy-
chology further complicated such notions of consumer decision-making 
and expanded the set of variables deemed relevant in this process. In a 
sense, these consumer researchers presaged a shift from focusing on adap-
tive and rational expectations to predict economic behavior to psychologi-
cally and socially framed “fictional expectations” that informed consumer 
behavior (Jakob, Nützenadel and Streb 2018).
Focusing on the life and career of George Katona, the economist respon-
sible for the original consumer sentiment index, the chapter highlights 
the transnational origins of consumer confidence measurements and of 
early consumer research more broadly. Katona, an émigré who came to 
America fleeing the Nazi regime in 1933, was part of a larger group of 
other émigrés who brought insights of continental European social and 
Gestalt psychology into mid-century U.S.  debates about marketing and 
economic behavior. Katona theorized about the interplay of experiences 
 2 In January of 2009 the Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index fell to 
its lowest level since 1967 which was widely reported as a sign of additional 
future woes: (Clifford 2009). For a critical assessment of the predictive value 
see Croushore (2004).
 
 
Measuring and Managing Expectations 45
and expectations of economic actors, drawing on psychological research 
to critique and supplement rational actor models of consumer behavior. 
Understanding and forecasting consumer behavior was a complex matter, 
Katona argued, involving close attention to socio-psychological dynamics.
More fundamentally, the chapter finally raises the question in what ways 
economic forecasting has been employed as a means of managing the ex-
pectations of consumers as economic actors and influencing their attitudes 
and behavior.3 Indicators such as Katona’s Index of Consumer Sentiment 
were intimately tied to corporate and government attempts at shaping and 
engineering mass consumption. Consumer research not only became a 
marketing tool for companies, but also a means to predict macroeconomic 
development used by government experts and academics. Economists such 
as Katona saw their work as part of larger social efforts to spur economic 
development and ultimately stabilize consumer capitalism. Katona was 
an outspoken champion of consumer-driven growth and he believed that 
“framing” consumer expectations was a crucial aspect of managing aggre-
gate consumer buying and demand as well as inflation (Horowitz 1998). 
In bringing consumer forecasting “back” to Germany and Western Europe 
during the postwar decades, Katona was not simply interested in transfer-
ring economic knowledge. Instead, he believed, such indicators presented 
a way of fostering a collective mindset adjusted to a dawning age of afflu-
ence in which European consumers, too, would embrace consumer capi-
talism during the Cold War.
2.  A Tool for “Scientific Marketing”: Interwar 
Consumer Research and Psychological Transfers
The growing use of market research and consumer surveys during the 
interwar years constituted one important context for the emergence of 
consumer surveys as a prognostic tool. Early, sporadic efforts by produ-
cers, retailers and advertisers to track and survey their customers in order 
to improve sales and distribution date back well into the nineteenth cen-
tury (Schwarzkopf 2016). After World War I, American marketing experts 
were actively searching for new methodological input from the academic 
 3 On the management of expectations in economic systems see Beckert (2013).
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world and calls for “Scientific Marketing” in analogy to “Scientific 
Management” built on work by scholars such as Walter Dill Scott and 
Arch W. Shaw (Kreshel 1993; Usui 2008, Ch. 3; Ward 2009). Advertising 
agencies were among the first to apply new academic concepts to practical 
marketing research. J. Walter Thompson (JWT) emerged as the prototyp-
ical full-service agency with a “scientific” approach to advertising as they 
proclaimed to their clients in 1928: “Advertising must be scientifically pre-
pared. Nothing must be taken for granted” (Kreshel 1993, 66). Predicting 
markets to plan marketing campaigns became increasingly important for 
advertisers.
At the same time, specialized market research firms began to offer 
market analyses to forecast consumer behavior. The A.C. Nielsen Company 
(est. 1923) compiled consumer demand projections based on household 
studies that asked consumer panels about what they stocked in their pan-
tries. Studies in media use for marketing purposes had been pioneered 
by the Curtis Publishing Company (Saturday Evening Post, Ladies Home 
Journal), which set early standards for consumer reception research (Root 
and Welsh 1942; Lockley 1950; Kreshel 1993). Institutions specialized in 
public opinion surveys such as the firms of Archibald Crossley (est. 1926), 
Elmo Roper (est. 1937)  and the American Institute of Public Opinion, 
founded in 1935 by George Gallup in cooperation with advertising exec-
utive David Ogilvy, also conducted commercial consumer research. The 
Market Research Corporation of America (est. 1934) likely had the lar-
gest contingent of interviewers across the United States, conducting elabo-
rate surveys and publishing the trade journal Market Research (Jones and 
Tadajewski 2011). By the 1930s, consumer research had become part of 
the American marketing landscape and its significance would only grow in 
the wake of the Great Depression.
Interwar consumer research, however, was confined to advertising 
agencies and large corporations and was not particularly sophisticated in 
its methodology. This changed over the course of the 1930s and 1940s. 
Corporate marketing specialists increasingly engaged in what they termed 
“merchandising”:  they planned products based on customer expecta-
tion and demand (Usui 2008, Ch. 4). Marketing experts envisioned a 
“new consumption era” in which the distribution of goods would be 
transformed by insights from the social sciences and earlier, “spasmodic” 
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efforts in salesmanship would give way to “more definitively and scientifi-
cally planned campaigns for the consumption of goods” (Hess 1935, 16). 
As forecasting increasingly became a business, claims to scientific exper-
tise opened doors in the corporate world. The new Journal of Marketing 
closely tracked ongoing academic consumer research across universities in 
the United States, emphasizing the connection of commercial practitioners 
to academic investigation (Taylor 1936). As marketing professor Edmund 
McGarry observed, scientific credentials created high expectations among 
businessmen: “[business men] are prone to look upon a scientific expert 
as one who has remarkable and mysterious powers of foresight […]. He 
must be a prophet who can foretell, where profits are to come from. He is 
expected to know the unknown, to foresee the unforeseeable” (McGarry 
1936, 83).
Traditional, mechanistic models of economic forecasting, however, 
did not fare particularly well during the years of interwar market crisis, 
as historian Laetitia Lenel has recently noted (Lenel 2018). Increasingly, 
companies became interested in empirical consumer research, which took 
psychological factors into account. Historians have demonstrated the 
growing influence of psychology on advertising research and the linkages 
between consumer studies and the emergence of empirical social sci-
ence research (Igo 2007; Samuel 2010). Already in the 1920s, J. Walter 
Thompson had employed prominent behaviorist psychologist John Watson 
to systematically study consumer responses to advertising. His stimulus-
response research explored the possibility of not just forecasting, but of 
conditioning consumers to react to advertising stimuli (Benjamin 2004). 
Similarly, the Psychological Corporation had been established in 1921 by 
psychologist James Cattell.4 Its “psychological sales barometer” drew on 
the expertise of 60 academic psychologists to survey changing customer 
preferences regarding various brands in an effort to systematically pre-
dict consumer behavior (Link and Lorge 1935). In this context, several 
émigré psychologists such as Paul Lazarsfeld, Ernest Dichter and George 
Katona from Vienna, Berlin and elsewhere in Europe were able to bring 
 4 Cattell had been a student of German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig. 
On consumer research before and during the Great Depression see Igo (2007) 
and Robinson (1999, 15–18 and 39–63).
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new insights from European individual, social and Gestalt psychology to 
American consumer research.5
The émigrés contributed to a transnational exchange between academic 
and commercial research, which allowed them to shape American con-
sumer psychology (Kasserdjan 1994). They helped push the field beyond 
behaviorist assumptions of stimulus and response mechanisms, which 
largely left actual decision-making processes as a “black box.” Much 
like theoretical economists, the psychological behaviorists had subscribed 
to a theory of “adaptive expectations,” which assumed a linear connec-
tion between past experiences (stimuli) and expected behavior (response). 
Building on insights from the émigrés, this notion was increasingly made 
more complicated in three ways:
 1. Depth psychology:  systematic research into (conscious and subcon-
scious) motives by Lazarsfeld and others increasingly opened up the 
“black box” of decision-making processes.
 2. Social psychology: the social context in which stimuli were processed 
and endowed with meaning received more scrutiny e.g. through the 
work of émigré psychologist Kurt Lewin.
 3. Cognitive (Gestalt) psychology: The research of émigrés such as Kurt 
Koffka, Wolfgang Köhler and Max Wertheimer directed attention 
towards cognitive processes and the perceptions and misperceptions of 
stimuli as they informed decision-making processes (Logemann 2017).
Consumer expectations (and, by extension, their decisions and future 
behavior), these psychologists argued, could not be understood as a simple 
function of past experiences or of present conditions such as income. 
Instead, the way consumers made choices regarding the future was 
informed by a complex interplay of conscious and subconscious motives, 
of the social dynamics in which information was received and decisions 
processes took place and, last but not least, of the cognitive processes 
which (mis)guided human perception. Taken together, these three strands 
of psychology influenced by émigré scholars informed the way American 
consumer research began to reevaluate the connection between experiences 
 5 On interwar market research in Vienna see Fullerton (1990) and Fullerton 
(2013).
 
 
Measuring and Managing Expectations 49
and expectation in consumer behavior. When the American Marketing 
Society published its first handbook on The Technique of Marketing 
Research in 1937, for example, Viennese émigré Paul Lazarsfeld contrib-
uted several chapters (Wheeler 1937). Beyond the field of marketing, too, 
the academic input of European émigrés contributed to the transformation 
of prevailing perceptions of consumers and to the study of their motiv-
ations, attitudes and social dynamics, which could help understand and 
predict consumer behavior.
3.  Consumer Expectations and Decision-Making: George 
Katona and Wartime Attitude Research
During World War II, state actors and economists similarly developed 
an interest in surveying and predicting consumer behavior. Their war-
time studies provide another important context for the emergence of con-
sumer forecasting, and émigré psychologist George Katona came to play 
a prominent role in efforts to predict and control home front consump-
tion. Along with Kurt Lewin, Katona was instrumental in transforming 
ideas regarding the social psychology of consumption. He focused on 
the formation and impact of consumer attitudes on inflation and mac-
roeconomic development. Both Katona and Lewin came from within the 
larger orbit of the Berlin Institute for Experimental Psychology where Max 
Wertheimer and Kurt Koffka had been leading protagonists of Gestalt psy-
chology before fleeing to the United States during the 1930s (Mandler 
1969). Katona applied their research to problems of the psychology of 
mass consumption during the war, contributing to the U.S. government’s 
fight against inflation.
An early exponent of behavioral economics, George Katona’s work 
challenged prevailing assumptions of consumers as “rational actors” 
by highlighting the role of psychological attitudes in economic deci-
sion-making. His career was both transatlantic and genuinely interdisci-
plinary, moving between the fields of psychology and economics. He was 
born in Budapest in 1901 where he enrolled in the University in 1918, 
but moved to Germany not even a year later after the revolutionary gov-
ernment of Bela Kun had come to power. Katona earned his doctorate 
in psychology at Göttingen University, developing an interest in sensory 
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perception and the work of the Gestalt school (Katona 1924). He subse-
quently moved to Frankfurt where he continued his research in experi-
mental psychology, but also worked for a commercial bank at a time of 
severe economic strain in Germany. The experience of the 1923 hyperinfla-
tion was formative for Katona’s pursuit of economic psychology, because 
it led him to explore what he saw as an intimate connection between eco-
nomic developments and the collective psychology of economic actors. 
In Berlin, where he had moved in 1926, Katona continued to pursue his 
dual-track career in psychology and economics:  he remained an exper-
imental psychologist studying and working with Max Wertheimer and 
Kurt Lewin, but also developed a second career as a financial journalist 
for Gustav Stolper’s Der Deutsche Volkswirt. Long before his emigration, 
Katona had thus begun to think about the relationship between social psy-
chology and economic behavior.6
During the war, properly forecasting inflation presented a challenge 
to U.S. economists and Katona brought Gestalt psychology into the field 
of economics to address this problem. He had emigrated to the United 
States following the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. Struggling to estab-
lish himself in American academia, Katona and Stolper initially joined a 
New  York investment office, which advised European investors on the 
U.S.  market. Through fellowships and a lecturer position at the New 
School’s “University in Exile,” Katona also stayed in close contact with 
Max Wertheimer while working on the psychology of learning from a 
Gestalt perspective (Katona 1940). With the advent of the war Katona 
returned to the interplay of psychology and economics. Émigré economist 
Jacob Marschak invited him to Chicago where Katona conducted surveys 
for the Committee on Price Control and Rationing as part of the so-called 
Cowles Commission. Here, he used detailed interviews with opened-ended 
questions to probe business and retailer reactions to price controls and 
inflation (Katona 1945).
In 1942, Katona published War without Inflation, a book-length essay, 
which argued for the importance of utilizing psychological insights to ad-
dress problems of the war economy (Katona 1942). Drawing on his prior 
 6 On Katona’s life and career see Horowitz (1998), Curtin (1984), Freie Universität 
(1982), and Strumpel et al. (1972).
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economic work in Germany as well as on more recent work in the psy-
chology of learning he argued for the potential of managing consumer 
expectations through “social framing” as discussed by Kurt Lewin. In 
his social psychological experiments conducted in exile in Iowa, Lewin 
had demonstrated that perceptions of and reactions to various stimuli 
depended on the “social field” and on the “frame of reference” in which 
they were received. The impact and meaning given to a message directed 
at consumers, for example, thus varied according to the social and cultural 
context in which it was embedded. Its effect depended on the way the mes-
sage was framed and on the means by which it was communicated (e.g. 
Lewin 1943a). Katona’s study now claimed that it was possible to avoid 
inflation, if the necessity of economic measures was properly conveyed to 
the public, which would adapt its economic expectations and consumer 
behavior to match wartime conditions. Favorably received by American 
economists and marketing experts for its methodological innovations, the 
book spoke to an overarching interest in shaping consumer behavior to 
meet wartime needs (Katona 1942).
Wartime studies directed at the consuming public and home-front pro-
paganda efforts still count among the largest attempts in mass persua-
sion in American history.7 Between 1942 and 1945, the U.S. government 
spent over $200  million on propaganda activities at home and abroad 
(Glander 2000). State agencies became involved in surveying consumer 
behavior and molding consumer opinions and expectations. As hundreds 
of social-scientists moved to Washington, D.C., the number of researchers 
employed by the federal government almost doubled during the first six 
months of the war and included leading communications scholars such as 
Harold Laswell, Hadley Cantril, and Samuel Stouffer. Commissioned and 
coordinated especially by the Office of War Information (OWI), survey 
research reached new qualitative and quantitative dimensions (Converse 
1987; Sudman and Bradburn 1987).
In the context of the war, many were eager to employ consumer psy-
chology in social engineering efforts. Public relations experts, however, 
grew increasingly skeptical towards simplistic assumptions about the 
 7 On the home front experience in comparative perspective see Berghoff, 
Logemann and Römer (2017).
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impact of propaganda on malleable “masses.” Instead, consumers came 
to be seen as part of diverse and socially contextualized groups, which 
were not as easily swayed by mass media messages. As in market research, 
communications scholars increasingly understood consumer behavior 
and attitudes as complex phenomena. Forecasting audience behavior thus 
required more sophisticated models that incorporated an understanding 
of changing attitudes, expectations, and social dynamics. This, too, was 
part of broader transatlantic exchanges in the social sciences as Viennese 
émigrés around Paul Lazarsfeld not only offered new survey methodolo-
gies to probe motivations. They also contributed to a new understanding 
of communication flows to consumers, which emphasized the “lim-
ited effects” of mass media messages and their social mediation through 
“opinion leaders” (Lazarsfeld and Katz 1955; Fleck 2011). Lazarsfeld’s 
wartime research research helped him develop these very insights. He 
served as a consultant to the Research Branch of the U.S. Army’s Division 
of Morale as well as to the OWI’s Bureau of Intelligence (and to its prede-
cessor, the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF)). As a group, wartime social 
researchers advised on survey studies and on forecasting and manipulating 
civilian morale (Converse 1987, 162–65).
Consumer attitudes and expectations presented a central object of this 
research on home front morale and behavior (on attitude research: Jahoda 
and Warren 1966). Katona’s studies on inflation dovetailed nicely with the 
survey work of Paul Lazarsfeld and other scholars studying the U.S. war 
economy. With its emphasis on “framing” public opinion to influence 
inflation, War Without Inflation immediately caught the attention of 
Lazarsfeld. Katona’s suggestions about survey methodology with regard to 
attitudes and expectations, he observed in a 1942 memo to OFF staff, “go 
beyond the things we thought of ourselves” (Lazarsfeld 1942). A couple 
of years later, Katona, too, moved to Washington to join the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics’ (BAE) Program Surveys Division, directed by the 
social psychologists Rensis Likert, which conducted research on consumer 
attitudes towards household spending and saving and towards food con-
sumption, two core concerns to home-front management efforts.
Predicting consumer behavior became one aim of government survey 
work that interlinked with broader development in consumer research. 
Research on the Treasury Department’s war bond sales conducted by 
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Lazarsfeld’s Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, 
for example, was later used as a model for forecasting buying behavior 
more generally (Garon 2011, 204–10). Rensis Likert, who had received 
his Ph.D. in psychology from Columbia University in 1932 for a study on 
attitude measurements, also came to the BAE with experience in commer-
cial market research (Likert 1932). During the 1930s, he (like Lazarsfeld) 
had been affiliated with the Psychological Corporation. Indeed, Likert 
was well acquainted with Lazarsfeld and much of his approach to detailed 
interviews and open-ended survey questions was developed in exchange 
with Vienna émigrés (Lazarsfeld 1961). As Likert moved to the BAE in 
1939, he pushed for an expansive survey program that soon went beyond 
strictly agricultural questions. By 1942, his agency conducted thirty-seven 
“special” studies on a variety of other wartime issues for agencies ranging 
from the OWI and the Treasury Department, to the War Productions 
Board and the Office of Price Administration (Likert 1942). Survey topics 
ranged from “Attitudes toward Buying and Shortages of Consumer 
Goods” (Program Survey Division 1943) to “What Housewives Eat for 
Breakfast” (Program Survey Division 1944). Their studies sought to 
understand the American consumer’s views on rationing and shortages, 
they asked about future buying plans and about assessments of the cur-
rent situation.
The BAE studies emphasized the importance of attitudes and expecta-
tions and the necessity of “understanding” consumer perspectives towards 
“sacrifice.” George Katona initially worked on BAE surveys of the use 
of wartime incomes, which were conducted at request of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve (Campbell and Katona 1946). The 
household surveys sought to capture both economic and psychological 
data with a mix of quantitative (statistical area sampling) and qualita-
tive (open interviewing) approaches. Katona’s surveys asked how savings 
habits were acquired and how future spending behavior could be predicted. 
He emphasized the importance of segmenting consumers, for example, by 
paying special attention to affluent households. Their attitudes towards 
saving and spending not only differed from the rest of the population, 
Katona argued, but they had the most significant impact on the sale of 
war bonds and on overall domestic economic development during the war 
(Katona and Likert 1946).
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Understanding consumer attitudes could help to predict as well as 
to shape consumer behavior. Building on the surveys he had conducted 
in Chicago and at the BAE, Katona theorized about the importance of 
studying attitudes and expectations for economic policy formation. In 
contrast to stimulus-response models of mass communication, Katona 
proposed to involve audiences and consumers in an active learning pro-
cess. Citing Gestalt psychologists Wertheimer and Koffka, Katona em-
ployed their insights on cognitive processes along with Lewin’s concept 
of social frames of reference to understand the formation of consumer 
expectations and attitudes: “All experience is organized within a frame-
work. A stimulus does not give rise to an isolated experience; the meaning 
of the stimulus changes according to the greater whole of which it is part” 
(Katona 1944, 342). Consumer expectations thus crucially depended on 
the social and cultural contexts in which they arose. What consequences 
a stimulus (such as e.g. a change in prices or income) would have for con-
sumer actions could differ depending on the circumstances and the way 
such a stimulus was framed.
For (wartime) consumer research to impact aggregate behavior, Katona 
believed, the task was to make people think in “appropriate frames,” 
bringing about a genuine understanding of “changed field conditions.” Such 
an “appropriate frame” of reference could be that of a war economy with 
shortages and a threat of inflation, requiring consumers to limit their spending 
and to save. In a postwar economy by contrast, Katona believed consumers 
would need to learn continuous spending to ensure sustained growth: “The 
task of the teacher and the molder of public opinion is, then, to help the 
public to gain a general orientation for war and for post-war conditions” 
(Katona 1944, 346). Katona thus proposed to use the insights of psychology 
to socially engineer consumer behavior on a macroeconomic level. The ana-
lytical and prognostic tools he developed in the context of the war economy 
would come to full fruition during the era of postwar affluence.
4.  Framing the Affluent Society: Consumer 
Sentiment Surveys as Behavioral Economics
In the context of the postwar consumer society, predicting consumer 
behavior was first and foremost a tool for increasing sales. Corporate 
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efforts in market and consumer research expanded, building in part on 
wartime studies. Paul Lazarsfeld stressed the insights of wartime research 
in a 1952 speech before the American Marketing Association. People were 
affected by mass media differently depending on the personal environ-
ment in which they found themselves, he noted, and they received the con-
tent of mass media messages not directly, but rather secondhand through 
so-called “opinion brokers.” Directors of advertising, he warned, were 
“not sufficiently aware of how greatly people are influenced by the groups 
in which they live” (Lazarsfeld 1952). By the 1950s, consumer researchers 
in advertising institutes and corporate marketing departments increasingly 
sought to forecast consumer decisions and future buying behavior both 
in terms of social dynamics and of psychological motivations and frames.
Economists and government offices interested in macroeconomic 
steering and the development of aggregate demand equally furthered 
their efforts in surveying consumers. George Katona now emerged as a 
leading expert on consumer sentiment and a champion of psychologically 
informed “behavioral economics” in the United States. Postwar economic 
growth, he believed, required a thorough understanding of how changing 
consumer attitudes impacted macroeconomic trends and growth. Now at 
the University of Michigan, he refined methods to forecast and predict 
changes in consumer spending, focusing on the role of expectations, deci-
sion-making and the socio-psychological framing that contributed to it. To 
Katona, consumer sentiment measurements not only presented a way to 
track consumer attitudes but also to engage prevailing consumer mindsets, 
adjusting them to, what he believed, would be an era of almost boundless 
growth and prosperity. Attitudes of optimism, Katona felt, would lead to 
increased economic confidence and growth, which his surveys were meant 
to study and foster.
With the end of the war, Katona and many of Likert’s former staff moved 
to the University of Michigan’s newly-founded Survey Research Center 
(SRC). The group brought with them several contracts from Washington, 
including the Federal Reserve survey on economic behavior and motives. 
These wartime survey studies provided the organizational and methodo-
logical foundation for one of postwar America’s most influential centers 
for empirical social research (Frantilla 1998). In 1949, the SRC was joined 
with Kurt Lewin’s Research MIT Center for Group Dynamics to form the 
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Institute for Social Research at Michigan (Lewin 1943b). At the univer-
sity, George Katona held a dual appointment as professor in economics 
and psychology, and he initiated the “Economic Behavior Program” to 
pursue a comprehensive set of consumer attitude studies, which included 
the “Survey of Consumer Finances” (conducted for the Federal Reserve 
until 1971).
A new, recurring “Survey of Consumer Attitudes” was introduced by 
the SRC for the Department of Commerce. This study asked representative 
samples of households about their perceptions and expectations regarding 
their own finances, the general state of business, and of overall economic 
development. Initially, the survey was based on personal interviews with 
respondents selected through random area sampling. By the 1960s, tele-
phone interviews were included and beginning in 1978, the survey was 
conducted through a random digit dial process. Respondents were part of 
revolving panels and thus confronted repeatedly with the same qualitative 
questions about their expectations regarding their own personal finances, 
their overall economic outlook and their plans for major outlays such as 
housing, automobiles, major durable purchases (Curtin 1982). Utilizing 
this data, Katona’s team began to calculate an index to predict consumer 
behavior in the near future. First published as the “Index of Consumer 
Sentiment” in 1952, it later became part of the Commerce Departments’ 
Leading Indicator composite index.
While Katona and his colleagues touted the reliability of their index to 
track and predict business cycle swings, the method faced critical scrutiny 
from the start. In 1955, the Federal Reserve board appointed a committee 
to assess the quality of the data, which produced a rather skeptical report 
regarding its predictive qualities (Dominitz and Manki 2004). During the 
early 1960s, too, several economists cautioned against a heavy reliance on 
the Michigan index (e.g. Juster 1964). For marketers, the index frequently 
proved too general to make specific predictions about consumer spending 
changes with regard to specific markets of products. It contained a sea-
sonal bias (with April and October as recurring high- and low-points of 
consumer expectations) and did not differentiate between different market 
segments and target groups within an increasingly differentiated con-
suming public. Still, many others saw value in the index’ seeming ability to 
forecast recessions or dips in growth about six-months out; and by 1967 
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the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index was established as a 
second rivalling prognostic tool (Linden 1982). Similar to Katona’s survey 
in its overall approach, the new index asked a bit more concretely about 
personal purchase intentions and differed slightly in the way the index was 
calculated.
The basic premise of these consumer confidence indices was the same, 
however:  to gauge attitudinal factors that would help predict consumer 
ability and willingness to spend. Projections based on income and the 
ability to spend or extrapolations of past behavior, Katona believed, 
were not sufficient to forecast consumer spending if they left aside cur-
rent expectations and attitudes informed by persistent cultural frames as 
by recent political events (Katona 1975, 61–83). Consumer sentiments, 
he believed, were highly situational and needed continuous monitoring 
through surveys. Whether in the context of wartime shortages or under 
conditions of postwar affluence, the consumer’s “frames of reference” 
needed to be assessed and then adapted whenever necessary. Referencing 
Kurt Lewin’s concept of “life-space,” Katona sought to reconstruct con-
sumer perceptions of the present and the past in order to predict future 
behavior: “The immediate purpose of psychological studies and of eco-
nomic surveys as well is diagnostic:  we want to obtain as complete an 
account as possible of the current situation, and this account must include 
people’s expectations, aspirations, plans, fears and many other for-
ward-looking (ex ante) variables” (Katona 1949). On the macro-level, 
his interest in forecasting consumer behavior based on psychological data 
played into the hands of Keynesian economists concerned with steering 
levels of inflation or aggregate demand. On the micro-level, marketing 
experts similarly paid attention to Katona’s efforts to analyze the psycho-
logical dispositions of American consumers. Their attitudes, expectations, 
and experiences were now seen as relevant variables in understanding pur-
chasing decisions (Pratt 1972).
In many ways, George Katona was an early proponent of behavioral 
economics, which seeks to bring insights from cognitive psychology to 
problems of economic decision-making (Hosseini 2011). The conventional 
“rational actor” models of neoclassical economists, he believed, needed 
to be augmented with sociological and psychological assumptions about 
group norms, attitudes and individual motivations (Katona 1947). Much 
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like later behavioral economists, Katona disagreed with the notion of 
consumers as cost-value optimizers whose behavior could be easily delin-
eated from a simple set of variables such as income and price incentives 
(Sent 2004; Heukelom 2014). Katona’s (1951) Psychological Analysis of 
Economic Behavior argued that attitudes and expectations formed on the 
basis of an complex interplay of variables rather than mere physical needs 
or available income became increasingly important in determining house-
hold spending patterns as consumers in affluent societies enjoyed more dis-
posable income. Rejecting behaviorist stimulus-response models in favor 
of Lewin’s social psychology (stimulus  – organism  – response), Katona 
analyzed decision-making processes which had long been a “black box” 
to psychologists and economists alike by introducing motivations and 
attitudes as intervening variables (Katona 1951).
Already in a 1946 article in the American Economic Review (AER), 
Katona had called on economists to improve their conception of the inter-
play of experiences and expectations in forecasting economic behavior by 
integrating social and cognitive psychology findings into their research 
(Katona 1946). Consumers, he again emphasized drawing on insights 
from his empirical survey work, were imperfectly informed and par-
tially impulse-driven, mirroring notions of “bounded rationality” which 
emerged around the same time (Simon 1955; Edwards 1954). Economic 
theory needed to do justice to the complexity of human decision-making in 
preparing prognostic models. Consumers were able to learn and to change 
their behavior and economic modelling had to take account of this in 
Katona’s view: “How can [traditional] theory be improved?” he asked in 
another AER article in 1968, “One possible way is by making the under-
lying assumptions more realistic. The introduction of principles of social 
learning and of expectational dynamics into economic theory promises 
progress in this direction” (Katona 1968a, 19–20; Katona 1968b, 149). 
While largely ignored by economists at the time, this behavioral perspec-
tive increasingly informed marketing scholarship and departments, con-
sumer activists as well as government regulators.
Katona’s work on consumer attitude surveys exemplifies what mar-
keting scholar Harold Kassarjian has called a “cognitive revolution” in 
American consumer research during the postwar decades (Kassarjian 
1994). During the 1950s and 1960s, a wealth of publications attested to 
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a broad-based social-scientific interest in consumer behavior, increasingly 
intertwining social science and marketing research (Festinger and Katz 
1953; Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg 1955). Marketing science opened itself 
up to new behavioral research first in specialized journal articles and, by 
the 1960s, increasingly in encompassing surveys and edited volumes in-
tended for classroom use (Blankenship 1949; Clawson 1949; Brown 1950; 
Alderson 1952; Heller 1956; Cox et al. 1964; Newman 1966). European 
émigrés contributed prominently to this shift. The Gestalt theorists, Kurt 
Lewin’s social psychology and especially George Katona’s economic psy-
chology informed a new cohort of consumer researchers in the United 
States interested in sensory perception as well as in the social fields and cog-
nitive frames of reference within which such perception took place. They 
brought experimental research designs to the marketing field and com-
bined this approach with mathematical models and statistics (Kassarjian 
1994, 271–72; Pietrykowski 2009, 54–78). A massive 1960s anthology 
of Consumer Behavior and the Behavioral Sciences, for example, prom-
inently featured the research of émigré scholars with contributions from 
George Katona, Paul Lazarsfeld, Kurt Lewin and many others (Britt 1966). 
Through a wider range of psychological approaches and through a more 
complex understanding of consumer behavior they fundamentally altered 
consumer forecasting during the middle of the twentieth century.
5.  Framing and Managing Expectations in the 
Cold War: More Transatlantic Transfers 
of Consumer Survey Methodology
If consumer confidence was “a key to the economy” as Katona claimed, 
it was also a fickle friend (Katona 1960). His research cast doubt on exu-
berant expectations of Keynesian macroeconomic steering that reliable 
predictions of consumer behavior were possible by simply using a few 
long-term indicators. The inclusion of rather volatile consumer attitudes 
in his surveys, he argued, instead allowed his index to out-perform other 
indicators in times of crisis, e.g. in forecasting the economic recessions 
of the early 1970s. Yet, consumer confidence was not simply ephemeral 
in Katona’s assessment, but rather based on relatively stable dispositions 
rooted in the social basis of a society. Thus, Katona, the longstanding 
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analyst of American consumer psychology, also turned to the compar-
ative, transatlantic inquiry of reactions to affluence during the postwar 
decades. Katona, I argue, regarded his social science methodology as a tool 
in winning Europeans over to American-style mass consumption, and to 
manage and adapt consumer expectations during the Cold War.
Promoting mass consumption as a crucial element of the “American Way 
of Life” was an important focus of the Cold War social sciences (Solovey 
and Craves 2012). Few scholars were more vocal in their enthusiasm for 
the American consumer citizen than George Katona (Katona and Mueller 
1953; Katona and Mueller 1956; Horowitz 1998). Fostering consumer 
confidence and its underlying attitudes towards acquiring new goods were 
vital to consumer capitalism as Katona observed in 1960: “Lasting pros-
perity calls for sustained high demand [… and for] general striving for 
higher standards of living […]. Prosperity requires self-reinforcing opti-
mistic attitudes based on sound reasons” (Katona 1960, 173). His atti-
tude research and the work of fellow economic psychologists advanced 
this agenda: “Consumer psychology, by providing a better understanding 
of the factors on which consumer demand depends, will contribute to 
ironing out excessive economic fluctuations and to assuring a greater rate 
of growth in our economy” (Katona 1961). Consumer research, Katona 
and many of his colleagues believed, served a larger public purpose.
This broader social impact of his work became especially significant 
with regard to postwar Europe. Katona returned to Europe several times 
during the early 1950s as a government advisor for consumer research. 
He surveyed research institutes at the behest of the American govern-
ment, helping to assess the state of market and opinion polling in postwar 
Germany. Because of his prior work in Germany, Katona observed in 
one report, German people, “usually, talked to me without considering 
me a representative of the Occupation Authority or a foreigner” (Katona 
1950c, 1). Participating in international conferences during the postwar 
decades, Katona also built up numerous academic connections, including 
financial economist Günther Schmölders in Cologne who shared his 
interest in “behavioral economics” and in the psychological determinants 
of economic development (Schmölders 1971). Translations of several of 
his major works appeared with the German publisher Econ-Verlag, which 
also translated books by émigré motivational researcher Ernest Dichter 
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in an effort to make American consumer modernity accessible to German 
readers (Katona 1962a; Dichter 1964).
Returning émigrés and exiles were particularly influential as facilitators 
of transatlantic transfers during postwar reconstruction in the early years 
of the Cold War (Krauss 2001; Krohn and Schildt 2002). Emigration 
scholars have demonstrated that West-German society was transformed 
in numerous fields with the help of returning émigrés whose work was 
frequently tied up within larger American reconstruction and reeducation 
efforts sponsored by the U.S. State Department or organizations such as 
the Ford Foundation (Berghahn 2002; Bauerkämper 2005; Hesse 2008). 
As they returned to postwar Europe, émigré consumer researchers felt 
they came back with new insights to share, touting the achievements of 
American scientific marketing, which – with their active involvement – had 
blossomed over the course of the 1930s and 1940s. Historian Nepomuk 
Gasteiger finds that returning émigrés were instrumental in dissemin-
ating an understanding of consumers as members of discreet sociolog-
ical market segments whose behavior was influenced by psychological 
desires and motivations to be explored and exploited by marketing experts 
(Gasteiger 2010, 19 and 32). Katona in particular helped to bring behav-
ioral approaches back to Europe, familiarizing colleagues on the continent 
with the marketing applications of Lewinian social psychology (Gasteiger 
2010, 142–43). In a keynote address at a 1950 Frankfurt conference on 
opinion research, Katona discussed recent “American” achievements in 
the field of opinion research. He stressed the importance of behavioral 
and attitude research in American consumer studies. Citing Kurt Lewin’s 
insights into group dynamics along with wartime motivation and attitude 
surveys, Katona offered his German audience the prospect of democratic 
consumer research contributing to economic growth and a coming age of 
mass consumption (Katona 1950a).
This was not a simple story of “Americanization,” however, as German 
consumer research dated back to the interwar years and had expanded 
under the National Socialist regime (Wiesen 2011; Hirt 2013). After the 
war, these researchers were not always eager to embrace methodological 
innovations from across the Atlantic. Indeed, Katona encountered resis-
tance to new methodologies perceived as “American” in the social sci-
ences, as he reported to the Allied High Commission. “Germany is, of 
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course, different from the United States,” was one objection Katona would 
hear from his German colleagues who tended to prefer qualitative studies 
to the more empirical “American” approach he offered (Katona 1950b). 
When Katona studied German survey research organizations in 1950, 
he found their number to be “surprisingly large,” but most were small, 
underfunded, and methodologically not quite up-to-date by American 
standards (Katona 1950c). Still, postwar European consumer research 
was frequently intertwined with political reconstruction efforts during the 
Cold War. The well-known Allensbach Institute highlights this intersection 
of consumer surveys with political attempts to shape a new consuming 
public (Brückweh 2011; Schwarzkopf 2012).
Consumer confidence and expectations in many European countries, 
however, appeared to be “lagging behind” in optimism compared to the 
United States in the eyes of contemporary observers. Katona worried 
that European consumers had not yet adapted to a mind-set of affluence, 
which, he feared, could present a major obstacle to continuous growth in 
Western Europe. In surveys of buying plans, for example, the acquisition 
of consumer durables was apparently not as important to West German 
consumers during the postwar decades as to their American counterparts. 
Indeed, plans to make “major outlays” for consumer durables actually 
declined among West German households after the late 1950s from 84 % 
in 1956 and 69 % in 1962 to as low as 54 % in 1967 according to one 
study. When asked “why not” buy more, more than half of West German 
consumers (especially middle class households of salaried employees, civil 
servants and professionals) stated that they “ha[d] everything” while less 
than 20 % stated lack of money as the reason. In the even more affluent 
United States, by contrast, cars and new houses topped the Christmas wish 
lists during the 1950s (Jacobs 2005, 249). Katona wrote drawing on his 
survey findings that there was “no indication of any increased feeling of 
saturation on the part of the American people” (Katona, Strumpel and 
Zahn 1971, 70–72).
George Katona therefore saw it as his mission to persuade Europeans 
to adopt a frame of reference and attitudes towards consumption, which 
he considered to be more “appropriate” for affluent societies. In this, 
changing European attitudes towards consumer credit was a crucial 
step, as he explained at a 1962 Eurofinas credit conference in Vienna. 
Measuring and Managing Expectations 63
Consumer financing, he believed, helped consumers to better budget their 
finances and to “raise their level of human aspirations” to ensure future 
prosperity through consumption driven growth (Katona 1962b). In con-
trast to optimistic Americans striving for more and more goods, Katona 
found Europeans to still be “maladapted” to modern mass consumption. 
Psychologically, he noted as late as 1970, Europeans had an “apprehen-
sive” and “defensive” posture towards consumption. The American émigré 
therefore collaborated with European colleagues to analyze what they saw 
as a “gap between the reality of a rapidly developing mass-consumption 
society [in Western Europe] and its perception by the people” (Katona, 
Strumpel and Zahn 1971, 173–78).
In this context, Katona’s index of consumer sentiment ultimately 
found its way across the Atlantic. During the 1960s, the Gesellschaft für 
Konsumforschung in Nürnberg (GfK) and the DIVO Institute had already 
conducted sporadic surveys of consumer sentiment. In 1972, the European 
Community introduced surveys of consumers in 12 European countries 
based on the methodology of the Michigan survey. In Germany, the quar-
terly survey with twelve questions is today still conducted by the GfK, 
which calculates the so-called Konsumklimaindex based on its results 
(Caspers 1992). While these consumer attitude surveys were initially less 
publicly prominent than in the U.S. and some methodological differences 
remained, their arrival speaks to the way to which Western European 
societies, too, increasingly began to understand themselves as mass con-
sumer societies by the early 1970s (Fabian 2016; Köhler 2018). Here, too, 
“the consumer” (and his or her psychological dispositions) now increas-
ingly became a central figure when it came to understanding the economy 
and predicting its future development. The consumer researcher Katona 
rejoiced in 1971 that the material conditions had changed tremendously in 
Western Europe: “Economic development is now much more than before 
determined by the behavior of consumers [and especially by] their wishes 
and desires” (Katona, Strumpel and Zahn 1971, 12).
6.  Conclusion
Since the 1970s, the prognostic prowess of traditional consumer senti-
ment measurements has declined somewhat as markets became even more 
 
 
Jan Logemann64
differentiated and more volatile than in the immediate postwar decades. 
Recently, new tools such as Google trends have outperformed survey-
based indicators of consumer behavior in predictive accuracy (Schmidt 
and Vosen 2009). Still, consumers and their attitudes and expectations 
remain an important aspect of economic forecasting. The emergence and 
enduring success of consumer attitude measurements during the second 
half of the twentieth century, this chapter has suggested, has to be under-
stood within several larger contexts.
First, how and with what indicators economic forecasting was conducted 
needs to be historicized. In the context of the rise of the mass consump-
tion society, both “the consumer” as an economic actor and disposable 
household consumption came to play such a significant economic role, 
that economic forecasting needed to incorporate a gauge of present and 
future consumer activity. Both corporate and government interests drove 
the development of consumer research in the United States, which was 
marked by a mid-century caesura during the 1930s and 1940s. The expe-
rience of crisis of the Great Depression as well as the home front needs of 
World War II spurred on more systematic research into consumer attitudes 
and expectations. This research came to fruition during the postwar 
“consumer’s republic” when consumer psychology and behavior research 
informed both corporate marketing and macroeconomic forecasting.
Second, the example of consumer confidence measurements underscores 
the degree to which economic forecasting was part of an increasing 
scientization of social and economic process in the mid-century decades 
of “high modernity” (Brückweh et  al. 2012; Logemann, Cross and 
Köhler 2019). Consumer research promised to provide seemingly predic-
tive and “scientific” data on the development of consumer markets. On 
the one hand, this was part of a broader search for predictability within 
corporations and state organizations during these decades. On the other 
hand, there was a distinctly political and ideological dimension to the rise 
of consumer confidence measurements. That economic forecasting can be 
tool for subtly shaping consumer behavior appears obvious in the context 
of corporate marketing. The case of Katona suggests that forecasting can 
also be seen as part of more comprehensive efforts in social engineering in 
the context of economic policy making during World II and the Cold War. 
Rather than outright manipulation, however, Katona used his consumer 
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attitude surveys in an effort to involve consumers as market participants in 
an active learning process. By changing their frames of reference he hoped 
to influence as much as forecast future economic developments. In this, 
Katona and his fellow consumer researchers engaged in managing expec-
tations in the way recently discussed by economic sociologist Jens Beckert.
Third, the quest to manage markets not only led to the professionaliza-
tion of consumer research, but also to numerous transnational exchanges 
that defy simplistic notions of “Americanization.” European émigré 
scholars in psychology, sociology and other behavioral sciences informed 
the increasingly complex and psychological approach to consumer 
research of U.S.  corporate and government institutions. After the war, 
they helped transfer new research concepts and methods back to Europe. 
Katona’s contributions to early behavioral economics through insights 
from social- and Gestalt-psychology speak to this process of transatlantic 
knowledge exchanges, which was more reciprocal and multifaceted than 
often assumed.
The development of the consumer sentiment index, finally, is part of a 
larger story about a changing understanding of the dynamics of markets 
and the economy. Properly forecasting economic developments, the atti-
tude research suggested, needed to take social and psychological dynamics 
more comprehensively into account. In this, it went beyond the more 
mechanistic models of interwar economic forecasting and the simplistic 
assumptions of early stimulus-response behaviorism. While one should 
be weary to speak of “scientific progress,” consumer research certainly 
became more rigorous and refined in its methodology e.g. with regard 
to surveys. Through the work of Katona, Lazarsfeld and many others, 
the field betrayed a much greater reflexivity and awareness with regard 
to behavioral factors and social dynamics as they relate to economic and 
market developments. Through his work on wartime inflation and on 
postwar buying, George Katona in particular emerged as an early theorist 
of the interplay of experience and expectations. Building on his empirical 
research, he sought to bring a more sophisticated understanding of the 
social and cognitive contexts and of the various intervening psycholog-
ical stimuli, which informed consumer decision-making, into economic 
modeling. While he may have not had the impact on economic theory 
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afforded to later behavioral economists, Katona’s work can still offer val-
uable insights on this relationship as it relates to economic forecasting.
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The Economist as Futurologist: The 
Making and the Public Reception of the 
Perspektivstudien in Switzerland, 1964–1975
Abstract: In the 1960s, long-term studies of the future that forecasted the develop-
ment of a country became fashionable in the Western world. Whereas certain coun-
tries prioritized a multidisciplinary approach, in which both economic development 
and social change were taken into account, others only considered the development 
of economic variables and in particular economic growth. The Perspektivstudien, 
which projected the future of Switzerland 30 years ahead, focused solely on the 
economic development of the country, implicating that political events had no 
impact on economic development in the long run. This contribution traces back 
the conceptualization of the economy as a separated sphere that was inherent to the 
Perspektivstudien and investigates the historical context in which they were created. 
This chapter shows that to understand the emergence of those studies, Keynesianism 
has to be taken into account as a governmentality in which the idea of a macroeco-
nomic controllability prevailed. Furthermore, the contribution suggests to concep-
tualize those long-term forecasts not as mere descriptions of possible outcomes, but 
as performative economic knowledge that invented an a-historical future.
Keywords: Long-term studies, Swiss economy, history of economic thought, 
performativity of economic knowledge
In 1968, the Swiss government assigned the economist Francesco 
Kneschaurek to analyze and forecast the economic development of 
Switzerland up to the year 2000.1 This assignment laid the basis for the 
Perspektivstudien, which asked for a study group to investigate the “ideal 
and long-term” development of Switzerland. The motion also pointed to 
the necessity of a general planning of the country, but it remained ambiv-
alent whether the requested studies should forecast or suggest concrete 
goals for planning the country’s future.2
 1 Pressemitteilung der Schweizerischen Bundeskanzlei vom 21. Februar 1968, 
BAR E1010B#1986/151#181#.
 2 Motion Borel (97170), vom 18. Dezember 1964, BAR, E1070#1974/32#1080*.
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In an international context, neither the mandate nor the ambivalence 
of the request were exceptional. In the course of the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II and the rise of macroeconomic governance, pla-
nning and forecasting became intertwined and widely accepted practices 
of economic policy3 (Laak van 2010, 4). At the same time, futurology as 
an interdisciplinary approach to investigate the future gained momentum 
at the end of the 1950s, which caused a growing interest in long-term 
studies of social and economic development (Seefried 2015). Despite the 
fact that futurology had its origins in the humanities, a strong connec-
tion between economic planning and futurology became apparent at the 
beginning of the 1960s. This was most notably in the case of France, 
where economic planning had been known since the end of World War 
II. In 1962, the Commissariat du Plan asked the “Groupe 1985,” which 
included experts from distinct fields such as economics, medicine, agricul-
ture, business and construction, to determine the most important features 
of the French economy and society by the year 1985 (La Documentation 
française 1964). Under the impression of lasting economic growth, the 
French planning horizon was pushed from five years up to twenty years. 
Moreover, by commissioning an interdisciplinary group to investigate 
the future of the country, the Commissariat du Plan considered planning 
no longer only as a means to achieve macroeconomic goals. Instead, it 
was also envisioned to anticipate the challenges of social change4 (Quinet 
1990, 44–46).
In the case of the United States, in the “Commission on the Year 2000” 
presided by the sociologist Daniel Bell, the interest in economic develop-
ment was less pronounced. The study group rather focused on long-range 
social questions and possible shifts of values (American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences 1968). Other countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, 
and Switzerland, however, strongly prioritized the long-term economic 
 3 According to Dirk van Laak, the idea of planning as a state practice appeared in 
the context of the authoritarian High Modernism, that is from the beginning of 
the 20th century to the end of World War II, encompassing both world wars and 
the great depression and spread after 1945 in the context of the reconstruction.
 4 Whereas the first plan contained no macroeconomic goal, the plans from 1954 
to 1957, 1957 to 1961 and 1962 to 1965 asked for economic growth amongst 
others.
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and demographic development5 (Steinmüller 2000, 41–42; Seefried 2015, 
313–24). As those studies had a long-term perspective they were– despite 
their economic focus  – forced to make assumptions about the overall 
development of the country. They had thus to consider also the possible 
change of non-economic factors or to conceptualize social change as the 
result of economic development. In Switzerland, Francesco Kneschaurek, 
who was mandated with the long-term study to the year 2000, chose the 
second option. This decision was not only motivated by the final parlia-
mentary request, which asked for prioritization of the economic develop-
ment, but was also in line with Kneschaurek’s professional convictions. He 
relied on Neoclassical theory to make assumptions about the future, which 
traditionally conceptualizes non-economic factors either as constant or as 
exogenous6 (Persky 1990). In both cases, the economy is treated as a sepa-
rate sphere that is supposed to evolve following inherent principles and is 
only sparsely affected by socio-political events.
The Perspektivstudien are a suitable research topic to historicize the 
emergence of long-term forecasts in the 1960s that focused primarily on 
the development of the economy. They enable historians to problematize 
the neoclassical concept as a general framework in long-term studies and 
to analyze its implications regarding processes of self-reflexivity in modern 
societies. Accordingly, this contribution traces the origins of the conceptu-
alization of the economy as a separated sphere and shows its crucial role 
in the design of the Swiss Perspektivstudien. Furthermore, this chapter 
investigates the historical context in which the Perspektivstudien were cre-
ated, the political setting and the processes that led to the mandate and the 
 5 In the Netherlands, the economist Jan Tinbergen directed the Centraal 
Planbureau and started in 1955 to realize future studies. The German govern-
ment mandated the private company Prognos that was specialized in economic 
forecasting for studies about the development of the German population and 
economy.
 6 Classical economists adopted the term “ceteris paribus” first used by William 
Petty in the 17th century to make clear that they assumed “all other things” that 
is non-economic factors that account for social change to be constant. It was 
then spread by Alfred Marshall in his Principles of Economics. Correspondingly 
Robert Solow conceptualized technological progress in his neoclassical growth 
model as exogenous to avoid formalizing it in purely economic terms.
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publication of the studies. By this means, the article aims to provide a better 
understanding of the overall emergence of long-term studies in the 1960s. 
Finally, the contribution explores the impact of the Perspektivstudien 
shortly before and during the recession of 1975 in order to explain the 
effect of this specific type of economic knowledge in the 1970s.
1.  The Economy as a Separated Sphere
The conceptualization of the economy as a separate sphere is of vital 
importance to understand the emergence of long-term studies focusing on 
the macroeconomic development in the 1960s7 (Morgan 1990; Armatte 
1992; Tooze 2001; Friedman 2014). Whereas it contributed to a specific 
understanding of social change during the 20th century, in which the idea 
of a development towards modernity was emphasized,8 the conceptual-
ization of the economy as a distinct sphere was itself the consequence 
of a momentous socio-political change:  the rise of capitalism. As Ellen 
Meiksins Wood argues in her seminal essay “The separation of the ‘eco-
nomic’ and the ‘political’ in capitalism,” classical economics emphasized 
the economic aspects of capitalism over the social aspects, thereby “emp-
tying capitalism of its social and political content” as it dealt with society 
in the abstract (Meiksins Wood 1995, 19, 22). Karl Marx, by contrast, 
considered the economy as a set of social relations and accordingly the 
mechanism of surplus value as a particular social relation between “appro-
priator and producer” (Meiksins Wood 1995, 21, 24). As Meiksins Wood 
argues, Marx’ conception of the economy did not deny that the rise of 
capitalism was accompanied by a process of differentiation of the eco-
nomic sphere, in which production and distribution increasingly assumed 
an ‘economic form’ that Karl Polanyi later on qualified as disembedded 
 7 In contrast with long-term studies, short-run economic forecasts go back at least 
to the 1920s when numerous business cycle institutes and economic services 
released forecasts on a regular basis.
 8 This idea of an overall development of mankind towards modernity appears 
particularly clearly in Walt Rostow’s “The stages of economic growth” in which 
the author conceptualizes social change as a mutual reinforcement of techno-
logical progress and increased economic output leading to new social forms 
(Rostow 1960).
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from social structures. However, Marx regarded this process as a histori-
cally specific development that could only be understood by considering its 
social meaning (Meiksins Wood 1995, 25, 28).
Whereas classical economics mainly relied on the idea that the economy 
could be differentiated from the social sphere as a means to understand the 
functioning of markets, this conceptualization was put to a next level with 
the emergence of marginalist and neoclassical economics, in which the 
economy became further formalized strengthening the idea of economic 
laws9 (Taylor 1929, 4–8; Hodgson 2013, 30–31). The idea of a universally 
valid description of market mechanisms remained, however, contested, as 
the Methodenstreit between Gustav Schmoller und Carl Menger in the 
1880s and 1890s showed. Whereas the former argued that the economy 
generally takes a specific historical form reflecting power relations and 
institutions, the latter claimed the existence of universal economic laws. 
The Methodenstreit addressed the question whether empirical or deduc-
tive methods are better suited to describe the economy, but pointed also 
to the role of history in the development of economy. The prevalence of 
the deductive approach, as it finally materialized in modern mainstream 
economics, strengthened the belief in universal economic laws and led, as 
Geoffrey Hogdson argues, to the spread of the conviction that markets 
and the economy as a whole can be explained without taking historical or 
cultural specificities into account (Hodgson 2001).
It can be assumed that the conception of a separated economic sphere 
was originally methodically motivated by the notion of the historical spec-
ificity of economic development and the interdependence, respectively the 
distinction of social and economic factors, which appeared as far too com-
plex to be taken into account. As institutions and the political balance of 
power could be considered as stable in the short-run, this heuristic was 
helpful to understand the functioning of markets and methodically ac-
ceptable as a simplification. Applied in the long-run however,10 as can be 
 9 Whereas the idea that economic actions are ruled by “natural laws” can be 
traced back to antiquity but remained implicit in the classical writings, it became 
explicit by the marginalist and neoclassical endeavor to formalize economic 
behavior such as scientific laws.
 10 A long-run economic development is considered as a period of one or several 
decades.
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found in growth models after 194511 (Solow 1956; 1957), the conceptu-
alization of the economy was no longer a simple heuristic but became a 
deterministic assumption about economic development and gained thus 
a strong ideological component. It is no coincidence that those growth 
models, whether they were Keynesian or neoclassical, emerged in the con-
text of Keynesianism, that is an era, in which the idea of a controllability 
of the economy spread and economic interventionism became generally 
accepted12 (Hall 1989; Schanetzky 2007, 87, 169; Schmelzer 2016). As 
growth models reduced long-term growth to the outcome of economic 
variables, they did not only perpetuate the conception of the economy 
as a separated sphere but became part of the Keynesian governmentality 
(Foucault und Lemke 2005, 1759:171–72).13
With the rise of Keynesiansim, the general understanding of the function 
of economic knowledge changed (Mitchell 2008).14 It was no longer 
 11 Whereas the Harrod-Domar model treated long-term growth as the outcome of 
investment and capital stock, the Solow-Swan growth model added technical 
change as explanatory variable to the Harrod-Domar model. But Solow treated 
technical change as a residual and did not further conceptualize it or investi-
gate its origin. The model remained thus stuck in the general framework of a 
separated economic sphere.
 12 Many Western countries applied Keynesian principles of anticyclical demand 
management to different degrees and at different points in time depending on 
their institutional setting, their political agenda and not last the status and 
influence of economic experts. However, as a significant number of countries 
adhered somehow to policies inspired by Keynesian theory and identified with 
the growth policy of the OECD that presupposed the possibility of growth pla-
nning, a general belief in the controllability of the economy can be assumed for 
the three decades after 1945.
 13 The term governmentality refers here to the Foucauldian concept of an ensemble 
of institutions, procedures, analyses and ideas that secure and perpetuate an 
economic order and legitimize specific policies. Whereas Foucault spoke of a 
governmentality of neoliberalism to point in particular to the aspect of the indi-
vidual internalization of neoliberal values, I argue that Keynesianism, too, can be 
considered as a governmentality in the Foucauldian sense, since the prevalence 
of Keynesian policies cannot be explained only by Keynes’ theoretical concepts. 
However, it also has to be understood as the convergence of different ideas, values, 
and technologies of the nation state that gained momentum after World War II 
such as national accounting, unemployment assurance, economic planning etc.
 14 According to Timothy Mitchell “the economy” was invented as an object only 
mid-20th century. Although this article doesn’t follow Mitchell’s claim of the 
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perceived solely as academic descriptions and explanations of markets, 
but became increasingly understood as a strategic means to improve the 
functioning of the economy at a national scale.15 This new understanding 
augmented the «performative» power of economic knowledge, that is its 
ability to influence the way the economy and more generally reality was 
perceived (Callon 2006, 7, 8, 21).16 In this new understanding and by the 
increased application in politics economic knowledge became popularized. 
However, beyond academia economic knowledge circulated in a reduced 
form. In particular, the methodological considerations and restrictions 
that a had led to a conditional acceptance of the conceptualization of the 
economy as a separated sphere were no longer explicit. Thus, the idea 
that the economy could be understood in itself without considering social 
forces and historical processes became increasingly taken for a fact rather 
than a contestable methodological position.
The spread of the concept of the economy as a separated sphere during 
Keynesianism affected not only how the economy was perceived, but 
also the general understanding of the future, changing its meaning from 
an uncertain horizon to a projection screen. As such it altered also the 
meaning of history. Since the future was no longer uncertain, history as an 
unpredictable event became associated with the idea of a planning error, 
that is an outcome that could have been avoided. In 1970, the Swiss phi-
lologist Karl Schmid argued along those lines when he stated: “Geschichte 
erscheint nun beinahe als eine illegitime Kategorie, die durch planendes 
Denken eliminiert werden sollte. Ausdrücke wie ‘Macht des Schicksals’, 
‘Gesetz der Geschichte’ und ähnliche sind heute kaum mehr angängig. 
late invention of “the economy,” it shares its understanding of the increased 
meaning of economic knowledge in the context of Keynesinism when it became 
increasingly used in a strategic way and in the believe that the economy could 
be managed in the way of a company.
 15 The idea that economic knowledge could be used a strategic means emerged 
with early concepts of scientific management already at the beginning of the 
20th century. With Keynesianism the concept that economic knowledge could 
be used to regulate and plan the economy spread at a national level.
 16 According to Michel Callon’s concept of performativity economic concepts 
should be understood as programs altering the way how reality is perceived and 
thus changing the way actors behave.
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Geschichte war einmal; was vor uns liegt, soll nicht Geschichte sein, deren 
Objekt wir wären – man will die Zukunft in den Griff bekommen und 
steuern können” (Schmid 1971, 707).
2.  Future Perspectives for an Economically 
Underexplored Country
For Switzerland, the Motion Borel that requested long-term planning of 
Switzerland’s future and led to the subsequent Perspektivstudien, was a 
novelty in many ways. Up to the end of the 1960s, neither economics nor 
future studies had played a major role in the guidance of Swiss economic 
policy. Switzerland had not developed explicitly interventionist economic 
policies up to this point. Due to its corporatist and federalist form of gov-
ernment applying the principle of subsidiarity, the Swiss Federal state 
developed political instruments for demand management only slowly, and 
with a considerable lag, in comparison to other European countries. Up 
to the end of the 1970s, the competences of the state regarding the orga-
nization of the economy remained limited to the prevention of economic 
downturns and the fight of already on-going recessions (Prader 1981).
The constitution of the Swiss federal state and its limited economic 
competences explain largely why Switzerland had not founded a fed-
eral institute for economic observation before the 1930s. The 1932 es-
tablished commission for economic observation (Kommission für 
Konjunkturbeobachtung KfK) worked only part-time and was essen-
tially trying to find an agreement amongst its very different members that 
ranged from officials from different departments to representatives from 
trade associations and unions. Economists from academia were underrep-
resented during in the first two decades, not at last because there was – 
due to the restricted interventionist competences of the government – only 
little use for economic expertise. Furthermore, the lack of economic sta-
tistics made it very difficult for the KfK to keep pace with the economic 
observation as it was practiced on an international level.
Especially the absence of production statistics, which were not intro-
duced in Switzerland before the 1980s, made it almost impossible for 
economists to get a real-time sense of the “pulse” of the Swiss economy. 
And it prevented the implementation of national accounts according to 
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the international standard System of National Accounts that provided an 
internationally standardized template for national accounts and the cal-
culation of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for decades. The absence 
of production statistics was less due to a lack of demand, but the result 
of a political power struggle between representatives of the state admin-
istration (especially of the Bundesamt für Statistik) and members of trade 
associations that had fought it very successfully since the 1920s. Thanks to 
their traditionally strong position in politics that eventually granted them 
a voice in legislative affairs, trade associations repeatedly managed to pre-
vent the introduction of productions statistics (Ronca 2020).
Finally, another factor contributed to the fact that economic observation 
and forecasting developed with a considerable lag in Switzerland. Because 
of its marginal position and the lack of relevant statistics, economic 
observation remained a small academic niche with very little competition 
among economists. For decades, a single name dominated Swiss economic 
observation: Eugen Böhler. The economist at the Federal Institute for tech-
nology in Zurich (ETH) was a distinguished expert for economic policy 
and in particular for economic observation. Böhler, who was member and 
later on president of the KfK, founded a center for economic observation 
at the ETH in 1938 that rapidly took over the economic observation that 
formerly had been supplied by the KfK. Being member of almost all federal 
commissions concerned with economic policy, Böhler had a strong influ-
ence on the Swiss government and on the perception of the business cycle 
from the 1940s up to the end of the 1950s (Prader 1981, 189). Böhler 
started his career with a strong disposition towards theory and scientific 
progress. Throughout the 1950s, he continued to expect an imminent 
economic downturn17 (Kommission für Konjunkturbeobachtung 1957; 
Prader 1981, 189–92). Due to his influence inside the state administration, 
Böhler’s belief in the imminent return of the economic crisis of the 1930s 
 17 Böhler was among the first Swiss economists to embrace John Maynard Keynes’ 
General Theory and to promote keynesianism within the KfK. Although Böhler 
made hardly no original contribution to economic theory he kept up with the 
development of economics, taking up new economic theories and methodolo-
gies. This became amongst others apparent in his text book he continuously 
revised.
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contributed strongly to a political culture of crisis expectation. For a long 
time, this culture prevented the perception of the economic expansion of 
the post-war era18 („Bericht des Schweizerischen Bundesrats über seine 
Geschäftsführung im Jahr 1965“ 1965, 232, 239, 287).
The misinterpretation of economic expansion as a short-term boom that 
was supposed to last only for a couple of years became apparent only at 
the beginning of the 1960s. Estimations of the state department of public 
finances showed that state income and state expenditure had repeatedly and 
systematically been underestimated due to the expectation of an economic 
downturn or at least a “normalization”19 (Jöhr 1966, 11–12; Kleps 1967, 
7, 31; Eisinger 1998, 72–73). Moreover, the existing infrastructure of the 
country proved to be less and less adapted to meet the needs of a growing 
population and the expanding business activity. This situation explains why 
no less than three parliamentary requests submitted in 1964 were concerned 
with the long-time consideration of the country’s economic future. While 
the “Interpellation Schürmann” suggested a long-term finance policy, the 
“Motion Heil” requested a long-term economic policy. The “Motion Borel,” 
finally, called for a study group to investigate the long-term problems of the 
country.20
The coincidence of the three parliamentary requests could be explained 
by a late and somehow brutal awakening of the country from its post-
Great Depression trauma to face the challenges of growth. This interpreta-
tion, however, would not sufficiently take into account that the demand for 
“long-term” forecasting emerged internationally almost at the same point 
 18 This culture of crisis expectation appeared distinctly in the figure of the deputy of 
work provision. This role had been institutionalized during the great depression, 
but remained in place up to the mid-1960s when it finally became converted 
into a deputy for economic fluctuation since the lasting economic growth made 
the role of a deputy for work provision appear superfluous.
 19 This misperception of the economic development became particularly apparent 
when the state department of public finances underestimated repeatedly state 
income as expenditure.
 20 Interpellation Schürmann vom 23. September 1964, Nationalrat Herbstsession 
1964, BAR E6100B-01#1980/#198*, Nationalrat. Herbstsession. Motion Heil. 
Langfristige Konjunkturpolitik, in: Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, 
1964, 406, Motion Borel vom 18. Dezember 1964, BAR E1070#1974/32#1080*.
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of time.21 Because of the lack of forecasting and planning in Switzerland 
up to this point, the Perspektivstudien, which emanated from the “Motion 
Borel” could not rely on pre-existing practices. This permits to analyze 
the emergence of these long-term studies as a specific historical moment 
when the development of the economy was established internationally as 
a leading variable for the overall future of the country.
3.  The Motion Borel: Between Planning and Forecasting
While the “Interpellation Schürmann” and the “Motion Heil” had a clear 
economic focus, the “Motion Borel” as it was submitted to the Ständerat22 
a couple of months later in 1964, was not restricted to economic questions. 
In his request to the Council of States, Alfred Borel rather emphasized the 
general difficulty of the country to meet the different political, economic 
and social challenges of the present and the future. He highlighted the 
need for important investments to improve the country’s infrastructure, 
its educational system, water protection as well as the development of 
nuclear energy. To determine the order of priority, the motion asked for 
a study group that should investigate the broad lines of an optimal long-
term development.
The request did not explicitly mention future or prospective studies, as 
they were called in France since the end of the 1950s to distinguish them 
from short-term and extrapolative forecasts (Steinmüller 2000, 41). The 
wording of the request, however, suggests that Borel had the academic 
work of the French futurologists Betrand de Jouvenel and Gaston Berger 
in mind, whose work he cited in a newspaper article from 1967 (Borel 
1967). As the request brought up issues from different political fields, it 
was at first not clear which department of the federal administration had 
to answer it. It was eventually passed to the Finance and Customs depart-
ment of the federal administration since it emphasized the importance of 
future investments.23
 21 See introduction and footnote 8.
 22 The Ständerat is the upper house of the Federal Assembly of Switzerland.
 23 Stellungnahme des Finanz- und Zolldepartements zur Motion Borel betreffend die 
Schaffung einer Arbeitsgruppe zum Studium der langfristigen Landesprobleme, 
23.01.1967, BAR E1070#1974/32#1080*.
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When the request was discussed in the Ständerat, it became clear that 
Borel had an almost exclusively economic focus in mind, which he had 
missed to make clear in the text of the motion. In his introduction to 
the Ständerat debate, Borel not only enumerated many examples of coun-
tries already practicing economic planning, but also harshly criticized the 
Swiss government for its reluctance to pass laws to fight the overheated 
economy.24 Borel made clear that the overall goal of his request was to 
determine a long-term policy of growth. He asked for an improvement of 
economic statistics, a determination of measures for economic planning, 
and an appropriate economic policy.25 This was surprising, as it did not 
correspond with the original motion and overlapped with the Motion Heil 
that had asked for a long-term economic policy. Moreover, as Borel did 
not communicate the focus of his request to the head of the finance depart-
ment, this led to an incongruity between his introductory remarks and the 
statement of the finance department which essentially focused on financial 
planning. Nevertheless, the Ständerat accepted the request and passed it 
to the Nationalrat,26 which also accepted it but did not take Borel’s focus 
on economic development into account. The Nationalrat did, however, 
emphasize the necessity of studies considering the overall development of 
the country.27
After the Nationalrat had accepted the request, it was  – despite its 
disputed focus  – passed to the deputy for economic questions, Hugo 
Allemann.28 Allemann, an economist himself, argued that the mandate, 
 24 Ständerat Wintersession 1965. Auszug aus dem stenographischen Protokoll 
der Sitzung vom 30. November 1965. 9170 Motion Borel. Arbeitsgruppe zum 
Studium der langfristigen Landesprobleme. BAR E1070#1974/32#1080*.
 25 Ständerat. Wintersession. Auszug aus dem stenographischen Protokoll der 
Sitzung vom 30. November 1965, S. 5, BAR E1070#1974/32#1080#, p. 4.
 26 The Nationalrat is the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Switzerland. 
Together with the Ständerat, they form the Swiss legislative.
 27 Kommission des Nationalrates für die Behandlung der Motion Borel  – 
Arbeitsgruppe zum Studium der langfristigen Landesprobleme, Protokoll der 
Sitzung vom 1. Februar 1967, S. 5, 7, BAR E1070#1974/32#1080*.
 28 Schreiben des Vorstehers des Finanz- und Zolldepartements Roger Bonvin an 
den Vorsteher des Volkswirtschaftsdepartements Hans Schaffner vom 19. April 
1967 betreffend die Motion Borel; Arbeitsgruppe zum Studium der langfristigen 
Landesprobleme, BAR E6100B-01#1980/150#198*.
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should it lead to useful results within reasonable time, had to be limited 
to the economy. Allemann’s request implied an implicit assumption of a 
separated economic sphere that could be studied independently. This as-
sumption became explicit in Allemann’s recommendation that the study 
group should consider non-economic factors such as technical progress 
or the structure of society only insofar as they had an actual influence on 
economic development.
Allemann did not make clear in which case non-economic factors had an 
influence on the economy and how this influence could be assessed. Instead, 
he merely argued that the general objective of the motion, the determination 
of the long-term development, could only be achieved by limiting the scope 
of the request.29 It is unclear whether Allemann made this suggestion for the 
sake of the feasibility of the request or because he was convinced that the 
Swiss future could be forecasted by only considering the economic devel-
opment. The fact, however, that Allemann justified this decision by merely 
pointing to its feasibility suggests that the implicit conceptualization of the 
economy as a separated sphere was not controversial and that there was a 
consensus within the Federal Administration regarding the economic devel-
opment as driving force of the society.
Focussing mainly on economic growth, Allemann proposed to man-
date the professor for economics from the University of St. Gallen, 
Francesco Kneschaurek, who had distinguished himself as an expert for 
economic growth and forecasting as well as for future studies.30 In 1968, 
Kneschaurek had founded an institute for future studies at the univer-
sity of St. Gallen and considered himself a futurologist and founded in 
1968 the St. Galler Zentrum für Zukunftsforschung at the University of 
St. Gallen (Reyhl 1976). Kneschaurek remained true to his conviction that 
the future was overall projectable – even when future studies went out of 
fashion after the 1970s31 (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1990). Already in the 
 29 Notiz für Herrn Dr.  K.  Huber, Generalsekretär des Eidg. 
Volkswirtschaftsdepartements vom 27.9.1967, BAR E7296A#1994/333#431*.
 30 Bericht und Antrag über das weitere Vorgehen i.  S, Motion Borel von 
Hugo Allemann an den Bundesrat vom 29. Dezember 1967, S.5, BAR 
E4110B#1986/81#248*.
 31 In his valedictory lecture “Der Griff nach der Zukunft” of 1990, which 
Kneschaurek titled after the German futurologist Robert Jungk’s writing, he 
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1950s, Kneschaurek was publicly known for advocating a perception of 
the economic boom as a growth process, that was quite different from 
Böhler’s pessimistic outlooks (Kneschaurek 1956; 1962; Kneschaurek, 
Kaufmann, und Geiger 1964).
The Bundesrat32 as well as the different state departments accepted 
Allemann’s proposition to study mainly the long-term development of the 
economy without major modifications. Only the department of finance 
requested that the study group should not include merely “theorists” but 
also welcome “realists,” indicating thereby a certain reservation towards 
growth theorists.33 Francesco Kneschaurek became the director of the study 
group that was composed of economists from his chair. Collaboration 
with exponents from other disciplines only took place in smaller ad-hoc 
working groups.34
4.  The Perspektivstudien and the Swiss 
Economy as a Separated Sphere
The reports of Kneschaurek´s study group were called “Perspektivstudien.” 
The first edition of the Perspektivstudien appeared in eight parts between 
1969 and 1972, a revised version was published between 1972 and 1973. 
The final report and summary followed in 1974.35 A second edition of the 
tried again to promote the importance of future studies and to defend it against 
wide spread objections.
 32 The Bundesrat is the Swiss executive.
 33 Bericht und Antrag über das weitere Vorgehen i.  S. Motion Borel, 
Mitbericht des Eidg. Finanz- und Zolldepartements zum Antrag des 
Eidg. Volkswirtschaftsdepartements vom 29. Dezember 1967, BAR E 
7001C#1982/118#1626*.
 34 Beschluss des Bundesrates bezüglich des Expertenauftrag an Prof. Rotach vom 
22. März 1968, BAR E7001C#1982/118#1626*, Schreiben der Schweizerischen 
Bundeskanzlei an die Departemente und Abteilungen vom 7. Mai 1968, BAR 
E7296A#1994/333#431*.
 35 The first report focused on the development of the population and the work-
force, the second on the development of the economy, the third on the sectoral 
development of the industry and the last five reports respectively on the develop-
ment of the agriculture, the education, transportation, energy and construction 
(Kneschaurek 1980, 39).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economist as Futurologist 89
Perspektivstudien appeared in 1978, but was much less publicized than 
the former edition (Kneschaurek 1980, 46). Originally, the studies were 
supposed to be published as a final report at the end of the investigation, 
in order to test the coherence of its different parts. Kneschaurek and the 
federal authorities agreed, however, that it was preferable to publish the 
results of the different parts right away as they thought that the studies 
could benefit from discussions and critical comments (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1970, 1).
The Perspektivstudien attracted much attention from the media, but 
were also harshly criticized (Kneschaurek 1980, 46). Because of the nega-
tive publicity of the Perspektivstudien, the Federal council abstained from 
holding a press conference to present the results of the second edition, 
as it had been done for the first edition in the early 1970s. Kneschaurek 
himself was ambivalent towards the critique. While he acknowledged the 
importance of a public feedback and a critical discussion of the results, 
he hardly took the critique into account. Notably, he at first ignored the 
harsh but well-grounded critique of his colleague, the economist Walter 
Wittmann, and attacked him personally, calling his critique dilettantish 
and contradictory, without addressing the different points in question in 
detail (Kneschaurek 1972).
The conception of the economy as a separate sphere appeared in the 
Perspektivstudien in different ways. In accordance with Allemann’s request, 
the Perspektivstudien only considered economic factors: the development 
of the population and workforce, overall productivity, different economic 
sectors, the educational system and agriculture. Non-economic factors 
such as shifts in values or new demographic or educational trends were 
assumed to be constant. This became obvious in Kneschaurek’s under-
standing of the so-called “Leitbilder” (overall concepts that are supposed 
to guide an entity). As he explained, he based his forecasts on the cur-
rently existing economic and socio-political “Leitbilder” of Switzerland. 
Kneschaurek’s use of the expression “Leitbilder” was unfortunate, since 
Borel’s request had asked precisely for developing new “Leitbilder” with 
the help of the studies. Moreover, no such official «Leitbilder» existed 
in Switzerland, or at least many of them were competing with another, 
as Walter Wittmann observed in his critique of the Perspektivstudien 
(Wittmann 1972, 1).
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By using the term “Leitbilder,” Kneschaurek wanted to make clear that 
he relied on the ceteris paribus principle. He assumed the social sphere to 
be constant and had not the intention to investigate social change. This 
decision was at least questionable with regard to the Swiss immigration 
policy, since an intense discussion about the limitation of immigration 
took place at this very moment in Switzerland. A popular petition issued 
at the beginning of the 1970s asked to limit the quota of foreigners to 
maximum 10 percent. If the initiative would have been accepted in the ref-
erendum, it would have led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of 
non-Swiss residents and would have strongly influenced the demographic 
development. The close run of the referendum with 46 percent yes-votes 
against 54 no-votes demonstrated that there was no “Leitbild” regarding 
immigration in Switzerland that could be assumed to be constant at that 
time (Maiolino 2011).
Though Kneschaurek acknowledged that it was not possible to make 
forecasts of the development of the non-Swiss population by consid-
ering past development patterns, he did not abstain from forecasting the 
development of the foreign population in Switzerland, as other studies 
did. Instead, Kneschaurek simply assumed that the number of foreigners 
would stabilize in the long run (Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1969, 
41–42). For the development of the Swiss population, Kneschaurek relied 
on models of democratic transition which predicted a continuous decline 
of the birth rate for industrial nations. Doing so, Kneschaurek neither took 
the ongoing value change of 1968 into account nor possible variations of 
the birth rate in relation to the growing female workforce participation 
(Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1969, 17). Overall, Kneschaurek ex-
pected the Swiss population to grow from 5.9 million in the year 1965 to 
7.5 million by the year 2000 (Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1969, 59).
Retrospectively, this forecast proved to be accurate since the overall 
population of Switzerland counted 7.164 million inhabitants in the year 
2000. This accuracy was, however, less the result of a correct population 
model rather than of Kneschaureks conviction that the number of non-
Swiss residents and the overall situation would stabilize in the long-run. 
Retrospectively, this is surprising given the context of the cold war as well 
as of the experience of major global conflicts in the first half of the 20th 
century.
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That Kneschaurek based his forecasts on an implicit concept of eco-
nomic development rather than on the assessment of individual economic 
and non-economic factors, became especially clear in his second report 
on the development Swiss economy. Kneschaurek had previously been 
criticized for not taking political factors into account36 (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1970, 13). So he decided to make explicit why he shared 
the conviction that the impact of non-economic factors could be ignored. 
In a first step, Kneschaurek acknowledged that non-economic factors such 
as political events had had an effect on the development of the economy 
during the last 25 years. In a second step, however, he argued that those 
events counterbalanced in the long-run so that it was not necessary to 
take them into account (Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1970, 13). To 
illustrate his assertion, Kneschaurek added a graphic to the second volume 
of his study that showed the development of the Swiss GDP starting from 
1946 to 1968 and amended what he called the most important events 
of global relevance. With an additional dotted-line, Kneschaurek traced 
the general trend of the Swiss economy, showing that the non-economic 
factors overall counterbalanced each other.
As Kneschaurek stated, it was remarkable that those numerous global 
events had in sum almost no influence on the Swiss economy (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1970, 22). It seems obvious that the graphic served pri-
marily as a justification for his methodology. It started precisely in the year 
1947, when the Swiss economy had recovered from World War II, and was 
moving on a remarkably steady growth path. This had not been the case 
in the first half of the century, as Kneschaurek knew from his doctoral 
thesis on the Swiss business cycle from 1929 to 1939 (Kneschaurek 1952). 
Kneschaurek did not explain by which criteria he had selected the “most 
important events” of global relevance and how he assessed and isolated 
their assumed effects on the economy.
Kneschaurek did not explain his methodology in detail, but he reacted 
strongly regarding the critique that he had merely extrapolated histor-
ical trends. As he objected, the forecasts of the Swiss economy were 
not based on statistical extrapolations but resulted from international 
 36 Kneschaurek was accused of assuming a standstill of the political discussions 
or a neutralization of all non-economic factors.
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comparisons37 (Schaffhauser Nachrichten 1972; Wittmann 1972, 1). 
Kneschaurek used many graphs to demonstrate historical trends in his 
reports, but it seems nevertheless probable that he used historical data 
and trend extrapolation to historicize the economy and to assess pos-
sible developments. To forecast the Swiss GDP up to the year 2000, 
Kneschaurek could, however, not use trend extrapolation since there 
were no data series for the national production available. Kneschaurek 
instead used a simple production function which derived economic 
growth from the increasing employment rate and increasing productivity 
(Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1970, 31). To determine the future 
productivity of Switzerland, Kneschaurek took the past productivity 
Fig. 1: “The Development of the Swiss Economy in the Light of the Most 
Important International Events since 1946.” 
Source: Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien (1970), 24.
 37 It was mainly the economist Walter Wittmann who accused Francesco 
Kneschaurek of using only extrapolation of time series and of not considering 
the accelerated change.
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development of the USA, which he implicitly perceived as the highest 
developed country. He assumed, that Switzerland would follow the eco-
nomic development path of the US with a time lag, disregarding the indi-
vidual features of the Swiss economy.38 (Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 
1970, 40)
Kneschaurek thus had  – whether consciously or unconsciously  – a 
“modern” conception of economic development, in which the United States 
were considered the highest developed country and a model for reaching 
modernity other countries such as Switzerland should follow (Wehler 1975, 
12). Using past productivity records of the U.S., Kneschaurek expected 
the Swiss productivity to slow down as it had happened in the United 
States. Accordingly, he forecasted that Switzerland’s annual growth rate 
would drop from 4.6 percent to 3 to 3.5 percent in average (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1970, 21, 37–38, 43).
5.  A Switzerland of 10 Million Inhabitants
Kneschaurek and the federal administration wanted to initiate a discussion 
about the future of Switzerland by publishing the results of the different 
reports right away. By doing so, they acknowledged that the forecasts 
of the Perspektivstudien could have an effect on the development of the 
country. They expected, however, that this effect would primarily mate-
rialize in political debates on future planning. The media coverage was 
accordingly of great relevance for the overall debate of the projects results 
(Arbeitsgruppe Perspektivstudien 1970, 3–4). The Perspektivstudien 
received a lot of media attention, as they were the first Swiss studies 
forecasting the future over a period of thirty years. Furthermore, the 
repeated publication of the reports from 1969 to 1974 and the set of press 
 38 With regard to the USA, Kneschaurek wrote:  „Die USA werden doch im 
allgemeinen als das Land mit dem fortgeschrittensten Stand der Technik 
und der ausgeprägtesten Unternehmerdynamik bezeichnet, in welchem die 
Rationalisierung, Standardisierung und neuerdings Automatisierung besonders 
grossgeschrieben werden. Es kommt nicht von ungefähr, dass man selbst von 
einem ‘technological gap’ oder von einem ‘managereal gap’ zwischen den USA 
und den industriell am weitesten fortgeschrittenen Industrieländern Westeuropas 
spricht.“
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conferences that emphasized the importance of the results contributed 
to the fact that the Perspektivstudien remained a talking point for years 
(Weber 1970). When Francesco Kneschaurek became the new deputy for 
economic questions (Delegierter für Konjunkturfragen) in 1973, replacing 
Hugo Allemann, the Perspektivstudien got even more publicity. This was 
especially the case because Kneschaurek’s double function as forecaster 
and top-ranking official for economic policy was controversial (Basler 
Nachrichten 1973).
As Kneschaurek noted in his second report about the development 
of the Swiss economy, most newspapers gave a correct account of the 
published reports. In some cases, however, some of the results were incor-
rectly reproduced or falsely interpreted. The decreasing growth rate of eco-
nomic wealth, for instance, was taken as evidence of generally decreasing 
wealth. This reactivated the fear of an economic downturn (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1970, 3). Generally, the newspapers interpreted the 
results of the study as alarming, even those which reproduced Kneschaurek´s 
forecasts correctly. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung worried about the slowing 
growth rate of the Swiss wealth (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 1970). The Basler 
Nachrichten qualified Kneschaurek’s forecast of the development of pop-
ulation and employment as indicating a “catastrophic labor shortage” 
(Basler Nachrichten 1970). The Aargauer Tagblatt started their article 
with Kneschaurek’s own words of a “keineswegs ermutigende Prognose” 
(Aargauer Tagblatt 1970).
These reactions were not only expected by Kneschaurek and Allemann, 
but intended. They inaugurated the first press conference with the confes-
sion that they had intentionally tried to shock the audience by presenting 
forecasts in an alarming way and that they wanted to wake the Swiss people 
from their lethargy (Berner Tagwacht 1970). Kneschaurek and Allemann 
thus communicated their forecasts as worst-case scenarios to prevent unde-
sirable developments. This, however, contradicted Kneschaurek’s implicit 
development model, which promulgated an evolutionary process towards 
modernity supposedly valid for all countries. Moreover, in Kneschaurek’s 
and Allemann’s dystopic conceptions, the ambivalent character of the orig-
inal mandate between planning and prediction became again apparent. 
The forecasts were presented both as a future to come and as a future that 
should be prevented by planning it.
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In 1974, the public perception of the Perspektivstudien started to 
change. Firstly, newspapers did not comment on the expected slowdown 
of the economic growth rate anymore, although Kneschaurek expected an 
even smaller growth of rate of 2.6 to 3.2 percent for the Swiss economy 
by the year 2000 in his revised report of January 1974 (Arbeitsgruppe 
Perspektivstudien 1974, 77). This can possibly be explained by the fact 
that the revised report did not get the same attention as the first one. 
The final report that followed a couple of months later contained hardly 
any numerical forecasts anymore, but focused on the description of the 
expected structural problems of the Swiss economy. Accordingly, the 
newspapers summarized the main statements without taking up particular 
aspects. Only a few articles honored Kneschaurek’s work that now came 
to an end (Böckli 1974; Keller 1974; Stauffer 1974). Others, however, 
questioned the general usefulness of the Perspektivstudien in the light of 
imminent problems such as inflation or the oil crisis (Meyer 1974). The 
public, it seems, had grown tired of the Perspektivstudien when the final 
report was released in August 1974.
At the end of the year 1974, however, when a severe economic recession 
hit Switzerland, Kneschaurek and his Perspektivstudien received again a 
lot of media attention. The rapidly worsening economic situation triggered 
a discussion about the “culprit” of the crisis. The building industry was hit 
particularly hard by the recession and experienced a dramatic downturn of 
demand that resulted in a fall in employment of 40 percent. Kneschaurek, 
who had been appointed Deputy for economic questions in 1973, attrib-
uted this overcapacity to a poor planning by industry. He explained that 
constructors had made the mistake to extrapolate the growth rate of 
demand of the last couple of years. As he argued, there was no possi-
bility to get back to the pre-crisis equilibrium. The building industry had 
therefore no other option than to adjust their supply to a realistic amount 
(Basler Nachrichten 1975).
The problem was, however, that Kneschaurek had never – neither in 
his forecasts nor in his role as Deputy for economic questions – pointed 
to the possibility of an imminent recession that would force the building 
industry to reduce their supply dramatically. Therefore, exponents of 
the industry refused to be blamed for their situation and stroke back by 
accusing Kneschaurek for having forecasted a population of 10 million 
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inhabitants in Switzerland by the year 2000. Among Kneschaurek’s 
harshest critics was the building contractor and national councilor Karl 
Flubacher, who expressed his deep contempt towards the economists who 
advised the Bundesrat in a talk at the annual conference of the association 
of the master carpenters in 1975:
„Der Schaden, der durch wirtschaftsfremde Theoretiker angerichtet wurde, 
ist wesentlich grösser als der Erfolg (…). Allzulange hat sich der Bundesrat 
bei seinen Entscheidungen auf den Rat wirtschaftspolitischer Technokraten 
verlassen. Während die Propheten die These von 10 Millionen Einwohnern im 
Jahr 2000 verkündeten und sich heute davon absetzen, macht man uns den 
Vorwurf, wir hätten zu vielen Wohnungen gebaut. (...) Viele wurden durch die 
falschen Bevölkerungsprognosen zu Fehlinvestitionen verleitet. Die Warnungen 
unsererseits, dass der Wohnungsmangel  – aus politischen Gründen  – stark 
übertrieben wurde, verhallten ungehört. Erst als man in den städtischen 
Agglomerationen Tausende von Leerwohnungen feststellte, zog man die 
Alarmglocken und suchte prompt Sündenböcke, aber am falschen Ort. Sie wurden 
nämlich von jenen Leuten gesucht, die selbst für die Misere verantwortlich sind“ 
(„Die Widerwärtigkeiten der heutigen Zeit“ 1975, 643).
Flubacher did not name the Perspektivstudien and Kneschaurek per-
sonally, but pointed to the general practice of economic advising and 
forecasting, which he made responsible for decisions that went against the 
market expertise of the building industry. Flubacher’s critique shows that 
not the individual results of the Perspektivstudien, but the general prac-
tice of forecasting had contributed to the idea that the post-war prosperity 
would last forever. This became particularly clear in the case of the figure 
of 10 million inhabitants, which did not stem from the Perspektivstudien. 
The 10 million inhabitants represented precisely the idea that the popula-
tion growth rate of the 1960s would persist and with it the high demand 
for apartments and consumption goods that that had boosted the Swiss 
economy. The figure of 10 million inhabitants was thus a metaphor for a 
stable growth path, in which the future became stabilized as a prolonga-
tion of the present state.
The practice of long-term forecasting relying only on the development 
of economic variables such as productivity and the workforce created thus 
a reality, in which institutions, political power relations as well as the 
conditions of world markets were assumed to be stable, thus discarding 
social change as a driving force. Since this projected reality inspired 
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investment decisions, it became performative, changing the overall orien-
tation of economic actors towards the future, and thus their decisions and 
actions. Their disappointment vis-à-vis the outburst of the crisis, in turn, 
cast doubt on the expertise of economists and the government and thus 
affected the political power relations in place.
Although the figure of 10  million inhabitants did not appear in the 
Perspektivstudien, the accusation that Kneschaurek had put it in circulation 
was taken over by newspapers and spread quickly (Walliser Volksfreund 
1975, 13). The Perspektivstudien also came under attack politically by a 
parliamentary request that questioned their usefulness, alluding to the fact 
that the forecasts had to be readjusted repeatedly. Kneschaurek asked the 
Chancellor of the Confederation for an official clarification.39 In his cover 
letter that accompanied his request for clarification, Kneschaurek noted 
that neither he nor his team had ever forecasted a population of 10 mil-
lion inhabitants.40 In a session of the parliament, the Federal Councillor 
and head of the economic department of the state, Ernst Brugger, declared 
accordingly that Kneschaurek never had forecasted a population of 10 mil-
lion for Switzerland for the year 2000 (Brugger 1975, 656). Unfortunately, 
it turned out that Kneschaurek had once referred to the possibility of 
a Switzerland with 10  million inhabitants in a paper of 1962 (Die Tat 
1975, 1).
The somehow odd recurrence of the figure of a Switzerland of 10 mil-
lion inhabitants shows that economic long-term forecasts of the 1960s 
and 1970s cannot be conceptualized as mere descriptions or projections 
of an actual state of the economy that help political elites to anticipate 
unwanted developments. Instead, they have to be considered as perfor-
mative, as they contributed to an overall idea that the future state of the 
economy could be projected and that its development was solely relevant 
to foresee the future of the overall society. Economic knowledge that relies 
on the conceptualization of the economy as a separated sphere to predict 
the long-term future of societies constructed a deterministic, a-historical 
 39 Einfache Anfrage Ganz vom 30. Januar 1975, Frühjahrssession des Nationalrates, 
Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, Bd. II, 1975, p. 589.
 40 Notiz von Francesco Kneschaurek an den Bundeskanzler vom 19.02.1975, BAR 
E1010C#2009/102#53*.
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reality that disconnected actors from short-run events and changes. The 
readiness to accept those studies and their methodical assumptions must 
be seen in the context of Keynesianism, in which after the experience of 
the Great Depression the idea that the economy could be controlled by 
demand management prevailed.
To understand the emergence of long-term studies and their tempo-
rary spread, Keynesianism has to be understood as a governmentality 
in which not only Keynes’ macroeconomic concepts, but also practices 
and institutions of the post-1945 nation-states supported and idealized 
the undertaking of a macroeconomic management that led eventually to 
a belief in the controllability and therefore predictability of the economy. 
The focus on the economic development, however, cannot be explained 
only by the emergence of Keynesianism. The Cold War and in particular 
the growing competition between capitalist and socialist countries, too, 
contributed to a prioritization of economic development and led to an 
obsession with economic growth rates and a neglect of the role history. 
It has thus a certain irony that the a-historical conceptualization of the 
economy as a separated sphere that reached an ideological summit with 
the emergence of long-term economic forecasts turned them into history 
with the outbreak of the economic crisis of the 1970s.
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Abstract: Modern ‘inflation targeting’ is widely praised as having achieved a level of 
technical sophistication and efficacy unprecedented by previous modes of monetary 
policy. Building on the Rational Expectation Hypothesis, it is premised on the idea 
that it is possible to influence future outcomes (inflation) by shaping and conducting 
economic expectations in the present. Monetary authorities thus rely on the struc-
ture of market expectations as the medium that transmits their intended policy into 
the future, allowing them to focus on fine-tuning the ‘communicability’ (credibility 
and transparency) of their signals. However, even among practitioners the precise 
nature and functioning of this inter-temporal link remains contested, despite its 
seeming effectiveness and the lack of a practical alternative. In this chapter, I want 
to deploy some concepts and analytics from a recent literature in sociology and 
anthropology on the coordination of social futures to query the link between present 
and future on which inflation targeting is premised. My objective is to uncover the 
social and organizational preconditions of this form of economic temporality, in 
order to better understand what limitations they place on central banks’ ability to 
‘govern the future’. To this end, I look at the so-called Volcker experiment in which 
the fundamental procedures for governing the future were developed – although 
their significance only became clear later. The gist of my argument is that the con-
sensus view of ‘modern’ monetary policy insufficiently distinguishes between the 
present future (the future as it is imagined and projected from the present) and the 
future present (as it materializes at a later point in time). Inflation targeting rests 
on procedures which set up what, sociologically speaking, amounts to a tightly 
integrated and formalized ‘interaction order’ between central bank and financial 
markets. This interaction order enables a fine-tuning of expectational reactions by 
markets to policy signals – but at the price of decoupling monetary policy from 
the economic structures required for securing a congruence between present future 
and future present.
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1.  Introduction: Monetary Policy and the 
Problems of ‘Knowing the Future’
Over the decade starting in the mid-1980s, central banking underwent a 
“Quiet Revolution” and “went modern” (Blinder 2004). By the mid-1990s, 
ongoing changes cohered enough to begin giving them a more formal codifi-
cation and a name: inflation targeting had been born (Bernanke and Mishkin 
1997; Bernanke and Woodford 2006; Cobham 2010). Where the ‘old’ view 
of monetary policy (implementation) attempted to shift the hydraulics of mac-
roeconomic aggregates (commonly, by seeking to control various monetary 
aggregates), the ‘new’ view’s “key proposition … is that the appropriate oper-
ational target of monetary policy implementation is the short-term interest 
rate, and that this is the case independently of the characteristics of financial 
markets and independently of the monetary policy strategy” (Bindseil 2004, 
5). Inspired by the “Rational Expectations Revolution” (Muth 1961; Lucas 
1972; Sargent and Wallace 1976; Phelbs and Taylor 1977; see also Miller 
1994), central banks worldwide have stopped attempting to push policy sig-
nals heavy-handedly through the cumbrous hydraulic machinery of mon-
etary quantities and macroeconomic variables of yore. Instead, they have 
shifted towards attempting to directly ‘conduct the conduct’ (Foucault et al. 
1991, 48) of market actors “whose activities propel the transmission mecha-
nism of monetary policy” (Braun 2015, 369).
Since then, it has become conventional wisdom that this new channel of 
policy transmission by directly influencing the structures of expectations of 
economic actors greatly improves monetary policy’s efficacy in achieving 
its primary objective of controlling inflation. By disentangling the tech-
nical procedures of monetary policy implementation from the problem 
of the transmission or propagation of the signals thus generated, central 
banks are capable of signaling their policy stance far more clearly than in 
the ‘old’ system, when the causalities on which implementation relied were 
tightly entwined with macroeconomic aggregates and dynamics. Thanks 
to this improvement in the communicability (Stinchcombe 2001, chap. 2) 
of its intended purposes, monetary policy can now shape inflation expec-
tations (more or less) directly through alterations in its key policy instru-
ment, the short-term interest rate, in such a way that they materialize into 
the desired inflation rate (of course, with a lag).
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Modern monetary policy thus is performative in the sense developed by 
a growing literature in the field of economic sociology and the so-called 
‘Social studies of finance’ (Callon 2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 
2007). As Mann (2018, 18)  has put it, “if [monetary policy] is believ-
able enough to shape (rational) expectations, it will work itself out like 
a self-fulfilling prophecy” –at least, that is, “to the extent that economic 
actors adjust their practices to fit the narrative” (Beckert 2016, 116) or 
state of the (economic) world that the policy intended. This also means 
that monetary policy has become inherently forward-looking, as it seeks 
to govern (through) the future, or more accurately: govern the future in 
the present through expectations about the future. To ensure that policy 
signals emitted in the present indeed produce their desired effects in the 
future, central banks have heavily invested in their forecasting apparatus. 
This has allowed them to focus their operating procedures on keeping track 
of the (shifting) expectations about the future held by the actors “whose 
activities propel the transmission mechanism of monetary policy” (Braun 
2015, 369). Investments in central banks’ economic modeling capacities 
have helped improve the sophistication of their forecasts, which have been 
integrated more tightly with the decision-making process (see, e.g. Smart 
2006). Better forecasting then allows for more fine-tuned policy signals, as 
well as increasing the transparency of those signals to the observers whose 
behavior and calculations it is meant to influence, especially when the 
reasons for the policy stance are openly communicated (Guthrie and Wright 
2000; Geraats 2002; Issing 2005; Demertzis and Hughes Hallett 2007).
By making such “investments in forms” (Thévenot 1984), which help 
in mapping (market) expectations, and tracking the effects of their policy 
interventions, central banks thus have been able to construct highly stan-
dardized and formalized shared “frames,” creating “an expectations 
environment that can be managed” (Morgan 2013, 744 – cited in Braun 
2015). Within such a joint(ly generated) frame, the signals sent through 
central banks’ manipulation of the short-term interest rate are translated 
into long-term interest rate(s) and asset prices, providing monetary policy 
with control over shaping the trajectory of inflation over time (cf. the ac-
count given by Braun 2015).
Practitioners take immense pride in this technical arrangement, a view 
often shared not only by academic economists but also adopted by many 
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observers in the social sciences who have studied this ‘communicative 
turn’ in monetary policy as an exemplar of a more general trend towards 
“future-oriented” or anticipatory modes of social coordination and gov-
ernance (Holmes 2014; Braun 2015; on the sociology of the future, see 
Tavory and Eliasoph 2013; Beckert 2016). There is, however, astonish-
ingly little sustained reflection within expert circles (both practitioners and 
their academic observers and interlocutors) about the forms of temporality 
that underpin this technical arrangement, or about the tricky epistemolog-
ical and theoretical problems involved in, first, knowing the future and, 
second, of using it as an instrument for shaping expectations. Beckert has 
put the problem in a nutshell when he points out that (present) expecta-
tions are necessarily (only) “pretended representations of a future state of 
affairs” (Beckert 2013, 226). Whether these representations turn out to be 
true, and thus whether the expectations based on them turn out to have 
been “fictional” or “rational”, will only be revealed in the future once it 
arrives.
The importance that contemporary accounts of monetary policy attach 
to the somewhat elusive concept of its credibility illustrates this problem. 
Credibility necessarily lies in the eye of the beholder: for monetary policy 
signals to be credible to (present) market actors, they need to align with 
these actors’ present “pretended representations of a future state of affairs” 
(long) before it can be decided whether they were, in fact, true. Whether 
credibility in terms of a two-way alignment between intended signals and 
expectations in the present actually extends to a three-way alignment with 
the future is a question that has received (too) little systematic attention. 
In aligning its signals to the structure of those beliefs about a “fictive” 
(Beckert 2016) imagined future, can monetary policy also be assumed to 
be influencing that future which eventually becomes real, and in terms of 
which the initial expectations will have been proven “rational”1? Indeed, 
it seems that “there is no consensus on why the framework is successful, 
 1 A problem solved by modern microfoundations economics by assump-
tion: namely, the assumption of an a-priori congruence of structures of expec-
tations with economic structures with only the probabilities of different possible 
states of the world being ‘unknown’ (Beckert and Bronk 2018, 8).
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why and how expectations become anchored by virtue of these targeting 
protocols” (Blinder 2004, 74 ff.; Holmes 2009, 403).
A number of well-placed and knowledgeable observers have raised 
serious issues with assuming a smooth transition of policy intentions 
through expectations that are isomorphic with (and based on perfect 
knowledge of) the true structure of the economy, to the economy’s future 
state(s). For instance, Orphanides has shown in a series of publications 
(Orphanides 2001, 2002, 2003; Orphanides and Williams 2007) that 
considerable gaps (may) exist between the (imperfect) knowledge actors 
can form in real-time about the economy and its structures as revealed in 
ex-post data, leading to considerable misfires of (intended) policy signals. 
Alan Blinder (2004, 67 ff.) has pointed out how, in attempting to align 
their policy (implementation) to market expectations, central banks may 
actually end up simply “following the market” rather than shaping its ex-
pectations to the futures they hope to enact. More troubling still, serious 
doubts exist about the mechanisms by which policy signals (by varying 
the short-term interest rate) become translated over longer terms into real 
economic prices, thus eventually shaping inflation. The standard linkage 
or transmission channel is, of course, provided by the so-called expec-
tations theory of the term structure, roughly suggesting that longer-term 
interest rates should be the average of short-term rates expected over the 
longer-term. Not only does this relationship fail to hold consistently, but 
more worryingly still, “the implied interest rate forecasts (expectations) 
that can be deduced from the yield curve bear little resemblance to what 
future interest rates actually turn out to be” (Blinder 2004, 77). Despite 
the fact that “the abject empirical failure of the expectations theory of 
the term structure of interest rates is a well-established fact” (ibid.), cen-
tral banks continue to use the yield curve to “read the future” (Zaloom 
2009; Christophers 2017) from the market expectations it (supposedly) 
captures– as well as assuming market actors to translate their (short-term) 
policy signals into longer-term price signals along its lines.
In this chapter, I want to draw on insights that have been developed 
in fields outside economics for understanding how future-oriented, for-
ward-looking and expectations-based modes of coordination function – in 
particular a recent and growing literature in the fields of sociology (and 
anthropology) (Mische 2009; Esposito 2011; Mallard and Lakoff 2011; 
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Tavory and Eliasoph 2013; Beckert 2016). The goal is not, as has become 
something of a fashion among social scientists, to provide an external 
critique of economic theories and methods as “undersocialized” (Barber 
1995; Beckert 2003) – a critique that comes lightly to disciplines whose 
bread and butter is “the social.” Rather, my objective is to investigate 
in what ways the insights gained in these literatures can help us under-
stand better how and why it is possible for central banks to “govern the 
future” by managing expectations. This will then allow us to develop a 
finer understanding of the conditions on which this ability depends, and 
what limitations these conditions imply.
To this end, I will be looking at a historical episode that has been crucial 
to the development of some of the key technical procedures and infrastruc-
ture on which inflation targeting relies, as well as having been formative 
to many of the theoretical debates and practical reflections that still shape 
our understanding of this form of monetary policy today. I will be looking 
at the policy experiments of the (early) Volcker years (approximately 1979 
to the mid-1980s). This “Monetarist Experiment” was aimed at breaking 
the so-called “Great Inflation” of the 1960s and 1970s by restoring effec-
tive control over the money supply. While the experiment failed to achieve 
the latter, it produced a number of technical innovations which subse-
quently became the technical basis for modern, independent monetary 
policy seeking to control inflation through the manipulation of market 
expectations. I  will historically contextualize these innovations, which 
today form a naturalized platform for inflation targeting, by showing 
how they respond to historically specific problems and, as a consequence, 
how the solutions on which modern monetary policy is premised still con-
tain the traces of this origin, and are in important ways limited by this 
path-dependency.
2.  The Temporalities of Modern Central Banking: Using 
the Future to Escape the Fetters of the Present
The sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1976), based on discussions with histo-
rian Reinhart Koselleck (2002), developed a fundamental distinction that 
provides much analytical leverage for our problem. He distinguished the 
future present, the future that will be an actual present at a future point 
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in time, from the present future, that is the possible future(s) projected in 
the present on the basis of various “instruments of imagination” (Beckert 
2016). While this is often used simply as a terminological distinction 
allowing us to designate two temporally differentiated meanings of the 
word “future,” it opens up a much deeper theoretical problem: namely, 
how do expectations about imagined futures link (action in) the present 
to the actually realized future(s)? As we have seen, monetary policy theory 
assumes such a link to exist if only signals shape expectations appropri-
ately in the present, and are credible.
However, a closer inspection of the origins of this mode of monetary 
policy might give us some pause. The later development of full-fledged 
interest rate targeting as the standard for monetary policy worldwide is 
commonly portrayed as something of an unintended consequence of the 
so-called Volcker experiment (or Monetarist Experiment). The experiment 
initially tried, and failed, to develop procedures that would allow a firmer 
and more effective control over the money supply. Attempting to avoid the 
disruptions resulting from a too rigid and mechanical pursuit of money 
supply targets, experimentation led the Fed towards a strategy of interest 
rate targeting. Initially, by attempting to manage non-borrowed reserves 
(through what today is called open-market operations) to achieve a partic-
ular interest rate, the Fed sought to indirectly control the path of borrowed 
(at the discount window) reserves, understood as a proxy for the overall 
money supply. In time, as market reactions to these interest rate signals 
remained stable despite the volatility of the money supply, this ability to 
shape market reactions through those signals became the linchpin of both 
practical monetary policy implementation and theoretical reflexion about 
it. Today, forward-looking monetary policy that operates by manipulating 
expectations of future inflation in the present has become naturalized 
as a trans-historical technical benchmark for good central banking (see 
Bindseil 2004 for an explicit argument to this effect).
In this paper, my goal is not to challenge the existing, well-founded schol-
arship and historical accounts of the Volcker experiment. Rather, I want 
to question the eagerness with which the set of procedures that emerged 
from it has since been naturalized as the irreducible technical basis for 
monetary policy. Instead of taking for granted that central banks actually 
exercise effective control over the future by shaping market expectations, 
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I want to apply some sociological concepts that allow us to better describe 
the temporal and social relations involved in this form of governing. My 
goal is twofold. First, I want to show how its technical procedures remain 
bound to an original historical context of tools and institutions, problems 
and institutions. Second and based on this, I will suggest that the technical 
logic of ‘modern’ central banking is not as transcendental and timeless as 
it likes to pretend – and that looking at the traces left by its origins may 
well help explain some of the difficulties it has been experiencing over the 
last decade.
The technical problems that many central banks faced in controlling 
inflation in the 1960s and 1970s are commonly seen to be tightly related 
to the question of central bank independence. At the time, the Fed was in 
many ways entangled with diverse societal interests – not simply by being 
subject to scrutiny by political authorities, but more importantly because 
of the very mechanisms though which it pursued and implemented mon-
etary policy. Krippner (2011) has provided a detailed account of how the 
Fed, over the course of the 1980s, struggled to extricate its fight against 
inflation and the operative procedures on which it relied from social 
struggles about the distribution of income and credit, and the inevitable 
contestations of each of its policy measures this entailed. Her account 
favours a political-economy perspective, emphasizing how loosening the 
control over international capital flows and inter-bank lending and endog-
enous credit-creation allowed the Fed to avoid making hard choices. Seen 
from this angle, the shift to forward-looking monetary policy quite logi-
cally appears as a de-politicizing strategy, intended to deflect responsibility 
for (macroeconomic) outcomes by “letting the market show through” in 
the determination of the interest rate, rather than depicting the longer-
term interest rate as an instrument fully under control of the central bank 
(Krippner 2011, 120).
Where sociologists and political-economists are wont to emphasizing 
the social and political struggles that shaped the transformation of cen-
tral banking during this time, economists and central bankers are more 
prone to looking at it as a process of technical evolution and improvement. 
Beyond the question of how political dependence reduced the Fed’s overall 
effectiveness, they are also interested in how these problems manifested 
themselves at the level of technical efficiency. From this perspective, US 
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monetary policy in the 1960s and 1970s was clearly deficient:  it consis-
tently failed to convey a transparent and credible policy stance, with each 
failure further undercutting its ability to achieve its policy objectives. As 
hydraulic monetary policy incurred considerable lags as it waited for its 
policy signals to work their way through the system of macroeconomic 
variables, both market observers and the Fed itself struggled to obtain 
timely feedback information about the effects and effectiveness of its pol-
icies (Orphanides 2002). In this context, ideas such as Friedman’s “adap-
tive expectations,” arguing that the ambiguity and lags in monetary policy 
encouraged a cumulative build-up of inflationary expectations (1968), 
became increasingly influential:  as he pointed out, economic agents 
adapted their expectations upwards each time monetary policy failed to 
clearly and unambiguously achieve its declared inflation target – which it 
rarely did, given the difficulties just discussed.
Over almost two decades, the Fed struggled to find solutions to these 
problems, seeking in particular new ways of technically improving the 
credibility and reducing the ambiguity of its policy signals due to lags 
and interaction effects. However, improving the clarity of policy signals 
within the hydraulic monetary policy system proved challenging: it would 
mean avoiding, in particular, overly powerful policy interventions that 
would trigger sharper reactions than intended, which then required fur-
ther (confounding) sterilizing actions on its part and further muddied the 
waters. The devious results are known under the twin terms of interest rate 
smoothing and a resultant base drift. Fear of political repercussions as well 
as technical considerations prevented the Fed from moving the interest 
rate sufficiently strongly and anti-cyclically to control inflation, with the 
resultant lags generally reinforcing subsequent cyclical countermovements 
and allowing the monetary base (thought to be directly correlated with 
inflation) to grow in an uncontrolled fashion (Axilrod and Lindsey 1981; 
Meltzer 1991, 39; 43).
Going through the economics literature on this period, one encounters 
a shared narrative that suggests political interference and entanglements 
prevented the Fed (and other central banks) from developing and adopting 
technically superior instruments and solutions for achieving its primary 
objective, price stability. In contrast to such “Whiggish” storylines built 
around histories of technical progress being held back (temporarily) by 
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political and social entanglements, sociological and political-economy 
perspectives refuse to conceive of the field(s) of possible technical solutions 
as given (more or less) ‘a priori.’ Instead, they seek to “open the black 
boxes” (MacKenzie 2005) of technical arrangements to analyse how the 
ways in which they are assembled reflect competing social interests and 
the struggles through which they find (political, and eventually technical) 
expression. In particular the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
has argued very forcefully (e.g. Pickering 1995) that technical problems 
and solutions are never given a priori – as much as it will look that way in 
retrospect, once a new “paradigm” has emerged from a scientific or tech-
nical revolution (Kuhn 1996). The technical solutions that prevail (and in 
retrospect always appear inevitable and rational) are thus contingent upon 
wider fields and contexts of social interests (Habermas 1969; Bloor 1991; 
Barnes 2015), path-dependent on a “seamless web” of available technical 
elements from which they are assembled (Hughes 1986) as well as on the 
scientific knowledge(s) providing the “instruction sheets” (Blyth 2003) for 
developing them.
As David Stark (2009; and others, e.g. Callon 1998) has shown, eco-
nomic domains are indeed rarely, if ever, fully subsumable to the formal-
technical accounts deployed by economists and central banks alike. These 
accounts and models depict fields of interdependent economic actions which 
are given descriptions as coherent (collective) calculative problems, which 
in turn makes them amenable to being governed as unambiguous technical 
problems. As Stark points out, however, in reality economic domains are 
marked by what he calls competing “accounts of worth,” that is, (collective 
or shared) projects of assigning economic value (and resources) to com-
peting social purposes or activities. The technical coherence of economic 
policies and regulations is thus the result of what Kallinikos (2014, 9) calls 
a (working) functional simplification, that is, “the demarcation of an oper-
ational domain within which the complexity of the world is reconstructed 
as a simplified set of tight cause-and-effect couplings.” A functional sim-
plification establishes robust technical ‘means-ends’ control relations by 
demarcating and insulating procedures of intervention from interference 
by ‘external’ causal sequences or influences (Kallinikos 2006, 32 ff.).
Monetary policy prior to the transformations it underwent in the 1980s 
provides a perfect illustration of the failure to demarcate and insulate a 
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technical domain in which coherent and stringent interventions can occur. 
The Fed, by the 1970s, had integrated various competing accounts of 
worth, and as a consequence heterogeneous conceptions of and operative 
strategies for controlling inflation, into rather ambiguous and heteroge-
neous policy procedures. Different theoretical conceptions of the causal 
mechanism(s) driving inflation co-existed uneasily within its operative par-
adigm. Most famously, the so-called notion of “cost-push inflation” led 
the Fed into various attempts to target the credit extended to particular 
economic sectors and considered to be driving general inflation, and into 
attempts to control wage dynamics. The real bills doctrine (see Glasner 
1992) with its notion that productive credit could never be inflationary 
long persisted within the Fed, so that targeting free reserves (reserves 
not backing productive credit) was seen as a way to combat speculative 
pressures that could lead to asset and, through it, generalized inflation. 
Such partially incoherent substantive theories of inflation and the opera-
tive mechanisms they implied uneasily coexisted within the Fed’s monetary 
policy. Its multifaceted conception of inflation also entailed a complex 
apparatus of technologies such as regulations of interest rates, relative 
(credit) prices and the allocation of money to different sectors of the 
economy (Konings 2011, 106 ff.). Through this, monetary policy became 
drawn into and contested over an entire spectrum of competing accounts 
of social worth – with a little artistic license, whether to fund schools or 
missiles, homeownership or poor relief. And, confronted with multiple, 
(partly) contradictory policy signals, market actors found it difficult to 
form clear-cut expectations about the Fed’s policy stance and actions.
As the Fed pursued multiple (intermediate and ultimate) objectives 
simultaneously, implementing them through various (and frequently 
incompatible and interacting) channels of transmission, all conceived in 
terms of the interactions of a growing number of policy-variables, con-
fusion crept in. Expert debates at the time revolved around the problems 
of demarcating an operational domain for monetary policy in such a way 
that (i)  it achieved “tight cause-and-effect couplings,” and would (ii) be 
able to send unambiguous, transparent and credible policy signals. These 
debates were cast in terms of the so-called Instrument-Target Problem 
(Poole 1970; Bindseil 2004, 29  ff.). While conducted in a highly tech-
nical jargon hard to decipher for posterity, the Instrument-Target Problem 
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essentially revolved around the endogeneity problems facing monetary 
policy due to the lags observed between (a growing number of) opera-
tive and target variables (organized in multiple, mutually overlapping and 
interacting transmission sequences), and the resulting instabilities of the 
functional relations between variables.
This discussion is directly analogous to a widely debated issue in orga-
nizational sociology and organization studies, namely the problem of 
“tight” vs. “loose coupling” of an organization to its relevant environ-
ment (Orton and Weick 1990). A tight coupling in this context refers to a 
situation in which too many variables from the environment appear in the 
instrumental sequences and procedures by which the organization seeks to 
“represent and intervene” (Hacking 1983) in its environment. The tighter 
the coupling between an organization and its environment, the more diffi-
cult it becomes (ceteris paribus) for the organization to achieve a working 
functional simplification. A functional simplification isolates tight cause-
effect couplings between variables in the domain in which it means to 
intervene, by shutting out other lateral couplings that dilute the intended 
control relation. A tight coupling can make achieving such a simplifica-
tion more difficult, by inscribing the inherent contradictions present (to 
varying degrees) in all domains of social practices inside the organization’s 
operative procedures. Rational organizations attempt to organize their 
procedures for intervention in a way that guarantees robust and iterable 
means-ends-relations (Stinchcombe 2001; Kallinikos 2004), and secures 
technical rationality for these interventions. If incompatible interests, insti-
tutional logics, or practical rationalities present within a domain manifest 
themselves as contradictory logics and imperatives within the policies and 
its instruments of an organization, both the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of the organization is threatened (see e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1977), as we 
have seen was the case for the Fed in the 1960s and 1970s.
In contrast, if an organization’s ways of representing and intervening 
are more “loosely coupled” to its environment, it becomes easier for it to 
focus on specific functional relationships (effectively). A loose coupling thus 
means that an organization must deliberately bracket or black-box many 
of the causal and functional interdependencies between relevant variables 
(Orton and Weick 1990, 203). This bracketing allows it, however, to focus 
its attention and available instruments on means-ends-relations that align 
The Janus Face of Inflation Targeting 117
well with its (main, central) objective or mission, and can be seen as a reli-
able and robust technical foundation for pursuing substantive policy goals.
To central banks in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the vocabulary 
and theorems of (Rational) Expectations provided just such an idiom 
which promised a plausible “loose coupling” and functional simplifica-
tion around which a more effective monetary policy could be constructed. 
In particular, it suggested a way of short-circuiting the complex morass 
of entangled instrument- and (direct, intermediate, and ultimate) target-
variables and cross-cutting transmission channels, by shaping economic 
agents’ expectations about inflation directly. The outcome, of course, is 
well-known: by “decoupling” its manipulation of the short-term interest 
rate from the movements of other (lateral) variables, the Fed gained addi-
tional degrees of freedom allowing it to move this “policy rate” as required 
for signaling its (longer-term) policy stance. Due to the higher transparency 
and credibility this permitted, its signals would be transmitted through the 
expectations of economic actors to the price system of the economy, giving 
the Fed more effective control over the evolution of the general price level.
In this way, the Fed demarcated and insulated policy implementa-
tion from the problem of monetary policy strategy and transmission. By 
improving its ability to control a particular (tightly coupled) cause-effect 
coupling, monetary policy thus has vastly increased the “communica-
bility” (Stinchcombe) of its policy intentions:  reactivity between policy 
signals and (presently observable) market expectations have greatly 
improved under the inflation targeting operational paradigm. However, 
these improvements in communicability were achieved by black-boxing 
the wider domain of causal pathways and functional relationships which 
link the (imagined) present futures monetary policy shapes to the future 
present it seeks to influence. This raises the obvious question: (how) is the 
undeniably high reactivity between monetary policy signals and observed 
expectations in the present transmitted to macroeconomic outcomes in the 
future?
In the next section, we therefore will have a closer look at how the 
Fed tried to develop novel means for ensuring the adequacy of the pre-
sent futures it generates and manages through is functional simplification 
and policy implementation, to the future presents as they unfold in time. 
If we do not simply assume that (all) agents’ expectations are a priori 
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commensurable (by virtue of partaking in the same ‘true model’ of the 
economy), what secures the commensurability of agents’ expectations and 
their continuity through time? Can they serve as an unproblematic trans-
mission mechanism if the techniques of implementing monetary policy are 
decoupled from the macroeconomic structures through which it is to be 
transmitted to the future? How does the Fed (try to) observe and ensure 
its signals elicit the intended outcomes in the ‘moving target’ of the future 
present?
3.  What ‘Futures’ Does Future-Oriented 
Monetary Policy Govern – and How?
Against the backdrop of today’s almost common-sensical operative and 
conceptual separation of monetary policy implementation and strategy/
transmission, the notion that central banks would target inflation through 
(market) expectations appears like a straightforward technical implica-
tion and application of the Rational Expectations hypothesis. And yet, 
all insights gained by Science and Technology Studies since it emerged as 
a discipline in its own right in the 1970s caution against such “Whiggish” 
narratives. What in retrospect appears as logical and effective solution to 
a scientific or practical problem, on closer inspection usually involves sig-
nificant experimentation and “heterogeneous engineering” (Law 2012). 
By “drawing things together” (Latour 1990) into novel configurations, 
old tools and instruments can be reconstructed and deployed as part of a 
new functional simplification for governing a particular social domain or 
field. The seemingly natural identity of a scientific idea or technological 
concept with its practical implementation thus is “socio-technical arte-
fact” (Kallinikos 2014) obscuring the contingency of each such translation 
between theory and practice.
For the case at hand, this suggests that we need to have a closer look 
at the processes of abstraction (Stinchcombe 2001), of reconfiguring the 
ways of “representing and intervening” (Hacking 1983) on which central 
banking rests, from which inflation targeting emerged as a possibility. What 
we need to understand is how it became plausible to conceive of shaping 
and governing inflation expectations in abstraction from how monetary 
policy is transmitted (to the future) through concrete causal pathways (in 
 
 
The Janus Face of Inflation Targeting 119
terms of macroeconomic and monetary aggregate variables). How did it 
become possible and plausible for monetary policy to focus (almost) exclu-
sively on the communicability of its policy signals? To explain this rather 
remarkable outcome, we need to track how the Fed “black-boxed” how 
the present futures generated by shaping expectations are transformed into 
the eventual future presents of which targeted future inflation rates are 
a part.
As we have seen, before the Volcker experiment, the Fed as an organi-
zational actor2 faced a fundamental problem of how to improve the trans-
parency and credibility of its policy signals, which was greatly impeded 
by the tight coupling of monetary policy’s representations and mode of 
intervention to its target-domain. This tight coupling meant that interest 
rate signals were not unambiguously read by markets as a clue to the Fed’s 
longer-term policy stance, but primarily considered as affecting short-
run refinancing costs, and as responses to the business cycle. This left the 
Fed with two options: amplify its signals, which however also amplified 
the business cycle rather than tighten the Fed’s control over it – or try to 
“smoothen” and steady the interest rate signals, which entailed a persis-
tent “base drift” and further undercut the Fed’s anti-inflation credibility 
with financial markets.
 2 While it is uncommon in disciplines such as anthropology or history to think of 
organizational forms as coherent actors in their own right, it is common practice 
in other disciplines. In the following, I adopt the (primarily sociological) concep-
tion of organizational agency as a function of the existence of institutionalized 
scripts (consisting of formal knowledges, technologies, and procedures) which 
govern its interaction with an equally rationalized environment (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Meyer and Bromley 2013). Within rationalized social environ-
ments, the existence of such scripts thus is the basis for assigning organizations 
‘actorhood’ (accountability, goal-directedness) in social practice (ibid.), so that 
individual agents (both within and outside the organizations) stand in relation 
of “structural equivalence” (Lorrain and White 1971) to it. My research interest 
lies precisely in the historical evolution of such ‘scripts’ of interaction between 
two highly rationalized organizational forms, the Federal Reserve (and, through 
the global diffusion of this script, eventually shared by central banks worldwide) 
and financial markets. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, I adopt the sociolog-
ical usage of treating organizations as actors in their own right for this limited 
purpose.
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At first, the Fed did not attempt to decouple its interest rate signals 
from monetary aggregates at all  – but instead sought to enhance the 
reactivity between its signals and financial market reactions, by binding 
them to a system of feedback mechanisms. These feedback mechanisms 
would then effectively chart a longer-term nominal anchor in terms of 
monetary aggregates for expectations about inflation, communicating 
the Fed’s intended outcomes as well as its credibility in pursuing them. 
The first attempt at installing such a mechanism became known as non-
borrowed reserve targeting. By observing the divergence of past volumes 
of borrowed reserves from the projection a desired overall money growth 
path, the Fed would target the short- and medium-term growth of non-
borrowed reserves through open-market operations, to restore it to the 
desired growth path of the money supply. Making banks bid for this 
pre-set volume allowed market expectations of the appropriate interest 
rate to ‘show through’ (Krippner 2011, p. 121 ff.). The discount window 
provided a security value and upper bound, avoiding the problems the 
Fed had experienced when implementing too biting constraints. In this 
way, both the Fed and the markets could gauge whether the volumes 
realized matched the Fed’s desired outcomes. Observing the movements 
of the interest rates and the eventual volume of discount borrowing 
allowed both to adjust their expectations on a convergent path (Walter 
and Wansleben 2019, 11).
In this way, the Fed hoped to avoid the lags between the sending of 
its policy signals and the materialization of their effects in the inflation 
rate (the “ultimate target variable”) that previously had created consider-
able noise and information deficits in its attempts to combat inflation (cf. 
Orphanides 2003). Thanks to these feedback loops and the (more) direct 
reactivity relation they generated, financial institutions’ plans (or ‘expecta-
tions’) were not only revealed to the Fed, but it allowed the Fed to signal 
whether it considered these plans well-aligned to its own. The (tight) cou-
pling of this mechanism to (indicators of) monetary aggregates worked, at 
least in theory, as a common benchmark or frame securing the commen-
surability of expectations between the Fed and the markets. In binding 
expectations to a structural background (i.e. the intended trajectory of 
monetary growth), it established a congruence and a substantive linkage 
between present future and future present.
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This system also entailed a number of problems, however. Most fun-
damentally, the stability of this frame (and thus of this entire mode of 
conducting monetary policy, and the link between present and future) 
depended on the stability of the functional relationship between the Fed’s 
interest rate signals, monetary growth rates and inflation. As markets ini-
tially failed to read Fed policy effectively (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986, 
69; Feinman and Poole 1989), the Fed’s attempts to signal a tougher policy 
stance induced precisely the types of overshoots and credit crunches the 
Fed had sought to avoid by this mechanism (Rosenblum and Strongin 
1983; Meltzer 1991, 40). Unfortunately for the Fed, as the financial 
system relied more and more on market-based liquidity, credit expansion 
became increasingly erratic. Overall growth of endogenous credit-money 
accelerated significantly while inflation rates decreased  – as the Fed’s 
tougher stance induced a series of recessions and pushed credit from the 
real economy into financial circulation.3
At the same time as this structural background of functional 
relationships which the Volcker reforms had relied on as a frame for 
governing (through) expectations dissolved, the Fed noticed something 
else:  the reactivity between its policy signals (sent by manipulating the 
short-term interest rate) and market pricing of the assets through which 
the Fed conducted its money market operations (basically, US treasuries) 
persisted and even improved. Pragmatically, over the course of the 1980s, 
the Fed reacted to this novel situation by cutting out the middleman:  it 
simply black-boxed the initial functional relationships that involved mon-
etary aggregates, and focused on honing the direct reactivity relation it had 
observed between its policy signals and what, in time, came to be labeled 
‘market expectations’. However, this functional simplification also meant 
that the structural background which had made expectations legible, and 
which had provided a durable, structural link between the present futures 
manufactured by the Fed and the future presents in which inflation was to 
be shaped, had been suppressed.
 3 On the positive side, though, the credit crunches and extremely high interest 
rates that resulted from this served the Fed as “credibility tests,” which estab-
lished its credentials as being tough on inflation (Goodfriend 2007, 51).
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As a substitute, the Fed proceeded to construct an alternative frame 
in terms of which the impact of its policy interventions on their intended 
target (future inflation) could be made legible. To forge such a link, the Fed 
since this time has relied on what Beckert has called “instruments of imag-
ination,” and what Mallard and Lakoff (2011, 341) more tellingly call 
“techniques of prospection with a constitutive purpose.” Specifically, the 
Fed has developed increasingly sophisticated models for forecasting infla-
tion (Brayton et al. 1997), and learned to use the expectations theory of 
the term structure for making legible the structure of market expectations 
(Johnson 1988; Frankel and Lown 1994). Through these instruments, “ex-
pectations in the economy are... anchored in prevailing cognitive models, 
which function as instruments for the construction of imagined futures” 
(Beckert 2016, 89). More specifically, monetary policy makes ‘constitu-
tive use’ of the future by constructing present futures in terms of which 
expectations can be coordinated in the present. Using imagined futures as 
constitutive frame for coordinating (actions or expectations) in the present 
is doubtlessly future-oriented – but whether this coordination ultimately 
produces future presents commensurate with these projections is an open 
question.
Through these (and other) “techniques of prospection with a consti-
tutive purpose” (Mallard and Lakoff 2011, 341), the Fed thus is able to 
construct a frame (Braun 2015) or ‘present future’ in terms of which it can 
coordinate expectations. The idea, supported theoretically by the Rational 
Expectations Hypothesis, is of course that expectations themselves consti-
tute a bridge between present and future. This means that through expec-
tations, the effects that policy interventions will have in a future present 
to come would become legible in the present. Observing the effects of its 
policy signals in and through these present futures (and assuming policy 
credibility) a central bank would then be able to fine-tune its signals until 
the desired effects manifest themselves.
However, there is considerable play between present future and future 
present built constitutively into this new mode of monetary policy. Indeed, 
in order to avoid problems with information lags that had crippled pre-
vious modes of monetary policy, inflation targeting in practice becomes 
inflation forecast targeting. As Svensson has pointed out, “inflation 
targeting implies inflation forecast targeting: The central bank’s inflation 
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forecast becomes an intermediate target (Svensson 1997, 1113). Targeting 
present inflation forecasts rather than future inflation is expressly moti-
vated by the desire to improve the legibility of policy effects, and thus the 
communicability of policy signals:
“The central bank’s inflation forecast is indeed an ideal intermediate target: it is 
by definition the current variable that is most correlated with the goal, it is more 
controllable than the goal, and it can be made more observable than the goal. 
It can also be made very transparent, and may therefore facilitate the central 
bank’s communication with the public, and the public’s understanding of mone-
tary policy” (Svensson 1997, 1114).
While this procedure has vastly increased the communicability of mon-
etary policy signals, it effectively means that these signals are now tai-
lored to second-order expectations about the effects of those signals (ibid., 
1119). This is a sharp departure from previous practice, where they were 
aimed at the actual manifestation of effects in terms of the trajectory of 
monetary aggregates as concrete, first-order economic variables. The con-
gruence of the present futures governed by the central bank with the future 
present that constitutes its ultimate target is condensed to a single, deriv-
ative indicator – but whether forecast and inflation turn out the same is 
only revealed in retrospect (and the reasons for correspondence, or lack 
thereof, remain external to this metric itself). Due to this time lag, the best 
operative procedure available is to try and achieve convergence of inflation 
target and forecast. Ex post divergence can be explained (and: explained 
away) by forecast and control error, often due to disturbances occurring 
within the control lag. The competence of a central bank then depends 
crucially on the quality of its forecasts. Assuming it uses the best forecasts 
available, its accountability does not extend to the actual correspondence 
of inflation target and outcome, but only to the convergence of target and 
forecast (Svensson 1997, 1120)!
As the goal of the exercise is to shape market expectations, the Fed (and 
other central banks) rely on a second instrument to achieve a “reflexive 
modeling” (Beunza and Stark 2012) of market expectations in relation 
to its policy signals. In order to achieve a (near-)real-time feedback on 
whether policy signals will have the desired effect, it is necessary to make 
legible its impact on (present) expectations, which are the moving forces 
supposed to transmit the policy signal through the economy. For this, the 
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Fed relies on a device that we have already briefly touched upon above – 
namely, the so-called term structure of the interest rate (see Goodfriend 
1998). By focusing on the yield curve of the asset categories through 
which money market operations for implementing monetary policy are 
conducted, central banks thus seek to make the effects of their policy sig-
nals on expectations visible in the present (Blinder 2004, 67; Mann 2018, 
12). These observed (changes in) expectations then provide the parameters 
that can be fed into the forecasting models in order to project the effects 
of policy signals.
To see what might be problematic with this (at first sight, seemingly 
rather sensible) procedure, it is useful to have a closer look at the pre-
vious uses made of this same device for contrast. The term structure had 
been used as a prism for reading the market within the Fed since since the 
1920s. Before its new use for the reflexive modeling of expectations was 
discovered, however, it was used in line with the free-reserves doctrine to 
detect whether idle reserves were producing speculative distortions in the 
structure of asset prices. This would then allow the Fed to sterilize these 
anomalies (by mopping up idle reserves) and restore normalcy to the struc-
ture of expectations (see Mehrling 2011, 47 ff.) – and, in doing so, remove 
local expectation dynamics that could interfere with the global, normal 
transition path from the present to the future.
The new use that has developed since the 1980s constitutes a com-
plete reversal of this causality. The yield curve makes expectations legible 
by relating yields at different points in time into an overall curve, whose 
shape can then be “read” as a summary of market expectations relevant 
for monetary policy (Christophers 2017), but also investment decisions 
(Zaloom 2009):
“Central banks typically estimate both nominal and real yield curves for govern-
ment debt instruments, and are able to extract from the combination and com-
parison of these what is referred to as the ‘inflation term structure’ or ‘implied 
inflation curve’ - in other words, the rates of inflation expected by the market at 
different points in time” (Christophers 2017, 66).
This constitutive use of the term structure of expectations creates a present 
future which can be taken to indicate substantive facts about the future 
present. One can “look first to the interest rate itself as a clue to under-
lying conditions… allowing the interest rate to speak not only about the 
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contemporary financial order but also about the impact that current events 
may have on future economic conditions” (Zaloom 2009, 253). As the 
Fed always sets the short-end of the yield curve directly through its policy 
actions, the form of the curve can be read as an indicator of market ex-
pectations as to future policy measures (Christophers 2017, 65). It thus 
provides the Fed with a ready measure of the credibility and projected 
effects of its policy signals in a however imagined future constituted wholly 
in the present.
While this game of expectations is thus played out entirely within a 
present future constituted and disciplined by instruments of imagination, 
theoretically this current use entails that the term structure represents 
substantive facts about the future present – so that in shaping expecta-
tions as read through the term structure, one is also substantively (re-)
shaping decisions in the future present, re-constituting causal pathways 
into the future. Christopher summarizes this shared belief when he writes 
that “monetary policy fashions the economy through the yield curve; 
the economy reacts back on monetary policy through the yield curve” 
(Christophers 2017, 68). However, this expectations game does not 
actually involve “the economy,” strictly speaking. What happens is that 
markets and the central bank are calibrating their respective present fu-
tures wholly endogenously within a jointly produced frame and “inter-
action order” (cf. MacKenzie 2019). As expectations are coordinated 
around a single metric (expectations of future interest rates as summa-
rized in the yield curve), this game can proceed largely decoupled from the 
specific, substantive content of the future presents projected. As Zaloom 
(2009, 253) points out, “the interest rate as a number disconnected from 
a specific time and place provided a powerful argument… to look first 
to the interest rate itself as a clue to underlying conditions. The number 
could be interpreted without initial reference to the specifics of time and 
place.” And indeed, as markets have come in turn to use the yield curve 
for predicting central banks’ presumed policy stance (Christophers 2017, 
66), there has been a marked tendency for them to simply converge on 
central banks’ published (and intended) projections of inflation, without 
much attention being paid to the specific reasons underlying these 
projections (Braun 2015, 379).
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4.  Conclusion: Why Standardizing the Future  
Increases Uncertainties
Is there reason to worry about the disconnect between the present futures 
of policy implementation, and the future presents that central banks seek 
to influence? From the perspective of most practitioners and academic 
economists, the answer is quite certainly a resounding ‘no:’ not only 
for them, there can be few if any doubts about the downsides of the old 
“tightly coupled” mode of conducting monetary policy. On top of this, the 
record of inflation targeting up until the 2007–2008 financial crisis seems 
rather impressive, although somewhat qualified by its heavy emphasis on 
price stability at the expense of considerable blind spots regarding financial 
stability (e.g. Fligstein, Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 2017). Additionally, 
as in fact every social action and practice is future-oriented (Tavory and 
Eliasoph 2013), it would appear only natural that central banks attempt 
to exploit this fact to direct present actions in a way to bring about desired 
outcomes in the future.
In contrast, the argument advanced here, while suggestive rather than 
conclusive, entails that we should think again, and more carefully, about 
the conditions under which monetary policy as it is still currently prac-
ticed4 is actually in a position to “govern the future” (Braun 2015). As we 
have seen, looser forms of coupling an organization’s operations to their 
target-domain often are a precondition for governing effectively – but they 
also transform what is being governed, and how. The specific arrangement 
of procedures and instruments on which modern inflation targeting rests 
not only decouples its implementation from the lagged structural back-
ground movements of monetary aggregates – but it quite tightly re-couples 
it to endogenously shifting market expectations within a joint and signifi-
cantly “functionally simplified” frame.
With a little ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills 2000), the concerns raised 
by practitioners and observers about (i) whether policy signals are effec-
tively translated to the future present (or remain contained in the present 
 4 The recent period of “unconventional monetary policy” (Bowdler and Radia 
2012; Braun 2018) indeed attempts to restore the conditions for inflation 
targeting rather than constituting (conceptually) a departure from it.
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future), as well as (ii) about the possibility that monetary policy might 
be forced into “following the market” as it seeks to govern through the 
market’s expectations, reveal themselves as quite natural results of such a 
tightly coupled interaction order. As we have seen, inflation targeting is 
centered, above all, upon the strong reactivity relation between numeric 
policy signals and numeric inflation expectations.
In sociological terms, this interaction order thus functions analogously 
to how standards organize social interaction(s) (cf. Brunsson, Rasche, and 
Seidl 2012). It provides a common (numeric) benchmark around which 
the present futures of the central banks and market actors can be coordi-
nated. Just like a standard, it “simplifies in two ways: by making irrele-
vant vast amounts of information, and by imposing on what remains the 
same form—a shared metric” (Espeland and Sauder 2007, 17). Additional 
information matters to coordination through standards only insofar as 
it facilitates convergence within the interaction order. Very much like in 
the case of rankings (a special case of a social standard), performance 
becomes measured exclusively in terms of the common metric:  what 
matters is whether the measures taken in the multiple dimensions this 
metric summarizes achieve the desired outcomes in terms of the ranking – 
not whether these measures achieve any substantively rational (in terms 
of the dimensions) objectives5 (Espeland and Sauder 2007). As Espeland 
and Sauder (2007, 17) point out, “commensuration as a mechanism of 
sense making is notable for how rigorously it simplifies information and 
for how thoroughly it decontextualizes knowledge.” Successful coordi-
nation in terms of the standard or disentangled frame thus can become 
radically decoupled from actual, successful interventions in the wider 
context which the standard allegedly “measures” if and when the stan-
dard becomes the main or only criterion of success (Espeland and Sauder 
2007; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013, 925). Translated to monetary policy, 
this suggests that improving the ability to fine-tune policy signals within 
the interaction order comes at a steep price. Increasing the credibility of 
policy action and thus its efficiency in influencing market expectations, 
 5 What matters is one’s place in relation to the others being ranked – not whether 
there is any substantive improvement in performance in any of the dimensions 
summarized by the ranking.
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reduces the effective control over the substantive shape and content of 
the future present. Indeed, as Stinchcombe (2001) demonstrates, a high(ly 
efficient) communicability of such signals does not entail their substan-
tive effectiveness – which depends on the adequacy and alignment of the 
functional simplification with the wider context(s) in terms of which sub-
stantive effectiveness is defined. Proceduralization thus essentially entails 
that efficiency in terms of the procedure does not (automatically) entail 
effectiveness in terms of achieving the broader, more substantive set of 
(societal) objectives which the procedure was meant to realize: “as long 
as the procedure is followed, the result obtained belongs to a sphere that 
is neither that which is true or just, but the unfalsifiable” (Salais 2016, 
121 ff.). Proceduralization, in this as in other cases, entails that the imme-
diate reactivity and appropriateness to the other’s (re-)action overrides the 
longer-term, “projective” significance of what is being done (see Tavory 
and Eliasoph 2013, 924).
The “intensive discursive exchanges within the epistemic community 
and ‘the economy’ ” (Beckert 2016, 260; see also Holmes 2009, 392) typ-
ical of modern central banking are considered key to its newfound effec-
tiveness not only by central bankers and academic economist, but also 
by many external observers from the social sciences (see Holmes 2014). 
However, as a number of observers and practitioners have pointed out, 
the pragmatic problem of converging on a number ends up consistently 
trumping the question of what this number “means” in terms of wider 
economic structures: in particular during the “Great Moderation,” market 
actors have taken to simply adopting without question the projections 
of future inflation rates, even irrespective of their own private forecasts 
(Braun 2015, 379). Substantive questions about whether this mechanism 
actually covered all relevant dimensions of its ‘target problem’ of infla-
tion, such as in particular the problem of asset inflation that helped push 
the global financial system into utter chaos in 2007–2009, could thus all 
the more easily be rationalized away (see, e.g. Bernanke and Gertler 2001; 
Raines, McLeod, and Leathers 2007), as they were ‘black-boxed’ from the 
technical and operative core of monetary policy.
Discursive interactions thus have become subordinate to the “interac-
tive nature of the ‘signaling process’ between the central bank and those 
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economic actors whose activities propel the transmission” (Braun 2015, 
369), locking central banks into a shadow play with financial markets.
The de-contextualization involved in functional abstraction and 
proceduralization thus loosens the coupling of monetary policy to its 
target-domain, providing it with additional degrees of freedom with regard 
to the ‘accounts of worth’ and social interests inscribed in the structures 
of this domain. At the same time, it constrains central banks’ abilities for 
organizational learning, which requires “an abstraction system … to have 
a trajectory of improvement so that it can track changes in the world, 
increase its scope, and correct its errors” (Stinchcombe 2001, 10).
This line of argument suggests that the blind spots and failures to “see” 
problematic developments within the economic system are, at least in part, 
endemic to modern monetary policy. In contrast to much of recent scholar-
ship (both among economists and observers from other disciplines), which 
has put the problem down to faulty models and groupthink (see Fligstein, 
Stuart Brundage, and Schultz 2017), it suggests that these problems were 
not accidents befalling an otherwise sound and technically flawless mode 
of conducting monetary policy. Rather, the very functional simplification 
and proceduralization on which inflation targeting is built might be in for 
a rethink.
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Social Interaction, Emotion, and Economic 
Forecasting
Abstract: From the perspective of traditional philosophies of science, economic 
forecasts may be perceived as the results of purely rational reasoning, applying 
scientific theories, and econometric modeling. Yet, a sociological view on eco-
nomic forecasting shows that economic forecasts mobilize more than these con-
ventional epistemic resources. First, economic forecasters are embedded in a huge 
interaction network including different kinds of economists, policy makers, and 
representatives of the economy. In the epistemic process of economic forecasting, 
this network actively helps improve the forecasts in (at least) three ways: it helps 
forecasters to produce new imaginaries of the economic future and to discover emer-
ging developments, it increases the forecasts’ social legitimacy, and it produces a 
common view on the economic future that helps to decrease uncertainty in markets. 
Second, economic forecasters mobilize emotions that help them to overcome the 
shortcomings of quantitative data, statistics, and econometric modeling: they develop 
a feeling for numbers – and numbers support them in developing a feeling for the 
economy – they have to control their emotions to keep cool when the economy or 
politics confronts them with increasing dynamics, and they are impassioned about 
their work. Drawing on data gathered in numerous economic forecasting institutes 
in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, I argue that the main resources in producing 
credible and accurate economic forecasts consist of various forms of social interac-
tion and the mobilization of emotion.
Keywords: Economic forecasting, economics, emotion, interaction, social network
1.  Introduction
Modern capitalistic economies are future-oriented. To be successful in 
such an economy, economic actors manufacture knowledge about pos-
sible futures of the economy, and they aim at bringing their plans, strat-
egies, and actions in line with this knowledge. The main challenge in this 
endeavor lies in the future in general (including the economic future) being 
open. Thus, producing scientific knowledge about the future is a radically 
uncertain process. This chapter asks how one specific kind of actor – the 
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scientific economic forecaster  – resolves this challenge and forms legiti-
mate knowledge about the economic future, how this actor builds expec-
tations and produces economic forecasts.
This chapter argues that there are two epistemic resources helping eco-
nomic forecasters bridge the gap between present and future. First, drawing 
on the notion of “epistemic participation” (Reichmann 2013), I  argue 
that interaction between economic actors, economists, and policymakers 
compensates for the radical uncertainty of the future. And second, I intro-
duce emotion as another epistemic resource. Both notions, interaction and 
emotion, underline how the formation of economic expectations – even 
scientific ones – unfolds in a social environment.
Using interaction and emotion when producing economic forecasts 
has some main advantages. First, embedding the production of economic 
forecasts in social networks sharpens economic forecasts in three ways: it 
brings to light novel imaginaries about the economic future, it ensures 
the forecasts’ social legitimacy, and it stabilizes the view of the future. 
Emotion is also being used as an epistemic resource. As data, models, and 
econometrics are not as unequivocal as some may hope, forecasters have 
to “add” something; they supplement them with different kinds of feelings, 
coolness, and passion.
The paper’s arguments are illustrated by using empirical data from 
a case study involving economic forecasters in German-speaking coun-
tries. Their forecasts are a special case of expectations about the economic 
future: the forecasts are made under the constraints of (and in alignment 
with the rules and methods of) scientific work; they are expectations based 
on theoretical approaches and methods from economics.
Two assumptions underlie this chapter. First, we cannot predict the eco-
nomic future. Whereas some elements of the economy count as ergodic 
and are governed by causal mechanisms and stable regularities, other 
parts of the economy are non-ergodic, transmutable, and undetermined 
(Davidson 1996). To date, no scientific discipline has developed a method, 
an apparatus, or an experimental arrangement to access these non-ergodic, 
and hence unknowable, elements of the future. The second assumption is 
that – irrespective of assumption one – economic agents (have to) predict 
the future. This chapter asks how economic forecasters handle the gap 
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between these two assumptions and what they do to compensate and sup-
plement for the implications of the economy’s non-ergodic side. I argue 
that this gap is bridged by interaction and emotion.
1.1.  The Field: Economic Forecasters in 
German-Speaking Countries
Before I present my results, I have to clarify which empirical field I am 
talking about. Nowadays, numerous organizations publish economic 
forecasts:  banks, financial institutes, rating agencies, academic research 
units, etc. The institutes examined in my research share at least four 
common characteristics. First, they earn their money exclusively by 
producing economic expertise (for example, forecasts) and do not use 
forecasts to sell something else. Thus, as an example, banks are excluded 
because they use their forecasts to sell other services or use them as part of 
their customer relationship management. Second, the institutes are called 
“semi-official”:  their work is partly financed by the government, and it 
is institutionalized within the policy-making process (Reichmann 2009). 
Third, they are “independent” in a specific way:  they do not belong to 
any political movement, to a company, an interest group, or a political 
party and have neither commercial nor political aims. And fourth, the 
forecasting institutes’ members consider themselves to be part of aca-
demia:  they have an identity as academic scholars and do things only 
scholars do (for example, giving courses at universities, earning their 
Habilitation, and so on) and their practices stick to the rules of economics’ 
methodology (Evans 1997, 408). However, despite their academic iden-
tity, the vast majority of the forecasting institutes analyzed in this paper 
are organized outside universities.
Another important clarification is that, in German-speaking countries, 
the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stands at the center 
of every economic forecast, and, especially in public discussions, it is what 
economic forecasts are often reduced to. The forecasts under research are 
very different. Most of them contain about one hundred pages. Others 
are part of reports of about 700 pages. Forecasts are summarized in short 
press releases showing the main economic indicators and a few points out-
lining the main messages. The institutes publish economic forecasts two to 
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four times a year, and most of them present their forecasts to the public at 
press conferences.1
The article is divided into two parts. The first one shows how different 
kinds of social interaction enable forecasters to produce knowledge about 
the economic future. In the second one, I  analyze how they mobilize 
emotion as an epistemic resource. It starts by presenting two theoretical 
concepts that help in understanding how actors use interaction to produce 
expectations and assumptions about the future. Then I describe and ana-
lyze the social conditions of the epistemic process in the field of economic 
forecasting and examine the two dimensions of “epistemic participation” 
in detail. In a final section, I take a closer look at the role emotion plays in 
producing economic forecasts.
2.  Interaction and the Future
In his classic definition, Erving Goffman states that “[s] ocial interaction 
can be identified narrowly as that which uniquely transpires in social situ-
ations, that is, environments in which two or more individuals are physi-
cally in one another’s response presence” (Goffman 1983, 2). In the 21st 
century, Goffman’s “body to body starting point” (Goffman 1983, 2) of 
interaction must be reformulated because new technologies enable humans 
to interact and form social situations without being bodily co-present. 
Nevertheless, Goffman’s main point remains useful: interaction is a recip-
rocal social action of two or more individuals. Each interaction partner 
orients his or her actions towards the past, present, or future actions of the 
other partner(s). In Goffman’s understanding, interaction does not have 
to be reduced to oral speech; although speaking is a common element 
 1 The data used in this paper were collected starting in 2004 and (at the time 
of writing this paper) consist of 42 qualitative interviews (30–100 minutes) 
with economists directly engaged in producing the forecasts, which are used 
by national, regional, and local governments, special interest groups, and labor 
unions. In addition, I spent some time at different forecasting institutes taking 
notes and have collected a large volume of documents from all forecasting 
institutes in the German-speaking countries. The interviews were conducted in 
German and translated by the author. Quotes from the interviews are marked 
“Interview,” followed by the number of the interview and a time stamp.
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of interaction, it is not a prerequisite. However, human interaction does 
include a consensus on a common immediate goal of action, a common 
definition and understanding of the situation, and it is embedded in a com-
plex interaction order. It also plays a significant role in the process of pro-
ducing expectations about possible futures.
In the following sections, this paper briefly introduces two theoretical 
concepts – “mental time traveling” and “foretalk” – that stem from dif-
ferent scientific fields but come to a common result. These concepts help 
us to understand how actors produce assumptions about the future by 
emphasizing the underlying interactional element of forecasting.
2.1.  Mental Time Traveling and Foretalk
Thomas Suddendorf’s work on the development of mental capacities in 
young children and animals provides an interesting view on how humans 
interact to imagine the future. Initially, his approach may seem to be 
slightly a-sociological, but, on closer inspection, it acquires an interac-
tional element.
Suddendorf focuses on the question “What makes humans unique?”. In 
his book The Gap (Suddendorf 2013), he identifies eight main differences 
between humans and animals: one of them is that humans are able to do 
what he calls “mental time traveling,” that is, mentally form expectations 
and stories about the future. It is one of the fundamental human capa-
bilities to imagine the future; and no other being in the world is able to 
“recall past episodes and imagine future events, including entirely fictional 
scenarios (such as the invention of an actual time machine)” (Suddendorf 
2013, 89).2
Suddendorf argues that “mental time travel into the past and mental 
time travel into the future are two aspects of the same faculty” (Suddendorf 
2013, 90). He refers to brain imaging studies that “have found that when 
participants are asked to recall past events and imagine future situations, 
the same areas of the brain […] are involved” (Suddendorf 2013, 94). In 
a second step, he argues that the human imaginative capacity, no matter 
 2 The claim that only humans have the preconditions for “mental time traveling” 
is challenged by biologists and animal researchers such as Clayton et al. (2008).
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whether about past or future events, is divided into three systems:  a 
memory for how to do things (procedural memory), a memory for facts 
(semantic memory), and a memory for events (episodic memory).
Episodic memory is not just responsible for us remembering past 
experiences, it also produces and imagines futures (Suddendorf 2013, 91). 
Humans use episodic memory in several ways to produce imaginaries. Of 
course, they use experiences from the past to construct futures. However, 
they are also able to imagine situations they have never experienced before. 
There is almost no limit to possible situations humans can imagine and, 
interestingly enough, humans can even evaluate these fictional situations 
(Suddendorf 2013, 95).
The problem is that episodic memory is well-known to be error-prone, 
no matter whether we use it oriented towards the past or the future 
(Suddendorf 2013, 98 ff.). But – and this is the more sociological aspect 
of Suddendorf’s argument – humans have developed a unique technique 
to increase the quality of their episodic memory and their “mental time 
travels,” namely interaction. As Suddendorf states, “we have radically 
improved our chances of getting it right through a wonderfully effective 
trick: we share our plans and predictions with others [and] we have an 
extraordinarily effective way of exchanging our mind travels through 
language [...].” Suddendorf argues that, by “exchanging our experiences, 
plans, and advice, we have vastly increased our capacity for accurate pre-
diction” (Suddendorf 2013, 99).
Suddendorf is an evolutionary psychologist. As such, he argues that 
both the ability to mind-travel and the ability to share real and fictitious 
stories about the past and the future with others interactionally increase 
the chance of survival. For him, it is an advantage in evolutionary compe-
tition to be able to create mental images for possible futures and thereby 
control the future better (Suddendorf 2013, 101–3).
David Gibson (2011b, 2012) also emphasizes the interactional element 
of imagining the future, and, by asking how this interaction is shaped in 
microsociological and conversational detail, he comes to two conclusions 
that enrich Suddendorf’s argumentation. He refers to interaction about 
possible futures using the term “foretalk” – a combination of forecasting 
and talk (Gibson 2012). He focuses on conversation and decision-making 
under extreme circumstances; in other words, on “talk at the brink.” As 
Social Interaction, Emotion, and Economic Forecasting 145
an example, he analyses the process of decision-making during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962, when President Kennedy and his top advisers had 
to decide within a couple of hours how to react to the Soviet Union’s 
installation of nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba (Gibson 2011a). In 
such extreme situations, people create possible future scenarios together 
by “foretalking” (Gibson 2011a). This group “foretalk” shapes decisions 
through two mechanisms. First, “foretalk” brings to light possible futures 
that might not otherwise have been imagined. Thus, “foretalk” is an epi-
stemic resource that enables us to produce new imaginaries of the future. 
Second, decision-makers anticipate the need to legitimate their decisions 
afterwards. The “foretalk” helps to justify decisions and improves their 
legitimacy.
Both Suddendorf and Gibson emphasize the interactional basis of pro-
ducing knowledge about the future. They show that the production of 
possible futures, for example, about economic development, does not take 
place in a social vacuum – it is not a purely mind-centered skill. It follows 
that concepts such as fantasy, creativity, mathematics, or cognition alone 
are not enough to provide an understanding of how fictional expecta-
tions are constructed. There are social and interactional aspects of pro-
ducing economic futures that go beyond the “reserve stock of knowledge” 
(Schutz 1967, 77) that individual people have accumulated and can access. 
Economic forecasts are based on an interactional process.
3.  Interaction and Economic Forecasting
The ways in which economic forecasters generate a common view by con-
stantly negotiating their views with each other and with external groups – 
how they “foretalk” and how they exchange ideas from their “mental 
time travels” – can be elucidated empirically. Economic forecasters pro-
duce their forecasts using several channels of interaction as part of their 
epistemic process. To avoid misunderstandings, it is important to empha-
size that this paper focuses on forecasting institutes in German-speaking 
countries, which operate quite differently from, for example, forecasting 
institutes in the United States or in the UK. There are national differences 
between forecasting systems and the political uses of the forecasts, espe-
cially between the United States and Europe (Campbell and Pedersen 
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2014). In general, one could say that American forecasters are more com-
mercially oriented whereas European forecasters operate closer to the state 
(Friedman 2009, 2014).
3.1.  Interaction and Econometrics
Textbooks show different ways of producing economic forecasts (e.g., 
Döhrn 2014; Tichy 1994). They differ mainly in terms of whether forecasters 
have more trust in numbers, quantitative data, mathematics, and econo-
metric models or whether they rely more on qualitative data gathered from 
representatives of the economy (Evans 1997; McNees 1990).
In practice, forecasters never rely solely on calculation. Econometric 
models are used merely as a starting point. And these models are increas-
ingly taking a back seat in the process of manufacturing a forecast. In 
fact, econometric models play a fairly minor role in producing economic 
forecasts, and the interviewees for this study agreed with Evans’s claim 
that “macroeconomic models support forecasting activity, but do not 
actually produce forecasts” (Evans 1997, 426).
Instead of econometrics, the more important parts of the forecasting 
process consist of various forms of interaction with various interaction 
partners. Interaction can be either informal or more institutionalized (see 
also Reichmann 2013, 861–67), and the interaction includes both internal 
partners (such as colleagues from the same institute) and external ones 
(such as academic economists and representatives of “the economy”). 
Forecasters have developed numerous formal and informal interaction 
channels and a permanent communication flow enabling them to contact 
those who represent, in one way or another, “the economy.” They build 
formal and informal platforms where they meet these representatives to 
gather data and information and thus jointly produce an image of the 
economic future. Economic forecasters supplement the human capacity 
for “mental time traveling” to imagine possible futures using the “trick” 
(Suddendorf 2013) of sharing their predictions with others to obtain infor-
mation about their respective views of and alternative perspectives on the 
future. Furthermore, forecasters “foretalk” (Gibson 2011b) with selected 
interaction partners in several ways, thereby ensuring that economic 
forecasting does not take place in a social vacuum.
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This paper emphasizes three reasons why forecasters engage in foretalking 
with various representatives of economics and the economy: novelty, legiti-
macy, and stability. First, foretalking enables forecasters to entertain possible 
futures and spot emerging developments they would have missed without the 
foretalk. They use interaction as a resource for novel imaginaries. Second, 
foretalk increases the social legitimacy of the forecasts in the sense that they 
are more likely to be believed. As Holmes (2013) shows, central bankers also 
develop strategies to increase their legitimacy by intensive communication 
with the public and the economy. Holmes’ argument is parallel to the way 
in which forecasters increase the legitimacy of their forecasts by involving 
those who use forecasts in the process of producing them. Users become 
co-producers of forecasts and thereby have less reason to reject them. Third, 
foretalk improves the stability of the view of the future. Foretalk helps to 
bridge the gap between the knowable and unknowable elements of economic 
futures by providing (highly) unstandardized data, including judgments that 
econometric models could not process. This comprehensive interaction pro-
cess may not make economic forecasts more accurate in a numerical sense. 
Nevertheless, it increases the range of knowledge about the intentions and 
assumptions of economic and political actors and therefore builds a more 
reliable basis for creating forecasts.
3.2.  Patterns of External Interaction
The forecasters are embedded in a network that includes several groups 
of interaction partners, such as other economists from universities, 
entrepreneurs, policymakers, and members of the government and the 
state administrations. This interaction network is a constitutive part of the 
epistemic process of economic forecasting. The members of this network 
are transformed from ordinary interaction partners into co-producers of 
the economic forecasts. This network is called here an “epistemic net-
work” because it is an active part of the forecasters’ epistemic processes. 
The forecasters do not just interview, survey, or observe the others in 
the network; they want them to actively co-produce the forecasts. In this 
sense, forecasters give them the opportunity to participate in the epistemic 
process of forecasting  – this is why I  call it “epistemic participation” 
(Reichmann 2013).
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This epistemic network includes a lively interaction between economic 
forecasters from different institutions. The forecasting institutes may follow 
conflicting scientific paradigms and they compete for funding; neverthe-
less, they frequently interact and cooperate, both formally and informally. 
On the more formal side, the institutes’ members attend meetings and 
workshops to discuss economic topics; they talk in advance about their 
views on current economic development; they meet at conferences, political 
hearings, and public discussions. On the more informal side, the forecasters 
know each other from a variety of activities and relationships developed 
outside their formal work, whether from their time together as university 
students or from previous cooperations, co-authoring articles, or spending 
leisure time together. Within the forecaster community, all forecasters 
have individually formed networks of “foretalkers” (Gibson 2011b) and 
personal sources of information. Furthermore, economic forecasters are 
part of a network of scholars working at academic institutions: they hold 
lectures and seminars at universities, they work on common research 
projects, and they co-author papers and books with researchers from uni-
versities. These close ties to universities not only sustain the forecasters’ 
identities as scientists (Evans 1997, 408) but also give them the chance to 
exchange ideas, share new insights and discuss problems, or, in Gibson’s 
(2011b) words, to “foretalk” with academic economists. As Evans (2007, 
691) argues, these “professional networks” are the source of certain types 
of expertise that help overcome the uncertainties of econometric models 
and allow judgment between models.
Exchanging ideas with colleagues is something familiar to most 
scientists. But the forecasters’ epistemic networks include not just other 
economists who have more or less similar knowledge they can bring into 
the “foretalk.” In particular, their external networks include policymakers 
and business representatives. The policymakers with whom they interact – 
for example, members of government units, federal banks, interest groups, 
lobby organizations, labor unions, and social partners, etc. – provide a dif-
ferent stock of knowledge and a fresh view on “the economy.” This part of 
the external interaction network enables forecasters to interact with “the 
economy” to gather information about “the economy’s” plans. In practice, 
forecasters are able to interact only with a limited number of representa-
tives of “the economy.” Still, for the forecasters, their interaction partners 
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are like intermediaries for “the economy.” When forecasters talk about 
their network, they rhetorically reify “the economy” and utter sentences 
such as: “It is really important to speak to the economy.” Of course, they 
are aware that they cannot really speak to “the economy” as such, but 
they interpret their intermediaries as windows on it.
Forecasters describe this part of their network as the most important 
one. Indeed, they say it is more important than econometric models or 
academic conferences. It is a place where those who forecast economic 
developments meet to “foretalk” with those who create economic policy, 
shape the economic policy frame, and actually make economic decisions. 
And it is a place where two quite different groups of “mental time travelers” 
exchange their imagined futures.
The business representatives in their networks (such as CEOs, busi-
nessmen, and industrial lobbyists) consider forecasters to be scientific 
consultants conducting studies to answer their questions. But forecasters 
also give informal advice that helps the business representatives get an idea 
of what others think about recent economic developments and of the ex-
pectations in other economic sectors. Forecasters allow them to leave the 
“fog of uncertainty” (Interview 10, 00:36:45) and get a “bird’s eye view” 
(Gilbert and Jaszi 1944) on the economy. For that purpose, several eco-
nomic forecasting institutes conduct regular panel studies. To obtain infor-
mation about business representatives’ views of the economic future, they 
gather data from certain groups – for example, financial experts, CEOs, 
purchasing managers, port executives, and so on – at specific time intervals 
using standardized questionnaires. This process can also be conceptual-
ized as one part of an ongoing (standardized) interaction between various 
groups of “mental time travelers.”
The integration of this external group works in many ways. During the 
forecasting process, the forecasting institutes first autonomously produce 
a forecast, which is called a “draft forecast” (field term). This first step is 
dominated by applying econometric models, which are analyzed by Evans 
(1997, 1999) in detail. After that, the continuous formal and informal 
discussions with the groups start. With an eye to recent problems on the 
political agenda, forecasters contact specialized policymakers to discuss the 
draft forecast, exchange views regarding ongoing economic developments, 
and explore the perceptions of the members of the policymaker network. 
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This process is generally not standardized, and it is permanently ongoing. 
As one member of a special interest group puts it:
“There are consultations; there are even continuous consultations between us 
and these forecasting institutes. Of course, we do not influence the results; they 
are their own. But within this process of consultation, actually we are not the 
only ones participating in this process:  the collective bargaining partners and 
the most important ministries are involved. In most cases, this is an ongoing 
process, but one that practically comes to a head when the forecasts are actually 
produced. In fact, they ask us to give input, to make them more true. Actually, 
our insights, those of the economic chambers, and those of the Treasury, Federal 
Reserve Bank, perhaps the Ministry of Economic Affairs are extremely highly 
valued by the forecasters. Not to say that the insight of the others is less valued, 
labor unions and so on, but we do indeed have our own data, and we are very 
liberal with this information, and we give it to the forecasters, and when they see 
that our insights are contrary to their forecast or their capital-investment tests, 
they have to think of a response. Well, this is how it works. It is an ongoing pro-
cess that obviously comes together four times a year. But I  think that the real 
value lies in the ongoing consultations. In the official meeting, to be honest, they 
tell us the forecast, and those of us who already know it and were somehow 
consulted during the preparations nod and the others watch, that’s it.” (Interview 
17, 00:27:50)
Before the forecasts are presented to the public, several meetings take 
place. They are formal in comparison to the more informal talks previ-
ously described in this section. At these meetings, the final draft forecasts 
are discussed with a group of policymakers. Normally, those who partici-
pate in these meetings are also involved in the prior talks. A forecast takes 
about two to three weeks to prepare completely, but the interaction and 
the “foretalk” take place continuously. The “mental time travelers” keep 
in permanent contact and ensure that information on economic policy 
plans, on the political climate, and even on shifts in the economic para-
digm are exchanged continuously.
We should not misinterpret this dense epistemic interaction network 
of forecasters and policymakers as purely a question of political power. 
Although the interests of particular groups and organizations may influence 
forecasts in the process of epistemic participation, there is no evidence that 
ideologically suitable forecasts can be simply ordered by policymakers. 
What is more important for the question of how forecasts for the uncer-
tain (and non-ergodic) parts of the economy are made is that it is really 
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the economic forecasters who benefit most from being in a process of epi-
stemic networking with policy makers. The impact of these contacts with 
political actors on the epistemic process of economic forecasting cannot 
be overstated: they bring to light new imaginaries about the future, they 
socially legitimate the forecasts, and they help to base the forecasts on 
better information and more diverse perspectives.
3.3.  Patterns of Internal Interaction
Another part of the epistemic process is much more closed and takes place 
inside the forecasting institutes. This process of internal interaction enables 
different forecasters to harmonize and stabilize their “mental time travels” 
and involves another type of “foretalk.”
There are five discrete internal roles the forecasters have to play.3 Each 
role is responsible for a specific part of what they call “the economy.” One 
examines public finance and the government’s budget; another focuses on 
the labor market; a third looks at fiscal policy and inflation; and a fourth 
studies foreign trade. The fifth role is to integrate the data, the arguments, 
and the information collected by the other economists: the economist con-
cerned is the one responsible for the national economy and is the “single 
person” also found in a group of econometric modelers – the one who 
“integrate[s] the disparate inputs and make[s] judgments about the wide 
range of factors that have impacts on the national and international 
economy” (Evans 2007, 688).
At the outset, each of the five economists playing those roles individu-
ally produces a forecast on their respective topics using both quantitative 
models and additional information gathered during the external interaction 
described in the previous section (Patterns of External Interaction). Each 
of them produces calculations, creates interpretations, and thinks about 
the assumptions underlying these results. In this part of the forecasting 
process, each forecaster tries to “get a sense for what the present devel-
opment may cause at the end of the year” (Interview 23, 00:18:25, my 
 3 The teams in the institutes vary and the description provided here is an “ideal 
type” generalization.
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emphasis). This brings to light that “mental time traveling” is not just a 
cognitive but also an emotional activity.
After the phase of working alone on the first forecasts, a further inter-
action process starts. The five types of internal forecasters meet to dis-
cuss their individual results, exchange data, discuss their aggregate-related 
forecasts, and describe and justify their assumptions. They interact and 
“foretalk” with each other and try to align their forecasts and harmo-
nize their “mental time travels.” Their aim is to create a forecast with no 
internal contradictions. One of the forecasters describes this step in detail:
“And if someone sees ‘Okay, this doesn’t fit here and there’, we just start again 
and take information from the others and go back to our offices and we begin 
to recalculate  – we cut off the corners to make the calculations fit we call it 
Rundrechnung.” (Interview 25, 00:35:39; my emphasis)
The notion of Rundrechnung is an interesting one as it shows the iter-
ative character of the interaction process. It is barely translatable, but a 
literal translation may be “round-calculation” or “circle-calculation.” It 
summarizes the process of several re-adjustments of the common forecast 
until it is a smooth, rounded, and theoretically consistent forecast. This 
notion describes accurately how economic forecasters adjust, re-adjust, 
and re-re-adjust their results until they have created a “rounded image” of 
the future. To them, this notion means that the components of the forecast 
fit together, that the forecast appears theoretically harmonious, and that 
there are no internal contradictions, no inconsistent corners, in the image 
it provides.
For about two to three weeks, the forecasters continue to work indi-
vidually on their special topic. They then meet again with the others to 
produce a new forecast that is in line with the views of the other four 
types of internal forecasts. The process of Rundrechnung is based mainly 
on social interaction and can be understood as a repeated “foretalk” of 
“mental time travelers,” each with a different angle on the economy. 
Every economist is a specialist in one part of “the economy” and 
experiences it from a specific perspective. They come together to produce 
interactionally a common view that could not be produced individually. 
This clearly delineates that the forecasters are not passive observers of 
the economy but active participants in constituting the “knowledge” 
they create.
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4.  Emotion and Scientific Reasoning
After analyzing the huge interaction network economic forecasters are 
embedded in and analyzing how forecasters use this network to produce 
scientific knowledge, I now turn to a second epistemic resource forecasters 
use that is also beyond numbers and econometric models: Emotion.
Typically, science and emotion are juxtaposed. Traditionally, philoso-
phies of science, such as positivism, argues that emotion has no place in sci-
entific research; it contaminates the methodological process of pure science 
and distorts and disturbs the knowledge produced. Traditionally, science 
is characterized as a “cool, logical, dispassionate” (Parker and Hackett 
2014, 549) activity. In contrast, newer methodological approaches argue 
that emotion in general helps to understand and interpret the world (e.g., 
Damasio 1994) – and this is also true for the economic world. These newer 
approaches criticize and challenge the “myth of dispassionate investiga-
tion” (Jaggar 1989, 161).
Within the sociology of science, emotion is an indispensable part of sci-
entific research and scientific knowledge. There, the dichotomy between 
reason and emotion, a sacred cow in the classic philosophy of science, is 
strongly challenged. Yet, though the sociology of science and the sociology 
of emotion grew at the same time, there is no synthesized, homogeneous, 
and integrated theory of emotion in science. So far, any empirical work 
on the topic has analyzed the connections between emotion and scientific 
research in fine detail without joining the dots. In general, that research 
identifies two levels where emotion plays a role in science: First, there is 
emotion on the epistemic level, i.e., emotion is part of the process of pro-
ducing scientific knowledge. And second, emotion plays a role on the insti-
tutional level, i.e., emotion forms and stabilizes institutions, e.g., through 
motivation, solidarity, etc.
Even in classic sociological writings, we find close relations between 
emotion and scientific reasons. The most prominent example was deliv-
ered in the 1930s by Ludwik Fleck (1979 [1935]), who created the famous 
idea of “thought styles”:  cognitive frameworks that form the percep-
tion of the outer world. Thought styles are characterized by common 
research questions, by methodological standards, and by a common way 
to think and speak about both. Scientist with common thought styles build 
 
 
Werner Reichmann154
“thought collectives” (“Denkkollektive”), and these groups are harmo-
nized by common emotions. As Fleck argues, these emotions are not an 
opposite to rational reasoning but a necessary part of the epistemic frame-
work in which every scientist works. Fleck argues that the “concept of 
emotionless thinking is meaningless. There is no emotionless state or pure 
rationality as such” (Fleck 1979 [1935], 49). For him, scientific research 
and scientific perception are deeply social and emotional activities, and 
emotion is an inevitable resource for analyzing the world.
Fleck’s insights were widely neglected until Thomas S.  Kuhn 
re-discovered them in the 1970s. Henceforth, recent sociologies of sci-
ence have frequently analyzed the role of emotion in science and (as Fleck 
did in the 1930s) destroyed the dichotomy between reason and emotion. 
Newer research analyzes, for example, how highly influential scientists 
describe the emotional aspects of their work and find that there are varia-
tions between disciplines (Koppman, Cain, and Leahey 2015) and investi-
gate socio-emotional aspects of scientific collaboration such as trust (e.g., 
Knorr Cetina 1999; Shapin 1994), solidarity (Collins 1998), job satis-
faction (Hermanowicz 2003, 2005), or emotions such as shame, despair, 
pride, and joy in peer review panels, job meetings, and priority disputes 
(e.g., Bloch 2012; Lamont 2009).
4.1.  Emotions in Economic Forecasting
Drawing on this line in sociological research, I turn now to scientific eco-
nomic forecasting again to analyze in empirical detail how forecasters 
mobilize emotions to produce economic forecasts. The interviews show 
that institutional and social aspects of emotion play only a minor role. 
Rather, they suggest that scientific economic forecasters emphasize and 
value emotion as an epistemic resource.
Let me start with an example from an interview with an experienced 
forecaster who worked for more than 40 years at the heart of German eco-
nomic forecasting. I asked him if there were any special skills or abilities 
one needed to be able to forecast the economy.
“Well, you have to have one: you have to have a feeling for numbers, for the 
statistics, what can the statistics achieve, what can’t they achieve? What do we 
have to add to the numbers, so to speak. You also have to have a feeling for 
developments, let’s say, what was the economic development in the past, what 
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can we learn from it for the future? [...] A feeling for courses and developments.” 
(Interview 37, 00:10:10, my emphasis)
Later in the interview, the forecaster clarifies that, with the notion of 
“feeling,” he does not mean an “empathy for numbers,” such as human 
can have for other humans, but rather a feeling for what is possible to 
read from the statistics at hand and “how they are to be interpreted.” 
The necessity for a feeling for numbers is a dominant phenomenon in 
the interviews.4 Another interviewee, a young forecaster, describes it as 
follows:
“[…] even when we do not have to produce a forecast right now to go public, 
we must, of course, have an idea of what impulse something has now for eco-
nomic growth, if the government has now decided this or that. Our colleague 
who focuses on financial policy deals a lot with the numbers we are provided with 
and asks: What was actually done? And makes a summary of the hard data and 
facts, which is, so to speak, the fiscal impulse, and then we start different quan-
titative programs and try to get a sense of (‘Gespür’), so to speak, what can this 
year still cause [...]” (Interview 23, 00:18:25, my emphasis)
These interviews show that, for forecasters, the line between emotion and 
numbers seems to blur. It is an epistemic two-way: It is not only necessary 
to get a feeling for the numbers, to know how far and in what directions 
they can be interpreted, and to identify possible errors. The numbers also 
support the forecasters in developing a feeling for the economy, for pos-
sible economic developments, and for what is going on, what the current 
main problems are in the economy. This is the main two-way epistemic 
resource of emotion in economic forecasting: Feelings for numbers and 
numbers as a support for feeling the economy.
How do forecasters develop such feelings for statistics and quantitative-
informed feelings for economic developments? This question is especially 
important as forecasters learn their business mainly on-the-job and, nor-
mally, economic forecasting is not taught at universities (Reichmann 2010, 
67–73). The interviews show that the ability to develop such emotion is 
based on experience:
 4 Furthermore, there is other work that has found the same phenomenon, e.g., 
Kennedy and Hill (2018).
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“You simply gather experience by joining in. [...] Then, of course, you also start 
reading the literature; you read the literature about models; you may develop a 
model yourself and then begin to forecast. At the beginning, one believes very 
strongly in the results delivered by econometric models. If one realizes after a 
quarter of a year that they were maybe not right, because something happened 
that was perhaps outside the model world, then you start to also bring in your 
experiences  – and that is exactly this experience I’m talking about. That one 
knows how to estimate the results correctly against the background of many 
years of experience and many years of observing cycles.” (Interview 39, 00:03:50, 
my emphasis)
This (very experienced) forecaster creates an opposition between econo-
metric models on the one side and experience on the other. Where the 
models fail, forecasters bring in other epistemic resources, such as emo-
tion, interaction, or experience. This is exactly the point when forecasters 
bridge the gap produced by the radical uncertain conditions that frame 
their epistemic world. The need for experience has another conse-
quence: Normally, young economists who are “rookies” (“Frischlinge,” 
Interview 37, 00:12:00) have to gain experience to develop the right 
emotions. This takes time, and it is difficult and complex for the more 
experienced ones to pass on such knowledge.
There is also a different side to mobilizing emotion as an epistemic 
resource: the control of emotion. One forecaster answers the question of 
the special skill or abilities differently – but he also refers to emotions:
“Yes, you have to, once, you have to stay cool and not let yourself be thrown off 
track by every little movement of any time series. So, for example, you’ve made 
a forecast and now, the stocks have fallen. Now you have to be very calm, let’s 
wait and see […] So you have to keep calm, stay firm.” (Interview 36, 00:15:00, 
my emphasis)
In this case, the forecaster argues that, to make good forecasts, emotions 
have to be controlled. Forecasters are often confronted with high dynamics, 
e.g., in financial markets or politics. Such dynamics should not upset 
forecasters as they have to keep an overview. The control of emotion and 
“keeping calm” is a further epistemic resource for economic forecasters.
The last case I want to present here is an economist who was deeply 
involved in producing the System of National Accounts (SNA) in Germany 
her whole academic life. She told me in great detail about her contributions 
to the SNA in Germany, about the technical developments, and about 
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conflicts she had with others. After this relatively long part of the inter-
view, she summarizes:
“Let me say, it was actually a fulfilling program, I had there.” I: “Yes, fulfilling in 
the sense of time consuming …?” “Yes, but also, I had fun. [laughs] It was really, 
well, with this ‘account of the flow of income’ (‘Einkommenskreislaufrechnung’) 
you can […] calculate balances that are not available elsewhere. And I was so 
crazy that I always found the new results exciting. [laughs] I was really, I really 
had, I really had fun, and I have to add that, I think that’s the way it must be; 
otherwise you can’t do that.” (Interview 35, 00:31:45)
The same forecaster said a little later in the interview:
“[…] for me it was like a crossword puzzle. Every time I was curious about the 
balances, for example. changes in inventories, or profits. Well, let’s say it this 
way: it was really, like I invested some of my blood, sweat, and tears (‘Herzblut’) 
in the whole thing.” (Interview 35, 00:32:30)
This interview shows another dimension of the role of emotion in economic 
forecasting. The work on the data and the development of a “feeling for 
numbers” mentioned above is “fun,” and it needs more than a superficial 
glance at the data. In the above case, the forecaster even highly identifies 
with the statistics she produced. And she had great “fun” when working 
on them.
4.2.  Emotion as Epistemic Resource
To sum up, the empirical data from the interviews show that emotion is 
mobilized in economic forecasting to produce knowledge about the eco-
nomic future and ensure the quality of economic forecasts. Producing sci-
entific knowledge under radical uncertainty requires investing in emotion 
that helps to bridge the gap left by the shortcomings of pure reasoning, of 
economics theory, and of econometric models. Economic forecasts would 
be worse5 without the feeling for numbers, without the quantitative-
informed feeling for the economy, without a coolness towards the man-
ifold dynamics of economy and politics, and without a kind of fun and 
“joy” (“Freude”) when working with statistics and numbers.
 5 For, what it may mean to evaluate a forecast to be “good” or “bad,” see 
Reichmann (2018, 251–87).
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The interviews furthermore show that the traditional juxtaposition 
between emotion and reason is untenable. Economic forecasters argue 
that the future is open and that pure reasoning, statistics, and econometric 
models cannot fill the uncertain world they work in. Forecasters have to 
“add” something, and that is feelings, coolness, and passion. In doing so, 
they make it possible to produce legitimate scientific knowledge under rad-
ically uncertain conditions and ensure the quality of their forecasts.
5.  Conclusion
Producing scientific economic forecasts involves not just econometric 
modeling, economic theories, and huge amounts of statistics – it is also full 
of social interaction and emotion. Forecasts are neither the result of simply 
feeding econometric models nor the result of pure reasoning in social isola-
tion. Rather, economic forecasting is also based on various forms of social 
interaction and on mobilizing emotion. The interactional processes enrich 
and sharpen the expectations and imaginations of the economic future by 
increasing the forecasts’ responsiveness to novelty, their social legitimacy, 
and their stability. Emotion helps to overcome the shortcomings of data, 
statistics, and econometric models.
Social interaction is, first of all, a resource for economic forecasters 
to discover novel imaginaries of the future they would otherwise have 
missed. It also increases the social legitimacy of their forecasts because 
they integrate many political and economic actors into their epistemic pro-
cess. Forecasters are confronted with the problem that the open character 
of the economic future increases the need to legitimate the knowledge they 
produce about the economic future. By including as many relevant actors 
as possible, the interaction process helps to justify forecasts and the polit-
ical decisions deduced from this knowledge, even if they turn out to be 
“wrong” afterwards, and therefore improves the stability of the common 
view to the future. The interaction network provides access to the beliefs 
of many economic and political actors and enables the forecasters to pick 
up emerging trends entertained by actors who have a significant chance 
of performing the future. Economic forecasters mobilize emotion because 
they are aware of the risks and shortcomings of statistics and econometric 
models. They argue that they have to “add” something to the models, 
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something that the models alone cannot fulfill. Based on experiences from 
past forecasting processes, they develop a feeling for numbers, one that 
helps them to analyze, process, and interpret what econometrics cannot 
depict. Both interaction and emotion are inevitable epistemic resources in 
forecasting the non-ergodic part of the economy.
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Olivier Pilmis (Centre de Sociologie des Organisations)
The Dynamics of Expectations: A Sequential 
Perspective on Macroeconomic Forecasting1
Abstract: The chapter claims forecasting is a process during which forecasts are regu-
larly updates and revised. Paying attention to the dynamics of expectations provides 
the opportunity to study changes in expectations formed by professionals, and thus 
give insights into how their labor unfolds. Drawing upon data from a purposely-
built database of forecasts running from September 2006 to September 2017, linear 
and logistic regression models investigate the informational and organizational 
grounds of forecasts revisions. It suggests that similar forecasts form a consistent 
sequence, so that revisions mostly consist in the adjustments of ‘old’ forecasts with 
respect to newly available information. By and large, forecasting means updating 
former forecasts. Besides, data shows the core activity of forecasting organizations, 
and in turn their audience, matter to understand the extent to which they revise their 
forecasts: despite what forecasters claim in interviews, public institutions, among 
which the IMF or the OECD, tend to revise their forecasts on a wider scale than pri-
vate banks or insurance companies. Eventually, scrutinizing how forecasts revisions 
distribute according to the years during which they are produced, stress that during 
major economic crises, such as the Great Recession, forecasters not only revise their 
former expectations downward but also upward. This hints at a Durkheim-inspired 
interpretation of economic crises as re-opening the future.
Keywords: Macroeconomic forecasting, forecasters, sequence, temporalities, or-
ganizations, regression analysis
1.  Introduction
While neoclassical economic theories often assume certainty to be a key fea-
ture of economies, other social sciences, along with some subfields of eco-
nomics, have long emphasized the importance of uncertainty in the ‘real’, or 
 1 The French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the “Investissements 
d’avenir” program within the framework of the LIEPP center of excellence 
(ANR11LABX0091, ANR 11 IDEX000502) funded this research. I am grateful 
to Valerie Arnhold (CSO) and Ulrich Fritsche (Universität Hamburg) for their 
comments on earlier versions of the text.
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‘empirical’, economic world. Uncertainty has been scrutinized from at least 
three points of view, respectively referring to the properties of commodities, 
to individual behaviors, and to the ontology of economies. First, uncertainty 
arises from unobservable qualities of goods and products. (Akerlof 1970) 
famously shows that asymmetric information implies releasing the theoret-
ical hypotheses of perfect information and homogeneity and, empirically, 
may lead to sub-optimality and, eventually, to the collapse of markets. 
Studying a similar topic, namely uncertainty over quality, sociologists 
highlight it renders obsolete price-based choices and requires turning to 
judgment devices (Karpik 2010). Secondly, ‘boundedly rational’ actors 
face difficulties to analyze complex situations and, as a result, to discern 
‘optimal’ solutions – all the more so as the ultimate consequences of action 
remain unknown (Simon 1959). Uncertainty here arises from actors’ lim-
ited computational abilities: Unable to reach the ‘best’ solution, economic 
actors pursue ‘satisficing’, rather than ‘optimizing’, solutions. Thirdly, 
uncertainty is a common property of ‘real world’ situations: The classic 
distinction between risk and uncertainty (Keynes 1921; Knight 1921) sheds 
light on the ontological differences between situations where outcomes can 
be associated to a defined set of probabilities, and those where “there is no 
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We 
simply do not know.” (Keynes 1937, 214) Whether its sources lie in individ-
uals, objects, or the economic system, uncertainty prevents from attaining 
the conditions of general equilibrium and therefore makes it impossible to 
reach optimality, or efficiency (Beckert 2002). In extreme cases, uncertainty 
prohibits any economic activity.
In a functionalist perspective, forecasting aims at providing economic 
actors with depictions of the future to enable action. When uncertainty 
prevails, actors’ decisions are necessarily anchored in ‘fictions’, requiring 
actors a priori to ‘suspend disbelief’ and adopt an ‘as if’ convention. When 
the future has yet to be created and cannot be known at present (Shackle 
1972), economic actors can base their action only on ‘fictional expecta-
tions’  – that is, “pretended representations of a future state of affairs” 
(Beckert 2013, 226). In this perspective, ‘instruments of imagination’, 
among which forecasts, fuel actors’ imagination – they eventually build 
the fictional expectations upon which economic action and coordination 
are based (Beckert 2016).
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2.  Shifting the Focus from Outcomes to Processes
Most literature on macroeconomic forecasting deals with ‘errors’, through 
the comparison between forecasts and actual economic performance. 
Indeed, assessing such errors relies on the ex post comparison between 
‘what actually happened’ and ‘what had been predicted’ – a reality test 
forecasters often discard as ‘irrelevant’ or ‘ineffective’ (Pilmis 2018). 
Following for example the outburst of the Great Recession, explanations of 
collective forecasting failures often focus on econometric models: in partic-
ular, economists advocate for new forms of macroeconometric modelling 
that would include financial cycles (Borio 2014) or reduce the discrepancies 
between the ‘real’ world and the one models create (Taleb 2007; Caballero 
2010). Other hypotheses stress the importance of cognition and beliefs in 
the economic world. While behavioral economists emphasize the impor-
tance of ‘animal spirits’ in finance and in the economy (Akerlof and Shiller 
2009), it is worth noting that the notion applies to forecasters as well as 
to ‘ordinary’ economic actors. Combining Durkheimian and Bourdieusian 
traditions, sociologists underline that economists’ adherence to a domi-
nant vision of the economic order form the common ground upon which 
similar interpretations of economic situations are built (Lebaron 2010).
Although inspiring, these sets of explanations remain partly unsatis-
factory. Approaches dealing with econometric models often share an 
optimistic, and somehow positivist, belief that improved future models 
will be robust enough to provide an accurate approximation of economic 
mechanisms. It claims a continuous ‘march towards progress’ will even-
tually put an end to most forecasting mistakes since they result from mere 
technical problems. Such explanations nonetheless make no reference to 
the social dynamics within the world of forecasting and concentrate on 
the sole statistical puzzles econometricians are bound to solve:  It thus 
offers little insight into the actual process of forecasting. Whether they 
originate from economics or sociology, a major drawback of ‘cognitive’ 
explanations lie in their almost tautological nature. One may provoca-
tively summarize them as follows: ‘Forecasters make the same predictions 
because they agree on how the economy works’, or even ‘They see the 
same things because they think the same way.’ Consensus then becomes 
self-explanatory, resulting from either socio-historical configurations of 
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the profession of economist (Fourcade 2010), the interwoven theoretical, 
political and ideological grounds of economic thinking (Lebaron 2000), 
or herd behavior. Keynes’s famous analysis of a ‘beauty contest’ (Keynes 
1936) shows that herding can be a rational strategy for actors facing 
uncertainty: In a game-theoretical perspective, mutual observation grants 
access to formerly private information, allowing individual behaviors to 
adapt accordingly (Chamley 2003). Obviously, forecasters are no excep-
tion: among them, consensus partly emerges from the observation of peers 
and especially from the observations of organizations that are deemed to 
hold information before earlier than others (major statistical agencies, for 
instance). However, in addition to reducing social processes to the sole 
spreading of information, the analysis of rational herds often leaves the 
issues its production raises in the shade.
Indeed, focusing on ‘errors’ rules out whole areas of the activity and 
process of forecasting. It pays attention to the opus operatum but provides 
little information about the modus operandi. Shedding light on forecasting 
as an on-going process rather than on its outcomes departs from how it is 
usually understood. Moving backstage, sociologists emphasize the collec-
tive dimension of forecasting and stress the importance of social networks 
in its making (Evans 2007) as well as the role of the ‘epistemic partici-
pation’ of the object of forecasters’ inquiry, namely the economy, to the 
very process of forecasting (Reichmann 2013). However, these scholarly 
works usually pay attention to one singular institution (e.g., one academic 
research center, or one central bank) rather than to the broader world 
of forecasting. More, they often implicitly assume forecasts from a same 
institution are widely unrelated, so that forecasting exercises could be 
studied independently from each other.
This chapter advocates for a different approach to the forecasting pro-
cess, which emphasizes forecasting sequences made of successive forecasts 
of a similar object. Indeed, forecasters issue several forecasts for a same 
horizon, a same country, and a same variable – usually at the end of each 
quarter. To take an extreme example, the United States Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) produced more than twenty different projections of 
the US GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth at the end of year 2017 – 
forecasts being produced twice a year (usually in January and August) up 
to ten years in advance. For the same variable, country, and horizon, the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) produced ten different projections – 
at the end of the first and third quarters of year y-5 (here, 2012), and at 
the end of each quarter of both years y-1 (2016) and y (2017). Each new 
forecast revises the preceding one to reflect the incorporation of newly 
available economic information  – the implied changes being sometimes 
dramatic (see Fig. 1 for an illustration).
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Fig. 1: CBO Forecasts of US Real GDP Growth at the End of 2010 and 2017.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook (https://www.cbo.gov/
about/products/major-recurring-reports#1).
Understanding the process and nature of forecasting requires paying 
special attention to forecasts revisions. From a theoretical perspective, 
revisions provide the opportunity to study changes in expectations formed 
by professionals, and give insights into how their labor unfolds. It allows 
investigating the weight of various factors, related either to the properties 
of the forecasted object, to the identity of forecasters, or to the historical 
and institutional environment of forecasting. This approach differs from 
Nordhaus’s (1987) which, through the analogy with financial markets 
(Fama 1970), concentrates on forecasts ‘efficiency’ and makes little, if any, 
difference between revisions and ‘errors’. It obviously conveys normative 
statements as to the process it evaluates and, because it focuses on the 
use of information rather than on its availability, misses a key aspect of 
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forecasting. For example, the deepening of economic crises, which the suc-
cessive releases from statistical bureaus trace, prevents forecast revision 
at date t to be independent from that at date t-1 – contrarily to what the 
efficiency hypothesis implies.
3.  Data and Material
The text exposes early results from ongoing research on macroeconomic 
governance. It draws upon data from a purposely-built database of 
forecasts running from September 2006 to September 2017 (designated 
below as ‘Forecasts Database’). Firstly, data first drawn from ‘Consensus 
Forecasts’,2 a series of monthly economic forecasts from professional 
forecasters. In order to match the quarterly pace of actual forecasting, 
collected forecasts were produced at the end of each quarter (March, 
June, September and December3). In other words, the database contains 
a sample of all ‘Consensus Forecasts’ issues over an eleven-year period 
(size  =  ⅓), and almost exhaustively represents all the end-of-quarter 
releases. Secondly, institutional forecasters usually grant access to their 
publications online, and enable retrieving the IMF World Economic 
Outlook, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Economic Outlook, the European Commission (EC) Economic 
Outlook or the CBO Budget and Economic Outlook.4 The ‘Forecasts data-
base’ eventually gathers more than 32,000 forecasts about two macroeco-
nomic variables (GDP growth and inflation, using ‘consumer prices’ as a 
proxy in the latter case) and eight countries or group of countries (China, 
France, Germany, Greece, Japan, United Kingdom, United States, and the 
Eurozone). Each forecast is further characterized by its point value, its 
date t, its (more or less distant) horizon and, when appropriate, the date 
and magnitude of its revision between t-1 and t. The approach taken here 
 2 Consensus Forecasts™ are publications from Consensus Economics™, a 
London-based organization established in 1989 which claims to be “the world’s 
leading macroeconomic survey firm” (Consensus Economics website, http://
www.consensuseconomics.com, accessed June 25, 2019).
 3 This rule suffered only one exception: “Consensus Forecasts” for December 
2011 were missing and thus replaced by data from January 2012.
 4 Appendix A displays these institutional sources with greater details.
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seemingly reduces forecasting to mere calculation, while forecasts encap-
sulate not only figures but also scenarios. It is assumed here that both 
go together: Figures may on occasion mitigate scenarios, but they mostly 
express them in a numerical fashion.
This chapter more specifically relies on a subset of the ‘Forecasts database’. 
In order to keep a balanced panel, analyses exclude forecasts about China 
and Greece, as well as those whose horizon exceeds 24 months.5 Besides, 
forecast organizations are distinguished according to their main activity:
 – Public institutions gather institutional forecasters, that is organizations 
such as IMF, OECD, EC, and CBO. They produce closely scrutinized 
figures and scenarios about a large number of countries.
 – Major banks are multinational banks whose subsidiaries or national 
offices produce macroeconomic forecasts for various countries. Here, 
such banks comprise Bank of America (including Merrill Lynch), 
Citigroup, Crédit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Morgan 
Stanley, UBS and Unicredit.
 – Other banks designates the remaining organizations of the banking 
sector.
 – Other organizations mostly regroup insurance companies (e.g. AIG, 
Allianz, Axa, Dai-Ichi Life, etc.), business firms with a department 
devoted to macroeconomic forecasting (among others, DuPont, FedEx, 
Ford, General Motors, Total or Toyota), research centers, consulting 
firms, rating companies, etc.
4.  Are Predictions Predictable? Forecasting as a Sequence
At some point, the purpose of forecasting is to compute the economic 
future by means of macroeconomic information, the largest part of which 
is made available to the community of forecasters by data providers and 
statistical bureaus. Scheduled press releases and embargos enable a simul-
taneous access to recent data for all forecasters and economists.
We forecast continuously: We are equipped with databases to feed Excel spreadsheets. 
Supply comes straight from databases once the GDP is out – a quarter an hour later, 
 5 Appendix B provides a more precise account of the panel structure.
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and even sometimes at the same minute. When the US figures are released, they are 
under embargo but they are already delivered to the press and data providers and, 
say, the embargo is lifted at 8 or 8:30 NY time, hop!, all the data becomes public at 
once through press agencies and data providers, and I get them on Excel, like, five 
or ten minutes later… that depends on the data provider, sometimes it needs maybe 
an hour. Then, they pour out… I don’t know, about one country, you get 20 or 30 
entries. I don’t use them all but I do get them that way, automatically.
Chief economist, Insurance company, French citizen, born early 1960’s, 
December 2015.6
In this regard, the world of macroeconomic forecasting displays some 
features of quasi-perfect information. Most, if not all, macroeconomic 
information is available and, what is more, purposely-designed devices 
implement symmetry and ensure economists and forecasters all get the same 
information at the same time. Since forecasting often consists in extrapo-
lating recent data to spot economic trends, the nature, amount and accu-
racy of information is critical to produce forecasts. Even though forecasters 
willingly compare their activity to some kind of ‘art’ which would require 
experience-based intuition to ‘feel’ the coming tendencies and identify key 
figures within a large-sized dataset, forecasts values may decisively depend 
on the information available and their basic properties (e.g. the forecasted 
variable or country). Provided information is symmetric, the date on which 
forecasts are produced and previous forecasts values may serve as proxies 
for new and past information, respectively. Testing such hypotheses requires 
linear regression modelling of the relationship between forecast value at 
time t (vt) and a varying set of independent variables. Tab. 1 displays four 
different models, which share the same ordinary least square (OLS) method. 
Model 1 tests the autoregressive vector vt  =  α0 + α0 vt-1+ ε. For models 
2–4, dummies enable including qualitative independent variables, such as 
forecasters’ activity, country, or forecasted variable. When continuous inde-
pendent variables are significant, using dummies also allows breaking them 
into discreet modalities to scrutinize their impact: Especially, in the case of 
production years, it enables paying attention to specific economic conjunc-
ture, rather than considering ‘time’ as a mere duration.
 6 All excerpts are part of a larger qualitative study, made of 48 in-depth interviews. 
The author has conducted them since June 2014 (average duration: 80 minutes) 
with economists and forecasters from public (either national or international) 
and private (banks, insurance companies, and so on) institutions.
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Tab. 1: Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Valuesa
       Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.036** -0.734*** -0.741***
France n.s. -0.861*** -0.853***
Germany 0.062*** -0.581*** -0.582***
Japan n.s. -1.247*** -1.241***
United Kingdom 0.062*** -0.186*** -0.191***
United States ref ref ref
Variable
GDP ref ref ref
Inflation 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.114***
Distance to horizon 0.023*** -0.004***
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major bank n.s. n.s.
Other bank ref ref
Public institution n.s. n.s.
Other organization n.s. n.s.
C
on
te
xt Year
2006
0.005*** -0.014***
0.573***
2007 0.368***
2008 0.060*
2009 -2.050***
2010 n.s.
2011 0.279***
2012 -0.291***
2013 -0.245***
2014 n.s.
2015 -0.299***
2016 -0.379***
2017 ref
Previous forecast value 0.999*** 0.999***
Intercept -0.073*** -9.438*** 29.594*** 1.938***
Adjusted R-squared 0.8199 0.8217 0.1286 0.3794
df 24,737 24,729 29,701 29,691
N 27,739 24,739 29,713 29,713
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
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Tab. 1 exhibits that simple linear regression modelling, including a small 
set of independent variables, accurately ‘predicts’ macroeconomic fore-
cast values. It is noticeable that the identity of forecasting organizations 
holds little, if any, role: There is no significant difference between banks, 
public institutions and other organizations. In contrast, the very object of 
forecasting matters. Regarding countries, the modelled coefficients unsur-
prisingly reflect the hierarchy of macroeconomic performances, since 
forecasts are often continuation of past trends into the future. Although 
not always in a strictly linear manner, the horizon also weighs in forecasts 
value: All other things kept equal, and the impact of conjuncture being 
controlled for, longer-term forecasts look more optimistic than shorter-
term. In addition, the forecasts are sensitive to their context of production. 
Here again, the outburst of the Great Recession (especially year 2009) is 
easy to spot through spectacularly negative coefficients. These results sup-
port the claim according to which data providers are decisive actors who 
disseminate the economic and statistical raw information necessary to pro-
duce forecasts. All organizations being granted access to the same infor-
mation at the same time, their precise nature, singularities and peculiarities 
make little difference, all the more so as cooperation is a key feature of 
the social world of forecasting (Evans 2007; Reichmann 2013). Shared 
economic information lead to fairly similar forecasts. To say it bluntly, 
forecasters seemingly lack ‘imagination’, and forecasting appears data-
driven to a large extent.
Yet, the most remarkable result lies in the decisive role of previous 
values to understand newly produced ones. Removing the previous fore-
cast from regression models dramatically diminishes their goodness of fit, 
as shown by the R2 dropping from around 0.82 (model 2) to 0.13 (model 
3). The finding stresses that forecasting is a process which continuously 
incorporates new economic information, rather than a series of unre-
lated operations. Forecasting widely draw upon preceding forecasts which 
supposedly embrace recent economic trends. That forecasts are actually 
self-referential is well-known in economics. “Forecasters,” Nordhaus 
(1987, 668)  writes, “tend to have a certain consistency (stickiness?) in 
their views of the world, so that recent forecasts will go far in explaining 
current forecasts.” A broader explanation for such self-reference argues 
previous forecasts encapsulate, not only forecasters’ own views about the 
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future,7 but also the amount of economic information available at time 
t-1 – the persistence of some information from one period to the next then 
contributes to the stickiness of forecasts. Indeed, revising forecasts by def-
inition implies forecasting exercises seldom start from scratch. The impor-
tance of ‘post-mortem’ in the world of macroeconomic forecasting – that 
is, the examination of former forecasts at the beginning of a new  exercise – 
demonstrates the connection between past and present forecasts: Improving 
future forecasts requires spotting flaws in previous similar forecasts. In 
line with the near-perfect correlation between two successive forecasts,8 it 
suggests that similar forecasts form a consistent sequence, so that revisions 
mostly consist in the adjustments of previous forecasts with respect to 
newly available information. By and large, forecasting means nothing but 
updating former forecasts.
5.  What Is Updating? The Informational 
Grounds of Forecasts Revisions
Studying updates sheds light on the practice of forecasting as well as on 
economic expertise as a whole. It especially suggests expertise not only 
originates from a defined set of knowledge and techniques, but is also 
anchored in a particular institutional setting. Indeed, interviewees some-
times relate forecast revisions to the properties of organizations, such as 
their main activity or the contours of their audience.
–   There is a major difference as to how work is done here [a major French 
bank] and in the public sector – especially the OECD but the Planning Bureau 
[Dutch Centraal Planbureau] too. People in those places are very cautious. 
 7 Nordhaus (1987) often regards forecasters’ views in a behavioral perspective, 
drawing from Kahneman and Tversky’s depiction of the ‘anchoring effect’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981). As most works in psychology-inspired behav-
ioral economics, such under-socialized perspective cannot truly account for 
social phenomena (Bergeron et al. 2018): Forecasters’ views are not just their 
own personal views, they are also grounded in the epistemology of economics as 
a whole, in the econometric tools they use, in the categories according to which 
the economy is described…
 8 Autogression Model properties (adjusted R2 = 0.8199, coefficient close to 1 – 
0.999) stress the almost perfect correlation between vt and vt-1. Autocorrelation 
coefficient for vt (all t) is 0.91.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olivier Pilmis174
When the figures are bad… well, next ones may be good. You don’t know if 
this is the beginning of a new trend. You keep very cautious. And if you look 
at the forecasts from the Planning Bureau, there is little difference between 
one forecast and the other. Things are very different here because, here, it is of 
great importance to get the new trends – and yet, like the others, we missed 
the [2008] crisis in the US. […]
 – When you said “you keep very cautious”, what does it mean? Does it mean 
saying, when the figures look bad, that they might not be “that bad” and, 
likewise, when the figures look good, saying they might not be “that good”? 
Or does…
 – [Interrupting] Yes. Well, most importantly, in the case of the OECD and the 
Planning Bureau, because these institutions are carefully watched. And, when 
they release something about the US, they fear it will trigger a stock market 
crash. They want to avoid that. Their goal is not to spread panic. Things are 
different here because we are not a public institution – we don’t bear respon-
sibility to the general public. We assume liability to our investors. And we are 
under an obligation to warn them that things may turn very bad. Well, if that’s 
our impression, we don’t want to spread panic either, but we state “the risks 
are high”. […] And our forecasts can change far more dramatically. Also, one 
reason for this is that our clients do not really look backwards. I do. I take 
a look at what I  had forecasted three months earlier. But our clients don’t 
give a damn: they get our forecasts once every three months and that’s it. At 
the OECD, people are far more cautious when it comes to changing forecasts 
dramatically.
Forecaster, French Bank, Dutch Citizen, born mid-1950s.
In addition to stating a testable hypothesis, the interviewee highlights 
the role of revisions as a means for forecasters to check their own work. 
As a practical category, forecast ‘revisions’ encompass a variety of situ-
ations, so that several proxies may capture their intensity. As numerical 
re-assessments of coming economic evolutions, their measure is three-fold:
 1. A revision can first equate to the deviation, i.e. to the arithmetic differ-
ence, between the values v of forecast at time t and at time t-1: (vt − vt−1)
– called below ‘revisions’ without any further specification.
 2. The squared deviation allows studying the magnitude of revisions, 
whatever their sign:  (vt − vt−1/vt−1)2– designated below as ‘squared 
revisions’.
 3. Finally, squared relative deviation provide a same scale for all revisions 
and, accordingly, enables comparing them despite widely different face 
values:
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(vt − vt−1/vt−1)2. However, as forecasters often anticipate unchanged 
macroeconomic situations (meaning vt-1=0), using such an index poses 
difficulties.
Tabs. 2 and 3 expose the statistical distribution of forecasts revisions and 
squared revisions. Whatever the measure considered, forecasts revisions 
are not normally distributed. First, forecasters more often revise down-
ward than upward (mean and skewness are both negative) and revisions 
concentrate around the mean (kurtosis is over 20 in the case of revisions, 
and over 400 in the case of squared revisions). The distribution of squared 
revisions is especially spectacular, whose median (0.04) almost equals the 
minimal value (0 per definition)  – meaning half revisions belong to the 
interval [−0.2; 0.2]. However, more than one fifth of all revisions exceed 
0.5 point in absolute value, and more than 1 in 15 exceed 1.0 point. The 
implementation of linear regression models deepens the understanding of 
the impact of forecasts properties on the magnitude of their revisions. Tab. 
4 exposes the results of three models, which share the same dependent 
variable (above-defined forecasts revisions). Models 5–7 implement the 
Tab. 2: Distribution of Forecasts Revisions (Overview)a
  Mean Median Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Deviation -0.08 0.00 0.55 -2.29 20.84
Squared Deviation 0.30 0.04 1.38 16.52 410.49
 aSource: Forecasts Database subset
Tab. 3: Forecast Revisions by Type and Magnitudea
Type
Magnitude
Negative Positive Null Total
N % N % N % N %
[0–0.5[ 8,449 34.15 7,454 30.13 3,552 14.36 19,455 78.64
[0.5–1[ 2,065 8.35 1,685 6.81 3,750 15.16
[1-max] 1,100 4.44 434 1.75 1,534 6.20
Total 11,614 46.95 9,573 38.70 3,552 14.36 24,739 100
aSource: Forecasts Database subset. With null revisions excluded, χ2 = 195.11, df = 2, 
p<2.2e-16
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same method (OLS) as models 1–4, and dummies intervene in the same 
way. Tab. 5 displays the results from another series of linear regressions 
(models 8–10), which are identical to models 5–7 except for the dependent 
variable –then, squared revisions.
In a seemingly unsurprising manner, Tabs. 4 and 5 show that the higher 
the value of preceding forecasts, the larger their downward revisions. As 
to the distance to horizon, dummies hint at a partly non-linear effect, 
suggesting lower revisions occur on the shortest- (less than six months) 
and the longest-term (more than 18 months). Both tables stress the impact 
of macroeconomic conjuncture, as years 2008 and 2009 are associated to 
increased downward revisions (Tab. 4) and higher squared revisions (Tab. 
5). Last but not least, all models show a close positive association between 
(either squared or not) revisions at time t and at time t-1. As mentioned 
earlier, this hints at a (more or less) deliberate forecast smoothing, but it 
also relates to the informational structure of forecasting and to the well-
known difficulties to assess economic turns, during which actors encounter 
difficulties to reach diagnosis of either economic crisis or recovery. The 
relationship between forecasts revisions in t and t-1 partly reflects the 
release of new information which gradually confirms what previously 
appeared only as a possibility: In the end, data corroborates forecasters’ 
previous judgments and interpretations.
More interestingly, Tabs. 4 and 5 provide little support to the afore-
mentioned claim that ‘public organizations’ would be especially cautious 
as compared to the private banking system. Considering either revisions 
or squared revisions, public institutions differ from the other forecasting 
organizations by a tendency to revise their own forecasts more strongly. 
Conversely, professional forecasters more easily smooth their forecasts than 
institutional forecasters. This obviously contradicts the above-quoted fore-
caster. On the other hand, it reminds of what other forecasters state: “One 
forecaster told me that he smoothed his forecasts because a more accurate 
but jumpy forecast would ‘drive his customers crazy.’ President Carter 
indeed complained about the ‘inconsistency’ of his economic advisers, 
stating he was tempted to prefer the fortune teller at the Georgia State 
Fair. Another reader commented that too-quick forecast revisions would 
entail reversing decisions about investment plans too often.” (Nordhaus 
1987, 673) Besides supporting this claim, such results raise two additional 
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Tab. 4: Linear Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisionsa
      Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.030*
France n.s.
Germany 0.052***
Japan n.s.
United Kingdom 0.045***
United States ref
Distance to horizon
0 to 5 months
-0.008***
ref
6 to 12 months -0.097***
13 to 18 months -0.079***
19 to 24 months n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s.
Other bank ref
Public institution -0.071***
Other organization n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year
2007
0.005***
-0.044*
2008 -0.326***
2009 -0.242***
2010 n.s.
2011 -0.101***
2012 -0.131***
2013 -0.073***
2014 -0.195***
2015 -0.173***
2016 -0.156***
2017 ref
Previous forecast 
value
Q1
-0.039***
ref
Q2 -0.166***
Q3 -0.272***
Q4 -0.455***
Previous forecast revision 0.178*** 0.217*** 0.183***
Intercept -0.069*** -0.105*** 0.314***
Adjusted R-squared 0.0329 0.0467 0.1524
df 19,659 19,656 16,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05.
Note: The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive 
forecasts, therefore excluding forecasts produced during Year 2006.
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
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Tab. 5: Linear Regression Modelling of Squared Forecast Revisionsa
      Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone -0.131***
France -0.163***
Germany n.s.
Japan 0.156***
United Kingdom n.s.
United States ref
Distance to horizon
0 to 5 months
0.021***
ref
6 to 12 months 0.379***
13 to 18 months 0.085**
19 to 24 months n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s.
Other bank ref
Public institution 0.263***
Other organization n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year 
2007
-0.057***
n.s.
2008 0.720***
2009 1.156***
2010 0.155**
2011 0.370***
2012 0.129**
2013 n.s.
2014 n.s.
2015 n.s.
2016 n.s.
2017 ref
Previous forecast  
value
Q1
-0.085***
ref
Q2 n.s.
Q3 n.s.
Q4 0.181***
Squared previous 
forecast revision 0.139*** 0.101*** 0.061***
Intercept 0.284*** 115.01*** -0.150**
Adjusted R-squared 0.0205 0.0422 0.0926
df 19,659 19,656 19,635
N 19,661 19,661 19,661
Method: OLS. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05.
Note: The inclusion of the previous revision requires taking into account three successive 
forecasts, therefore excluding forecasts produced during Year 2006 (see Appendix A).
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
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issues for future research. It first requires explaining the discrepancies 
between forecasters’ discourses:  How come professionals from a same 
field hold so widely contrasting views of its functioning? Secondly, both 
discourses stress the importance of audiences to understand the process 
of forecasting. It challenges the usually admitted idea that forecasting is 
solely data-driven and instead suggests studying forecasts and forecasters 
in their broader social environment, taking into account the specific needs 
and demands of their own audience.
A further investigation of the institutional setting of forecasting implies 
defining revisions as ‘events’ rather than ‘calculations’. Indeed, each fore-
cast revision holds a singular meaning, with respect to its sign (‘negative’ 
or ‘positive’) and magnitude (‘more or less than 0.5 point’). Some of these 
events are frequent enough to be modelled using logistic regression model-
ling (see Tab. 3). Each model then studies a specific binary dependent var-
iable (coded 0/1): negative revisions (model 11), positive revisions (model 
12), and revisions over 0.5 point (model 13). All models rely on Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and propose the same set of independent 
variables:
 – Country (6 modalities: Eurozone, France, Germany, Japan, UK and US)
 – Forecasted variable (2 modalities: GDP and Inflation)
 – Distance to horizon (4 modalities: 0–5, 6–12, 13–18, and 19–24 months)
 – Forecasting organization (4 modalities:  major banks, other banks, 
public institutions, other organizations)
 – Production year (12 modalities: 2006 to 2017)
 – Forecast value in t-1 (4 modalities: quartiles by year)
Results from Tab. 6 are consistent with the preceding linear regression 
models. They do not support the hypothesis that banks would more 
likely overreact to new information in order to warn their clients of 
coming downturns, while public institutions would be more cautious 
to avoid spreading panic. Indeed, public institutions are more prone to 
revise their forecasts downward (model 11) and to revise them strongly 
(model 13)  than any other organization in the panel. On the contrary, 
major banks lean toward rising successive forecasts, which further 
weakens the claim according to which they would mainly (or at least, 
more than other forecasting institutions) commit to alerting their clients 
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Tab. 6: Logistic Regression Modelling of Forecast Revisions (odds ratio)a
   Model 11
Dependent 
variable: 
Negative 
Revision
Model 12
Dependent 
variable:  
Positive Revision
Model 13
Dependent 
variable:
Abs. Revision 
≥ 0.5 pt
Fo
re
ca
st
s
Country
Eurozone 0.745*** n.s. 0.531***
France 0.851*** 0.722*** 0.544***
Germany 0.599*** 0.902* 0.784***
Japan 0.823*** n.s. n.s.
United 
Kingdom 0.670*** n.s. n.s.
United States ref ref ref
Variable
GDP ref ref ref
Inflation 0.895*** n.s. 0.689***
Distance to 
horizon
0 to 5 months ref ref ref
6 to 12 months 1.115** 1.086* 2.992***
13 to 18 months n.s. 0.847*** 1.276***
19 to 24 months n.s. 0.739** n.s.
Fo
re
ca
st
er
s
Bank
Major Bank n.s. 1.149*** n.s.
Other bank ref ref ref
Public institution 1.523*** 0.778*** 2.051***
Other organization n.s. n.s. n.s.
C
on
te
xt
Year
2006 1.685*** 0.560*** 0.575***
2007 0.619*** 1.394*** 0.606***
2008 1.573*** n.s. 3.945***
2009 n.s. 1.200** 3.367***
2010 0.490*** 2.021*** n.s.
2011 0.781*** 1.791*** 2.696***
2012 ref ref ref
2013 n.s. n.s. 0.601***
2014 1.738*** 0.639*** 0.618***
2015 1.541*** 0.684*** 0.664***
2016 1.351*** 0.720*** 0.730***
2017 0.563*** 1.834*** 0.264***
Previous forecast 
value
Q1 ref ref ref
Q2 1.815*** 0.529*** 0.668***
Q3 2.764*** 0.346*** 0.665***
Q4 5.686*** 0.169*** 1.194***
 
The Dynamics of Expectations 181
Tab. 6: Continued
   Model 11
Dependent 
variable: 
Negative 
Revision
Model 12
Dependent 
variable:  
Positive Revision
Model 13
Dependent 
variable:
Abs. Revision 
≥ 0.5 pt
Intercept 0.272*** 2.449*** 0.214***
Pseudo R2 (MacFadden/ Nagelkerke) 0.0927/ 0.1605 0.0889/ 0.1518
0.1445/ 
0.2156
Confusion Matrix Accuracy 64.84 % 66.70 % 79.87 %
df 24,712 24,712 24,712
N 24,739 24,739 24,739
Method: MLE. Signif. codes : ***: Pr. < 0.001. **: Pr. < 0.01. *: Pr. < 0.05
aSource: Forecasts Database Subset
of coming economic bursts (model 10). Distance to horizon as well as 
production year also bear salient outcomes. First, the distance to horizon 
once again hints at a non-linear temporality in forecasting. Indeed, the 
6 to 12-month-ahead period is the most closely associated with forecast 
revision, whatever its sign, as well as, by far, with stronger revisions. 
Secondly, considering odds ratio, 2008 and 2009 appear as years during 
which forecasts underwent massive revisions. Yet, while many negative 
revisions occurred in 2008, the following year 2009 is associated to pos-
itive revisions. Interestingly, odds ratio for positive revisions are not sig-
nificant in the case of 2008, neither are those for negative revisions in the 
case of 2009. This contrasts with all other years included in the analysis, 
for which a negative association (odds ratio <1) with one particular type 
of revisions (either positive or negative) comes along a positive association 
(odds ratio >1) with the other. That more upward (respectively, down-
ward) forecast revisions than expected occurred in 2009 (respectively, 
2008) does not mean that, the same year, fewer downward (respectively, 
upward) revisions were observed. It reminds that moments of economic 
crises jeopardize former conventions and habits, thus opening the field of 
possibilities: Both deep recession and dazzling recovery seem possible, if 
not likely.
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6.  Discussion and Conclusion
These early results shall be considered with caution. They require con-
solidation through further analyses. In particular, testing hypotheses 
on smaller subsets would allow restraining the analysis to one country 
at a time, excluding some years, and would therefore prevent an over-
determination of statistical results by some singular socio-historical 
configurations. Besides, factor analyses would enable studying forecast 
revisions with a different stance, emphasizing a ‘mutatis mutandis’ rather 
than a ‘ceteris paribus’ perspective to shed light on the congruence and 
correlation between variables.
The inquiry however highlights some features of forecasters’ work. First, 
and unsurprisingly, forecasting is partly data-driven. Indeed, forecasting 
organizations do not hold an instrumental role per se. The homogeneity of 
models and methods amongst organizations demonstrates the similarities 
of economic reasoning across the world of forecasting. Economic infor-
mation is treated in such similar ways that little differences arise between 
forecasting organizations. Forecast revisions trace shifts in expectations 
and representations of the future, whether major or minor. Mostly are they 
nothing but adjustments, which marks the incorporation of new, though 
sometimes significant, data. Studying the kind of data leading to such 
changes is a promising lead for further research, as it may enable investi-
gating the categories of thought according to which forecasters apprehend 
the economy. Forecasters have to identify what is supposedly relevant 
within a plethoric and ever-growing economic information, so that not 
all data can serve as input to econometric models. The analysis of how 
forecasters select information, and how their selection principles evolve 
across time, would give the opportunity to understand macroeconomic 
thinking in the making and, eventually, to study together both the nar-
rative and calculative dimensions of forecasting. How expectations form 
and change arises from the dynamics of forecasting, i.e. from forecasters’ 
working practices, which involve the tasks of selecting, questioning, 
interpreting and incorporating newly available economic information to 
produce forecasts for a certain type of clientele or audience. In the end, 
expecting means revising, adjusting, or updating former expectations.
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Paying attention to forecast revisions also emphasizes a two-fold 
non-linearity of economic forecasting. Obviously, it first reflects the 
non-linearity of economic evolutions, especially in the case of crises and 
downturns, by definition disruptive. The Lehman Brothers collapse and its 
aftermath led to huge forecast revisions, especially during years 2008 and 
2009. Secondly, it has to do with the very nature of forecasting and eco-
nomic expertise. One would expect the distance to horizon to be inversely 
related to the amount of available economic information, so that most 
forecast revisions would happen in the final months, when it accumulates 
and grows more precise. The collected data highlights on the contrary that 
forecasts revisions are more likely to occur earlier during the sequence 
of forecasting. Everything goes as if the main features of macroeconomic 
forecasts were fixed between six and twelve months prior to the horizon, 
leaving just some details to set. In line with an informational perspective 
on forecasting, it raises questions as to the nature of the economic data 
that is made available at that precise moment. Altogether, these results 
remind that the time is not a continuous but a discreet variable, whether in 
the economy or within economics.
A Durkheimian perspective on economic evolutions provides a theoret-
ical frame to understand how fictions about the economy change. “Crises,” 
Durkheim writes in his seminal study on Suicide, “[are] disturbances of the 
collective order” (Durkheim 2005, 206). Such ‘anomy,’ as he names it, has 
widespread consequences.
The [social] scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised. 
Time is required for the public conscience to reclassify men and things. So long as 
the social forces thus freed have not regained equilibrium, their respective values 
are unknown and so all regulation is lacking for a time. The limits are unknown 
between the possible and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legiti-
mate claims and hopes and those which are immoderate. Consequently, there is 
no restraint upon aspirations.
(Durkheim 2005, 213)
That forecast revisions, in times of crisis, go both upwards and down-
wards seem to confirm the Durkheimian intuition of a widening range of 
possibilities. Major crises contribute to (re-)open the future, by making 
possible or thinkable what was not. Fictions, i.e. representations of the 
future, change. Again, switching narratives eventually alter point forecasts. 
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Yet, another complimentary way to draw on such an argument instead 
considers the combination of downward and upward revisions of forecasts 
as a way to keep the future unchanged. Forecasters indeed distribute and, 
through the notion of ‘horizon’, categorize a continuous time into discreet 
temporalities (short-, medium- and long-term), and assign each of them 
to differing explanatory models. Investigating forecasters’ practices shows 
that each horizon involves a singular bundle of concepts and techniques. 
The analysis of economic conditions in the last few months of an on-going 
year makes use of economic data about the first quarter or semester of 
the same year, which have then been made public by national statistical 
agencies. Conversely, economic conjuncture cannot take part in longer-
term forecasting, which provides statements about economic structures – 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), potential 
GDP, or potential growth are then crucial notions. Revising long-term 
forecasts therefore means re-investigating how economic structures trans-
late into numbers. Provided that, in times of crisis, downward revisions 
are more closely associated to short-term forecasts and upward revisions 
to medium-term forecasts, their combination brings about a same depic-
tion of the long-term economic future as prior to the crisis. In this per-
spective, crises are nothing but temporary perturbations. Medium term 
would then matches what Durkheim defines as the “required time to 
regain equilibrium.” In times of crisis, fictions about the economic future, 
for the shaping of which forecasting is instrumental, change dramatically. 
Yet, forecasters still share a same belief:  that, in the long run, equilib-
rium will prevail, and that the potential output will only slightly change. 
In this respect, economic theories would operate less as “instruments of 
imagination” fueling actors’ imagination (Beckert 2016, 245–68) than as 
constraints restraining forecasters’.
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Appendix A: Forecasts Publication Date
Tab. 7: Source: ‘Forecasts Database’
  Consensus 
Forecasts
CBO
Budget and 
Economic 
Outlook
EC
Economic 
Forecasts
IMF
World 
Economic 
Outlook
OECD
Economic 
Outlook
2006 Sept./ Dec. Aug. Nov. Sept. Jun./ Dec.
2007 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Dec.
2008 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Sept. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Jun./ Sept./ 
Dec.
2009 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Mar./ 
Aug.
May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2010 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Sept./ Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov.
2011 Mar./ Jun/ 
Sept.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Nov.
2012 Jan./ Mar./ 
Jun/ Sept./ 
Dec.
Jan./ Aug. May/ Nov. Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
2013 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Feb. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. May/ Sept./ 
Nov.
2014 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Feb./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Sept./ Nov.
2015 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2016 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Aug. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Feb./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Nov.
2017 Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept./ Dec.
Jan./ Jun. Feb./ May/ 
Nov.
Mar./ Sept. Mar./ Jun./ 
Sept.
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Appendix B: Panel Overview
Tab. 8: Source: ‘Forecasts Database’ Subset
 Variable and Modalities N %
     
Country 29,713 100
Eurozone 5,538 18.6
France 4,109 13.8
Germany 5,570 18.7
Japan 4,153 14.0
United Kingdom 4,876 16.4
United States 5,467 18.4
Macroeconomic Aggregate 29,713 100
GDP 14,988 50.4
Inflation 14,725 49.6
Distance to Horizon 29,713 100
0 to 5 months 7,313 24.6
6 to 12 months 10,692 36.0
13 to 18 months 7,621 25.6
19 to 24 months 4,087 13.8
Forecasters 29,713 100
Major Banks 7,137 24.0
Bank of America – Merrill Lynch 1,026 3.5
Citigroup 910 3.1
Crédit Suisse 530 1.8
Goldman Sachs 1,004 3.4
HSBC 899 3.0
JP Morgan 726 2.4
Morgan Stanley 654 2.2
UBS 868 2.9
Unicredit 520 1.8
Other banks 8,997 30.3
Public institutions 2,096 7.1
Congressional Budget Office 92 0.3
European Commission 736 2.5
IMF 550 1.9
OECD 718 2.4
Other organizations 11,483 38.6
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Tab. 8: Continued
 Variable and Modalities N %
Production year 29,713 100
2006 1,342 4.5
2007 2,647 8.9
2008 2,643 8.9
2009 2,514 8.5
2010 2,506 8.4
2011 1,896 6.4
2012 3,107 10.5
2013 2,658 8.9
2014 2,684 9.0
2015 2,779 9.4
2016 2,792 9.4
2017 2,145 7.2
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Never Change a Losing Horse?: On 
Adaptations in German Forecasting after the 
Great Financial Crisis
Abstract: Using data from a recent survey among German professional macroeco-
nomic forecasters, we analyze whether their (self-reported) behavior and attitude 
towards new methods has changed since the Great Recession. We find that several 
forecasters claim to use new methods and some known methods more frequently. 
By contrast, forecasters do not report to have changed their loss function after 
the Great Recession. Although linking forecasters´ attitudes towards a change 
in methods to socio-demographic variables (age, gender, nature of the institu-
tion) did not yield precise estimates, point estimates still suggest that the openness 
towards new methods is negatively related to medium-run forecasting success. 
Forecasters with good medium-term track record seem to be more reluctant to 
change technology whereas forecasters with a bad record seem to be more open 
for new methods.
Keywords: Forecast error evaluation, questionnaire, survey, business cycle forecasts, 
professional forecaster
1.  Introduction
The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) is related to a huge macroeconomic 
forecast error of the Great Recession (GR) which tremendously impaired 
the reputation of the entire macroeconomic forecasting guild and the 
economics profession as a whole (see for example Besly and Hennessy 
2009; Nienhaus 2009; Gaffney 2011; Bezemer 2010). Consequently, 
intensive debates have emerged, e.g. over probate macroeconomic mod-
elling strategies (Aghion et al. 2002 Krugman 2018; Reis 2018; Stiglitz 
(2018); Vines and Wills 2018), as well as about updating stylized business 
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cycle facts following the GFC (see S. Ng and Wright 2013, for a survey). 
On the academic side, there is a ongoing discussion about the necessity 
to re-formulate macroeconomic models after the GFC. Positions range 
from fundamental criticism of the road macroeconomics has taken since 
Sargent and Lucas (1979) (see Romer 2016, for a long and detailed 
discussion) to moderate arguments in Vines and Wills (2018) or Reis 
(2018) to a defence of established models Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Trabandt (2018).1 The idea that the academic discourse is influenced 
by real-world development is supported by Lüdering and Winker 
(2016), who undertook a text-mining analysis of the Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, a German economic scholarly 
journal.
We contribute to these debates by asking, whether the behavior of profes-
sional macroeconomic forecasters and the discussion within the economic 
profession has changed. Furthermore, we investigate what determines 
forecasters’ openness to apply new methods or models. Although at first 
glance it may seem unlikely that there is a direct relationship between a 
single but huge macroeconomic forecast error and the behavior and the 
toolkit used by macroeconomic forecasters, the academic debate draws a 
very distinct picture.
As Friedman (1953) argued, the ultimate goal of economic models 
in a non-normative, i.e. positive way is to deliver “predictions” of phe-
nomena unknown in advance. In this methodological tradition based 
on Hempel (1942), there is often an implicit parallelism between con-
ditional (i.e. model-based with a priori assumptions) forecast and the 
scope of explanation of a certain model/ method/ paradigm. The implicit 
parallelism can be found e.g. in the arguments of Sargent and Lucas 
(1979).
 1 It is beyond the scope of the paper to document all discussions in detail but a 
look at the grants and projects of the “Institute for New Economic Thinking” 
reveals that there is an ongoing and lively debate about the re-formulation of 
traditional macroeconomic modelling after the GFC.
 
 
Never Change a Losing Horse? 193
Box 1 shows some quotes of influential scholars representing different 
viewpoints on the relation between forecast errors and macroeconomic 
thinking.
The research question of this chapter can be stated as follows: Did the 
experience of the GFC and the GR lead to changes in the way macro-
economic forecasts are produced in Germany? This question could be 
addressed in several ways: For example, Frenkel, Lis, and Rülke (2011) 
analyse the expectation formation process of professional forecasters 
before and after the recession. The authors argue that certain important 
relations of applied macroeconomics, namely an Okun relation, a Phillips 
curve, and a Taylor rule have not changed in the eyes of professional 
forecasters. Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof (2019) evaluate forecasting 
Box 1:  Quotes Highlighting the Role of Forecast Errors in the Evolution of 
Macroeconomic Theory
“Thus, the logical structure of a scientific prediction is the same as that of a 
scientific explanation.”
(Hempel 1994 [1942], p. 38)
“Judging econometric models by their forecasting success seems such a nat-
ural procedure that it might occasion surprise to question its usefulness.”
(Hendry 1986)
“[The Keynesian models, UF, JD, GW] predictions were wildly incorrect and 
that the doctrine on which they were fundamentally awed are now simple 
matters of fact, involving no novelties of economic theory.”
(Sargent and Lucas 1979)
“Nonetheless, I remember the 1970s quite well, and stagnation did indeed 
play a role in the rise of New Classical macroeconomics, albeit in a sub-
tler way than the caricature that it proved Keynes wrong, or something like 
that. What mattered instead was the fact that stagnation had in effect been 
predicted by Friedman and Phelps; and the way they made that prediction 
was by taking a step in the direction of microfoundations.”
(Krugman 2014)
“The stagnation of the 1970s, when both inflation and unemployment 
rose, is one of the greatest successes of out-of-sample forecasting by a 
macroeconomist.”
(Mankiw and Reis 2018)
“This analysis shows that a valid model can forecast badly, and a poor 
model can forecast successfully.”
(Castle and Hendry 2011)  
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errors before and after the recession and conclude that forecast accuracy 
has not changed, but that there are some signs of a change in the loss 
functions of the forecasters before and after the financial crisis. Pain et al. 
find that the OECD has learned from the crisis, since they subsequently 
re-thought their forecasting practice and now pay more attention to global 
economic or financial developments. Heilemann and Schnorr-Bäcker 
(2017) provide an in-depth post-mortem analysis of the failed forecasts 
of the downturn after the financial crisis in Germany and remain more 
sceptical on the possibility of learning effects from the GR. Forecasters, 
they argue, had low priors about the probability of a recession in the first 
place. Drechsel and Scheufele (2012) take a different perspective and argue 
that, based on leading indicators, forecasters had little chances to cor-
rectly predict the recession. While the combination of forecasts provides 
same gains of accuracy, the forecasts made in the dawning of the recession 
came pretty close to the best indicator based forecasts. Thus, there are 
only small incentives to look for better indicators. Based on a structural 
model of the U.S. economy, Fair (2012) finds that a large share of forecasts 
uncertainty is based on fluctuations of asset prices, which – as the author 
argues – are almost unpredictable. Therefore, one might see the financial 
crisis and the subsequent recession as a “perfect storm” that teaches not 
much lessons to improve forecasts in the future.
Common to all approaches is an indirect way of assessing the behavior 
of the forecasters:  observed forecasts, forecast errors, and information 
over the available information at the forecasting date are used. The lit-
erature, however, also suggests a more direct way to collect relevant 
information: ask the forecasters. Surveys among professional forecasters 
have frequently been used to analyze a range of problems. To name just 
a few: D. Batchelor and Dua (1990a) and R. Batchelor and Dua (1990b) 
analyze how divergent theories and models are across different forecasting 
institutions and do not find a strong impact of theoretical positions and 
forecasting techniques on the accuracy of the forecasts. In a similar vein, 
Ashiya (2006) cannot find a respective connection based on Japanese 
data. The European Central Bank (2009) and European Central Bank 
(2014) has conducted special surveys among participants of the regular 
“Survey of Professional Forecasters.” The results confirm a great impor-
tance of judgemental forecasting as opposed to model-based forecasting 
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(Fildes and Stekler 2002; Lawrence et al. 2006). Furthermore, they find a 
very low “relative weight” of use of modern macroeconomic (i.e. DSGE) 
models, which contrasts to the high academic reputation of these models 
(see, e.g., Wieland and Wolters 2013). Stark (2013) presents results based 
on a special survey among the U.S. “Survey of Professional Forecasters.” 
According to his results, forecasters use a combination of methods with a 
high degree of judgemental methods.
In the following, we are going to argue that astonishingly little has 
changed after 2008. We find only weak evidence that the (self-reported) 
behavior of forecasters has changed substantially since the GR. While 
some forecasters claim that they use new methods or known methods 
more frequently, they remain silent on the question of what methods are 
meant by these statements. The vast majority of forecasters reject the 
idea of a changed loss function. Linking the attitude of the forecasters 
towards a change in methods or theories to demographic information on 
the forecasters (age, gender, nature of the institution) yield only highly 
imprecise estimates and rests heavily on the assumption of a linear 
probability model.
In the course of the paper, we discuss several hypotheses and lines of 
arguments why this might be the case. Briefly:
 • First, in line with the hypothesis in Mankiw (2006) we can interpret 
macroeconomic forecasting as a task of macroeconomists in their role 
as “engineers.” Colander (2017) takes up this notion and extends the 
methodology of engineering to a general role model for economists. 
This might explain the de-coupling of academic and theory-related 
discussions from the “business-as-usual” in macroeconomic forecasting.
 • Second, the populations in the academic “camp” seem to differ from 
the people living in the forecaster’s “camp” (Geiger, Sauter, and Schmid 
2009). The differences mostly refer to the “schools of thought” people 
sympathize with and to the models people have in mind when asked 
about how the economy functions.
 • Third, in contrast to the period mentioned in Sargent and Lucas (1979), 
macroeconomic forecasters were not (scientifically and personally) 
discredited in the scientific community  – which in turn is related to 
the first argument – but in the general public. This provoked several 
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“self-evaluation” and “re-assessment” studies but no pressing need for 
a fundamental change of methodology.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the survey we have 
conducted among German forecasters. In Section 3 we present the empir-
ical analysis with respect to whether the forecasting process has changed 
since the GFC and the Great Recession. Section 4 will provide arguments 
and evidence for the de-coupling hypothesis and Section 5 concludes.
2.  The Survey
Included in our statistical population are forecasters that meet the fol-
lowing criteria:  The institution the forecaster is working at is based 
in Germany or provides forecasts for the German economy. These 
forecasts are quantitative, i.e. includes at least a prediction for real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth. Additionally, we only included 
macroeconomic forecasters, i.e. we exclude institutions that provide 
forecasts for individual sectors, branches, or regions only from our 
sample. The institution forecasts on a regular basis. We refer to short-
run, i.e. mostly to one-year-ahead or at best two-year-ahead forecasts. 
We include only forecasts that are – at least in part – offered as a public 
good. Some institutions provide a detailed explanation of the forecasts 
only for their customers, but are counted in public rankings with their 
“headline” numbers of, say, real GDP growth. Our net-based search 
strategy, however, will miss firms that provide their forecasts exclusively 
for their customers, although we are not aware of such a firm. In con-
trast to previous studies, our basic statistical unit are not the forecasting 
institutions, but the individual forecasters. We refer to currently active 
forecasters.2
Relying on publicly available information, we have identified 266 per-
sons that match the above-mentioned criteria. We have taken into account 
institutions that have been listed in the ranking of Fricke (2016) and the 
 2 We have asked retired forecasters and individuals, who are still active as 
economist, but not as a forecaster for comments on a pre-test version of the 
questionnaire.
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regular reports of Consensus Forecast ™ (2016). We contacted 266 per-
sons. The overall response rate was 34 % with respect to the invited per-
sons and 67 % with respect to the invited institutions, which is relatively 
high compared to other online surveys.
Tab. 1 provides some demographic information regarding the 
respondents. The median years of experience as a forecaster is of partic-
ular interest for our topic, since it makes clear that roughly half of the 
forecasters have no personal professional experience that includes the 
time span leading to the GR. Therefore, we have specifically asked for the 
changes within the institution, the respondent might be aware of.3
3.  Empirical Results
3.1.  Responses to Pre-Formulated Statements
Fig.  1 shows the responses to a question exploring changes in the 
forecasting process that might have happened following the recent finan-
cial crisis and the subsequent GR. The most popular answer is that the 
Tab. 1: Some Demographic Information. In Brackets: 25 % and 75 % Quartiles. 
Source: Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof (2019)
Median age of respondent 43 49 [37; 52.5]
Median years experience as a forecaster 50 10 [5; 18]
Share of female forecasters 54 13 %
Academic degree or position 56 Diplom: 9
Master of Science: 4
Dr.: 39
Professor: 3 Other: 1
Field of studies 57 Economics: 53
Mathematics: 1 Others: 2
Group of institutions 81 Public institutes: 18
Private institutes: 12
Policy related institutions: 19 
Private firms: 31
 3 Further details, analyses, and a list of all relevant institutions can be found in 
Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof (2019).
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institutions now use “new” methods in forecasting. However, we offered 
the possibility to answer a free-text question to provide more information 
which new models have been used. In this question, it was possible to add 
“additional” methods that have been used for forecasting in the institution 
as answer categories. Hence, the “new” method mentioned should shine 
up in the answers for that question, but this was generally not the case.
While there is some evidence for the use of new methods or the more fre-
quent use of already known methods, or “other” changes in the forecasting 
process, the overall impression is that there have been little changes in 
response to the crisis and the subsequent forecast errors. In particular, 
it seems intuitively reasonable that forecasters might have changed their 
loss function and, e.g., try to forecast more cautiously. We find, however, 
no hint to a changed loss function in either direction. In addition, only a 
minority of the forecasters report that their institution takes dissenting 
opinions more seriously into account than before. Again, this statement 
seems to be plausible in advance.
Interestingly, the statement favoring new methods in forecasting is 
much more popular than the idea of new theoretical models. On the 
one hand, this is in line with previous findings that applied macroeco-
nomic forecasting prefers data-driven to theory-driven forecasts. For 
example, Meyler and Rubene. report – based on the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters conducted by the European Central Bank – that more than 
35 % of the respondents refer to judgemental forecasting in short-term 
forecasting GDP growth. Additional by about 45 % refer to time series 
methods. These numbers contrast sharply to the share of less than 20 % 
who use traditional large-scale econometric models, and markedly less than 
5 % who use DSGE models. Similarly, Stark (2013) documents – albeit on 
a small sample – for data from the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters 
that models with subjective adjustment and “No Model – Experience and 
Intuition” alone dominate mathematical and computer models. On the 
other hand, it might be a hint that more recent theoretical models are not 
very popular among forecasters.
Question: In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis 2008/09 economic 
forecasts have been criticized (again). This leads to the possibility that your 
institution may have changed its forecasting process. Which statements 
apply to your institution?
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3.2.  Answers to Free Questions
Respondents also had the opportunity to answer to a free-text question 
and provide information about what has changed in the forecasting pro-
cess due to the Financial Crisis. One person reported that the respective 
institution has undertaken an overhaul of existing and estimation of new 
econometric models, in particular new indicators, and now uses methods 
of model averaging. Another respondent argues that the institution looks 
more strongly on measures of uncertainty that rely on market prices. 
Moreover, they consider more strongly the balance sheets of both firms 
and households, because they feel that balance sheet adjustments have 
weakened growth after the crisis. Finally, according to the results, this 
institution finds that bubbles have become more important. A third fore-
caster argues that his or her institution takes now into account a broader 
diversity of forecasting methods and models as well as forecast combina-
tion. A forecaster from an institution that relies on own surveys among 
11%
5%
5%
4%
17%
11%
28%
50%
50%
79%
68%
65%
58%
58%
56%
41%
38%
29%
11%
26%
30%
38%
25%
33%
31%
12%
21%
e loss function has changed: we now try harder
to avoid under-estimations
e loss function has changed: we now try harder
to avoid over-estimations
Dissenting opinions in the forecasting group are
regarded more strongly
e forecasting process has become more cautiously: in
the face of strong evidence we change our forecast.
e forecasting process is more ready to take
risks: we accept the risk of a forecast error
more easily in order to avoid missing an
important development
e forecast is based on new or modied
theoretical models
We use already known methods more frequently than
before
Response
Applies
Probably does not apply Does not apply
Does probably apply Applies partly
Percentage
Other changes
We use new methods to forecast
100 50 0 50 100
Fig. 1: Consequences of the Great Recession. 
Source: Own Survey and Calculation
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firms to build their forecasts reports on changes in the methodology of the 
surveys, in particular an adjustment of the own survey technique (shorter 
survey period, faster publication).
More generally, one forecaster observes for his/her institution that they 
are more aware of inaccuracy, think in broader bandwidths. Furthermore, 
they place greater emphasis on risk scenarios. One forecaster also points 
to “systematic forecast error evaluation” as a consequence of the failed 
forecast of the crisis. It also seems that at least some forecasters feel that 
their business has become harder: For example, one person points to his/
her impression that the literature regarding forecasts has become more 
complex and requires in-depth studies.
3.3.  Evidence from Probability Models
Tab. 2 shows the results of some estimations of determinants of the prob-
ability that a certain forecaster responds positively to a certain item. We 
chose the two answers that led to the most pronounced average support 
by the respondents:
 (i) Agreement to the statement “We use new methods to forecast.” 
(“New method” for short),
 (ii) Agreement to the statement “We use already known methods more 
frequently than before.” (“More often”).
All answers are recoded to a numerically scale such as “5” denotes full 
agreement, whereas “1” represents no agreement at all. Thus, we check, 
whether a forecaster is more open to changes after the GFC.
Fig. 2 shows, for example, the agreement to the statement “Our insti-
tution uses new methods” by age group. Forecasters with an age under 
35 are rare and have mostly no opinion on whether their institution has 
changed their forecasting methods. For the two other groups of older 
forecasters, there is no noticeable difference. As possible determinants for 
openness to change, we consider the following variables:
 • Forecaster Age: An older age might make him or her less open for 
models that are more recent. However, increased age might have dif-
ferent implications for the usage of models. Although forecasters might 
be unwilling to learn new methods, at the same time their perceived 
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pressure to conform to standards in the field might decrease with 
experience and confidence. Lamont (2002) argues that forecasters 
become more established with age and therefore have incentives to 
stick to the consensus, since they face an increased risk of a reputa-
tion loss. Therefore, his model predicts that forecasts of older fore-
caster are less accurate. As the relation of age and the probability of 
using new methods might be non-linear, we take also into account 
squared age.
 • Type of Institution:  We include a dummy variable that assumes the 
value 1, if the institution of the forecasters is a private one, 0 otherwise.
 • Gender: We test with the help of a dummy variable, whether the gender 
of the forecaster is important for the probability of interest.
 • Previous Success of the Institution:  We also suspect a possible influ-
ence of the previous success of the forecasting institution. Hence, we 
include the rank of the forecasting institution according to the ranking 
Applies at least partly
35 or younger 35 to 55 55 or older
Don’t know/no assessment possible
Does not apply
0,00%
10,00%
20,00%
30,00%
40,00%
50,00%
60,00%
70,00%
80,00%
90,00%
100,00%
Fig. 2: Agreement to the Use of New Methods by Age Group. 
Source: Own Survey and Calculation
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of Fricke (2016). A lower value indicates a more successful forecasting 
institution.4
 • School of Thought and Openness to Change: Finally, we tried to link 
the attitude towards changes to the theoretical position of a forecaster. 
It has been argued (see, for example, Farrell and Quiggin 2017) that 
certain macroeconomic events had been challenges for different mac-
roeconomic schools of thought, in particular, the Great Recession has 
been a problem for neoclassical models. Therefore, we test for a differ-
ence in the attitude towards new models by using a dummy variable 
that equals 1, if a forecaster leans more to a neoclassical position, 0 
otherwise.5
We estimate the relation both by means of the linear probability model 
(Angrist and Pischke 2008, 101  ff.; Wooldridge 2014, 209  ff.) and by 
means of a multinomial Logit model.6The results do not provide much 
support to the view that forecasters’ attributes may explain a lot of the 
variation of their openness to change. Of course, our sample is very small 
and, consequently, parameters can be estimated very imprecisely only. 
Furthermore, the results of columns 1 and 3 of Tab. 2 heavily depend on 
the assumption of a linear probability model. Note that most results have 
to be interpreted with care due to relatively high standard errors. Given 
these caveats, it is still worthwhile to have a brief look at the results:
 • Forecaster Age: According to the point estimates, the probability to 
use new methods increases with experience, but up to a certain point 
only. After this point in time, forecasters tend to stick with their already 
known methods.
 4 Note that the ranking does not exclusively rely on the accuracy of the growth 
rate forecast. Rather, the ranking takes also into account whether the directional 
change of some central components of final demand (consumption, exports, 
investment) have correctly been anticipated. For details please refer to https://
neuewirtschaftswunder.de/
 5 Details on how this dummy is constructed can again be found in Döpke, Fritsche, 
and Waldhof (2019).
 6 The relative merits of both estimation strategies are discussed in Hippel (2015) 
and Schaffler (2012).
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 • Type of Institution:  Working in a private institution makes it more 
likely to use new methods, but less likely to use known methods more 
frequently.
 • Previous Success of the Institution: The impact of success, i.e. a good 
rank in the ranking of the institutions is the largest single effect and 
also (at least at the 10 % level) statistically significant in all models: the 
lower the rank of the forecaster (which corresponds to a relatively bad 
prediction record) the higher the probability that a respondent reports 
the use of new methods.
Tab. 2: Probability Models for the Likelihood to Change the Forecasting Process. 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Source: Own Survey and Calculation
Constant −3,80 −0,17
(10,04) (6,35)
Age 0,26 0,34 0,13 0,19
(0,40) (0,83) (0,28) (0,78)
Age2 −0,00 −0,00 −0,00 −0,00
(0,00) (0,01) (0,00) (0,01)
Institution 0,96 1,59∗ −0,23 −0,54
(0,59) (0,95) (0,43) (0,92)
Gender −0,28 −0,59 0,43 0,87
(0,72) (1,66) (0,27) (0,69)
Success 0,10∗∗ 0,16∗∗ 0,08∗ 0,16∗
(0,04) (0,06) (0,04) (0,09)
Theory 0,78 1,20 −0,13 −0,33
(0,49) (0,80) (0,49) (0,89)
Cut1 6,41 2,15
(22,14) (16,62)
Cut2 8,93 4,12
(21,85) (16,83)
Cut3 9,52 5,77
(21,77) (16,72)
Cut4 10,34 7,91
(21,56) (16,59)
n 27 27 26 26
R2 0,12 0,09
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 • Neoclassical Positions and Openness to Change: Tending to a neoclas-
sical position goes hand in hand with a higher probability of using new 
methods and a lower probability of using existing methods more often.
4.  Decoupling of Academia and 
Macroeconomic Forecasting Camp
As pointed out above, we consider the possibility that academic work 
on forecasting and practical forecasting processes do not overlap by very 
much. We are, of course, not the first, who see important gaps between 
different spheres of forecasting. For example, Tichy (1976) diagnosed what 
he labelled the “Great Dichotomy” between business cycle theory, business 
cycle empirics, and the receptive policy. He argues that, after the initial large 
interest in business cycle theory related to the Great Depression the 1960s 
and 1970s had been a phase with substantial progress in empirical methods 
and forecasting, but little interest in related theory. Later, he argues in ret-
rospect (Tichy 2013), the picture changed: empirical business cycle research 
stagnated while interest in business cycle theory increased again.
In a similar vein, we have argued that active forecasters and academic 
economists, who work on related questions, are likely a rather distinct 
groups of persons. To give a first impression on how distinct these groups 
are, we compare our underlying sample – the forecasters we have invited to 
our survey – with a subgroup of the Verein für Socialpolitik – the German 
Economic Association.
In particular, we referred to all members that have singled out either 
the JEL code E3:”Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles” or the JEL 
code C53:  “Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods” 
as their main scientific area. The overlap of these two groups was very 
small: while our sample includes 252 persons, and the subgroup of the 
academic association consist of 109 persons, we have found only 5 per-
sons that are members of both groups. More generally, only 25 subjects 
from our invited sample have been found in the database of the members 
of the Verein für Socialpolitik – by about 10 %.
Additional to institutional differences, survey results point to substan-
tially different views on particular economic schools of thought. To illus-
trate this point, we compare the results of Schneider, Frey, and Humbert 
(2007), who surveyed the members of the Verein für Socialpolitik with our 
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more recent survey. As can be seen from Fig. 3, the popularity of certain 
schools of thought is markedly different.
The possible decoupling might also in part reflect a changed importance 
of macroeconomic forecasting for academic research. For example, in 
1962, the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik) devoted 
a complete annual conference to the problem of forecasting Giersch and 
Borchardt (1962). Thus, we wonder whether forecasting plays a sim-
ilar prominent role in broad academic cycles today. Evidence in favor of 
the decoupling hypothesis might be seen in the frequency of papers in 
general-interest scholarly journals that are devoted to study related topics. 
Survey of Fricke (2017)
Socialism/Marxism
Monetarism
Keynsianism
Other schools of thought
None
Neoclassical Economics
Present survey
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Fig. 3: Comparison of Survey Answers of Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof (2019) 
and Fricke (2017).
Notes: For the present survey the bars represent the share of respondents that see a partic-
ular school of thought as either as “extremely important,” “very important,” or “relatively 
important” personally. For the present survey “Neoclassical economics” is “Neoclassical eco-
nomics” and “New classical economics,” “Keynesianism” is the average of “Keynesianism 
(neoclassical synthesis)” and “New Keynesianism,” and “Public choice etc.” represents 
“Theory of political business cycles.” “Socialism/Marxism” has been no answer option in 
the present survey (but possible as a free-text answer). Note that the answer options in to 
Fricke (2017) survey have been exclusively, whereas in Döpke, Fritsche, and Waldhof (2019) 
respondents have been allowed to choose more than one answer. 
Source: own survey and calculation; Fricke (2017)
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Taking the German Economic Review as an example, we searched the 
IDEAS-database for papers that have either “forecast*” or “predict*” or 
“macro*” in title or abstract. From this list we picked the papers arguably 
directly relevant for macroeconomic forecasting. We end up with 7 papers 
out of 461 (by about 1.5 %) listed for that journal in IDEAS recently. In 
a similar vein, we use the ECONBIZ database of the Leibniz Information 
Centre for Economics, Kiel to check for the frequency of papers that deal 
with questions related to macroeconomic forecasting.
Fig.  4 reveals that the scientific interest in business cycle forecasting 
in Germany indeed reacts to the financial crisis, but temporarily only. 
Of course, this is a first illustration of this point only. We therefore test 
this hypothesis with the help of a broader dataset: the texts of the papers 
presented at the annual meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
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Fig. 4: Hits for Search “Konjunkturprognose* + fehler*”1) in ECONBIZ 
Database per Year. 
Source:  Own Calculation Based on https://www.econbiz.de/Search/Results?type=AllFields 
1) “Business cycle forecast*+ error*”, * represents truncation and “+” a logical “and”.
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We furthermore used the abstracts of the papers presented at the open ses-
sions of the annual meetings of the “Verein für Socialpolitik” to fit a Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model on the abstracts (Blei, A.  Y. Ng, 
and Jordan 2003; Blei 2012). Unfortunately, data are only available from 
2010 to 2018 in the ECONBIZ database. LDA stands for “Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation” and describes a mixed membership model where all word with 
certain probabilities belong to topics and all topics with certain probabili-
ties appear in documents. The Dirichlet distribution in fact is the conjugate 
prior to the multinomial distribution in Bayesian statistics. The LDA model – 
despite its analytical non-tractability  – can be estimated using variants of 
Gibbs sampling or variational inference (Heinrich 2005; Hornik and Grün 
2011) conditional the number of topics is fixed a priori. Several criteria were 
proposed in the literature to deal with that issue. We used the criteria pro-
posed by Arun et al. (2010), Cao et al. (2009), Deveaud, SanJuan, and Bellot 
(2014) and Griffiths and Steyvers (2004) to determine the number of topics. 
We fixed the number of topics to 15. Inspection of the most probable words 
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Fig. 5: Share of Forecasting Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
German Economic Association. 
Source: Own Calculation
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Fig. 6: Topic 1: Wordcloud Figure. 
Source: Own Calculation. LDA topic model fitted with number of topics k = 15
in the topics revealed that two of the identified topics are possibly strongly 
related to the GFC and GR: topic 1 (risk, banking, finance) and topic 7 (mac-
roeconomics, monetary policy)
Forecasting papers in a narrow sense are papers that have at least on 
of the following JEL-classifications: E32 (Business Fluctuations, Cycles), 
E37(Forecasting and Simulation:  Models and Applications) or C53 
(Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods). Forecasting 
papers in a broader sense also include papers with the JEL-classifications 
E30 (Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles, General), E31 (Price Level, 
Inflation, Deflation).
The distribution of estimated topics over time reveals a very stable 
structure but no obvious trend for the GFC- or GR-related topics 1 and 7 
to become more prominent (see Fig. 8).
This data provides insights into the German discourse. Additionally, we 
searched international data, or data for the Anglosaxon research commu-
nity. We searched the American Economic Review articles indexed in the 
JSTOR database and again focused on papers that have either “forecast*” 
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Fig. 7: Topic 7: Wordcloud Figure. 
Source: Own Calculation. LDA topic model fitted with number of topics k = 15
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Fig. 8: Abstracts of Papers Presented at Annual Meetings of “Verein für 
Socialpolitik”: Distribution of Estimated Topics over Time 2011 to 2018
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or “predict*” or “macro*” in title or abstract. We applied the same search 
string to the full IDEAS database (data are scaled relative to all IDEAS-
indexed economic papers per year).
The figures reveal that in the academic discourse outside Germany, 
the topics “macroeconomics” and “forecasts” seem to be on the rise. 
This is in contrast to the analysis for Germany, where the interest rose 
only shortly after the GFC/ GR and points to another (second) decoup-
ling problem:  the particularity or oddity of the German economic dis-
course with respect to macroeconomic issues. Beck and Kotz (2017) and 
Winkler (2018) recently analyzed the discourse. Given that there are dif-
ferent perspectives on the issue that the German economic policy debate 
with respect to monetary policy and fiscal austerity is an “oddity,” two 
observations remain: first, there is a very strong argumentation in favor 
of general principles instead of a pragmatic use of policy instruments. 
The latter is popular among a certain subgroup of German economists. 
Second, Germany as a net creditor country was never strongly under pres-
sure to adjust or use harsh austerity.
To sum up: On an international level we can observe that the importance 
of research devoted to macroeconomics and forecasting issues increased over 
the last couple of years with the German academic scene as an exception.
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Fig. 9: AER and IDEAS Key Word Search Results. 
Source: Own Calculation. Count of JSTOR-indexed AER papers that have either “forecast*” 
or “predict*” or “macro*” in title or abstract. The same search was done for the full IDEAS 
database (data are scaled relative to all IDEAS-indexed papers per year).
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Glandon et al. (2018) also report that macroeconomics has responded 
to the crisis at least to a certain extend. While, on the one hand, they find 
that the share of theoretical papers has increased at the expense of empir-
ically orientated contributions, the role of financial intermediation in the 
papers, on the other hand, has increased (again) after the crisis. Still, the 
gap to the forecasting practitioners has probably increased, since the share 
of general equilibrium models has become much larger in their sample, 
while partial equilibrium models, which are more relevant for forecasting, 
have become less important over time.
5.  Conclusion
Relying on data from a recent survey among professional macro-
economic forecasters in Germany, we conclude that changes in the 
forecasting process are at best modest. While forecasters claim to use 
new methods and some known methods more frequently, they remain 
unspecific which methods they mean by these statements. Forecasters 
do not report to have changed their loss function after the recession. 
Linking the attitude of forecasters towards a change in methods or the-
ories to demographic information on the forecasters (age, gender, nature 
of the institution) yield only highly imprecise estimates. A longer-term 
bad forecasting record, which exceeds the single event of the GFC, 
is the single most influential factor explaining the openness for new 
methods. However, we can infer some tendencies from the open ques-
tion part:  Some forecasters seem to combine forecasts from different 
methods more often, and re-evaluated their existing toolbox after the 
GR. Furthermore, the sources of forecast errors are evaluated more 
often in some cases and measuring macroeconomic uncertainty seems to 
be more important for the forecast.
This is in contrast to the debate on macroeconomics on the interna-
tional level but not necessarily on the German level. The astonishingly little 
reaction of the forecasting community on the macroeconomic turbulences 
after 2008 in our interpretation might be due to a mixture of facts:
Macroeconomic forecasting is to a very large extent “engineering” 
and only loosely related to theoretical debates about the “right” theory 
or school of thought. Consider, for example, the German “oddity” of 
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neglecting the need for active macroeconomic policy or opposing the 
idea of active policy at all, which is common to a relevant subgroup 
of German economists and parts of the public discourse. This point 
of view might have decreased the pressure on forecasters to use more 
modern theoretical models (at least for the German sub-population we 
analyzed).
These conclusions are obviously based on a small database only, which 
future research will have to extend. One possible way to do so might 
be seen in an analysis of citations. Based on such an analysis Fourcade, 
Ollion, and Algan (2015) show that economics shows a larger degree 
of insularity as compared to other parts of the social sciences. If our 
decoupling hypothesis is true, a similar picture should be visible for the 
forecasters camp. Another way to gain further insights might be a closer 
look at personal relations and biographies of forecasters. As they are aca-
demically trained, it would be interesting to look at their origins in this 
respect and to check whether they come from certain universities and/or 
other institutions. This link may well establish social networks (Grimm, 
Kapeller, and Pühringer 2017), which in turn may explain how certain 
positions evolve during time.
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